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devoted to

Democracy and World Affairs

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Sirocco (*Drawing*) . . . . . Robert Hale 100

Editorials

Offensive and Counteroffensive 101

Cover for Fascists 102

Observations on AMGOT 103

America Tomorrow . . . . . Henry A. Wallace 105

The Liberated Nations and the New Order . . . . Claude D. Pepper 110

Committee of Liberation, Trustee of French Interests . Jacques Maritain 114

Questions without Answers . . . . . Janet Flanner 117

United States of India . . . . . Lord Lytton 119

India in the Fourth Year of the War . . . . . Henry Stanley 122

Progress of the Struggle . . . . . Norman Angell 126

World Scene in Washington . . . . . Ernest K. Lindley 129

Special Correspondence: Results of the Labor Party Conference . John Clyde 132

Round Table No. 17: The Future of Italy 134

A Soviet Criticism of Air Power—and a Reply

Modern Aerial Warfare . . . . . Nikolai Lazarev 154

Commentary . . . . . Francis Vivian Drake 158

Death of the Dictator . . . . . Don Gordon 160

Reconstruction in France: Educational Equality . . . Henri Laugier 161

The Frontiers of the Future . . . . . Hans Ernest Fried 166

Brazil: Laboratory of Civilization . . . . . Afrânio Coutinho 172

Plans for the Future 175

Underground Reporter: Powder Magazine of the Balkans . Pierre Dupont 180

Books:

The Guiding Principle . . . . . Louis Dolivet 184

Religion and Our Times . . . . . James Luther Adams 185

Invitation to Maturity . . . . . Johan J. Smertenko 186

Recommended for Study . . . . . D. C. B. 188

Chinese Philosophy . . . . . C. F. Chow 188

Drawings by Theodore Brenson, Stan Fraydas, Ivan Opffer, Tom

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Sirocco

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EDITORIALS

Offensive and Counteroffensive

THERE are three offensives at the present moment. Their final details are now being prepared. The first is the military offensive of the United Nations against the Axis powers. The second is the offensive of the subjugated peoples and of their heroic Underground movements, waiting for the signal to unite their forces with the Allied armies. The third is the offensive of the reactionaries and fascists of all types against the democratic peace that has been solemnly promised by the United Nations to the peoples of the world.

For every step the United Nations take toward a military victory, the reactionary front is taking ten steps toward the destruction of the very ideals and principles for which this war is allegedly being fought. The reactionary offensive is not an open attack made by men standing courageously before the people of all lands and telling them: "Fools, there is no such thing as permanent peace or world organization. We don't want to do better after this war than we did before. Wake up and put aside your dreams. You are fighting the same old war, and we are only sorry for you if you dream of peaceful relations among equal peoples, of better living conditions, and of greater opportunities for all mankind."

No, it is a hidden offensive wrapped securely in the national flag of each of the fighting countries. Its generals have a guileless smile on their faces and are talking about "winning the war first." Those who have helped the Axis morally and materially to prepare this war, who have flattered the tyrants, who have sold them war materials and inventions, who have constantly belittled the danger of fascism, are now giving lessons to the liberal and progressive forces on the necessity of concentrating everything on winning the war. These lessons are completely and obviously unnecessary, since to the liberals the war against fascism is a question of life and death, while to the others—well, look up the members of the puppet authorities in the various social registers.

The generals of the third offensive are also talking about the necessity of "national unity." There again the admonition is impudently superfluous, because for a decade the liberal forces have called for national unity against aggression and against fascism. Who broke that unity? Who went to Berlin and Nuremberg, to Rome and to Vatican City, agitating about the need for the forces of "order" to unite against Russia and Spain? Who asked Czechoslovakia to make concessions? And who let China down? Not the liberals. And when the war broke out, who defended the vested interests and fought the principle of equality in sacrifices? Not the progressives. And who is now trying to divide the United Nations, whispering about the dangers of Russian expansion, about the need of having reactionary governments imposed upon bleeding Europe? Not the democratic forces.

The third offensive does not stop at the borders of truth. It is slowly but constantly exploiting anti-American feeling in Europe, anti-European feeling in America, and the feeling against both in Asia. At present, this offensive consists of the written and spoken word only, but later on it will be

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expanded to financial crises, unemployment, and hunger. Finally, it will end up in machine guns against the people at home, in sharp diplomatic notes and war abroad.

The time has come for the sound and progressive forces of the whole world to prepare and to organize their own offensive. The moderates and the nice and agreeable "play-along-and-have-patience" advocates must recognize by now that a fundamental revision of their methods and of their program is indispensable. It is the eleventh hour for meeting the challenge of the reactionary offensive, not merely with redundant criticism but with a positive program of action to make this war truly a people's war.

Never have the chances for the triumph of a democratic peace been greater than at the present moment. The sense of unity and solidarity among the forces of freedom—be they on the battlefields or behind the barbed wires of the enemy, be they in the production, food, or educational fronts of the Allies—is solid ground on which to work. In offering the peoples of the world a program from which the slightest concessions to fascism—secret maneuvers against this or that Ally, anti-Semitism and racial discrimination under whatever form, acceptance of irrational economic theories, and power politics and imperialism—are excluded, the liberal forces will put an end to distrust and fear. In including in that program the effective organization of the United Nations *now*—collective security and obligatory arbitration of international disputes, the Four Freedoms everywhere, an international economic policy raising the standard of living of all peoples—the liberal forces will gather behind them tremendous strength to help them win both the war and the peace.

But to do that, they must unite and put aside their personal quarrels and ambitions and must be on guard against the ersatz-fascisms of the Von Keitels, Badoglios, Von Eckhardts, and other Darlans. They must start the fourth offensive.

Cover for Fascists

NOTHING more clearly indicates the need for constant watchfulness on the part of the democratic forces than the recent crisis of the Polish Government-in-exile and the manner in which it was resolved. Upon the death of General Wladislaw Sikorski, the Polish President appointed General Kazimierz Sosnkowski Commander in Chief of the Polish Army. The appointment evoked immediate and unanimous opposition from the liberal elements among the Poles, and it was followed by a reshuffling of the Cabinet which seemed to indicate a victory for these liberal forces. General Sosnkowski resigned his post as Deputy President and agreed to take no part in politics. The Polish Cabinet increased the representation of the Leftist parties by two members, and Tadeusz Romer, former Ambassador to Moscow, became Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Yet the fact remains that this was anything but a victory for the Left. General Sosnkowski is confessedly pro-fascist. His history, from the creation of the Polish Republic at the end of the last war, has been one of reaction, chauvinism, and anti-Semitism. As Minister of War during the Polish-Soviet conflict in 1920, he created the infamous concentration camp, Jablonna, near Warsaw, where he put the Jewish soldiers who had volunteered to fight

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in protection of Poland. He was known as the most reactionary of Pilsudski's lieutenants, the man nearest to the fascist Endeks. In May, 1936, he demanded dictatorial powers from President Mascieki, and in July, 1941, he was one of the three ministers who resigned from the Cabinet in protest against the signing of the Polish-Russian agreement. From the time of his resignation, he was the candidate of the reactionary forces for leadership, and in February, 1943, he was the central figure in an attempted *coup d'état* in London to overthrow the Sikorski Government and to break up Polish-Russian relations. Later on he defended Lieutenant Adam Daboszynski, who had a prison record for murder in anti-Jewish and anti-democratic pogroms, when the latter was arrested in connection with this plot. In his open demands for a rupture with the Russian Government, he associated himself with the Endeks, and contributed to their paper, *Walke*. His emissaries are even now spreading fascist propaganda among the Americans of Polish origin.

This, then, is the man who has been put in complete command of the Polish Army. An indication of the extent to which this army is permeated by fascist ideology is seen in that General Sikorski's ill-fated trip to Iran was made because General Anders, who commands the Polish troops there, demanded, in the name of his soldiers, Sikorski's immediate resignation and a complete break with Russia. Sikorski went there to avert revolt; it is quite conceivable that Sosnkowski may go to incite one.

These facts pose some important questions. How much freedom and power is left to the Polish Cabinet, however Left it may be, when it is deprived of the support of the army? How effectively can it carry out a liberal and moderate program under these circumstances? What guarantees are there that, having exploited this "front" to the utmost, the Polish Fascists will not overthrow it when it suits their convenience? The past history of Poland shows that precisely this sort of thing may be expected. Her tradition actually favors the assumption of power by military chiefs. We who are interested in establishing democracy everywhere cannot afford to be deceived again by the unscrupulous machinations of the fascist forces.

Observations on AMGOT

THE creation of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories under the name of AMGOT in Sicily is an event of great historic importance, and it gives some idea of how the American-British authorities plan to administer other territories similarly occupied.

Two very definite decisions can already be credited to AMGOT. The first is the dissolution of the Fascist party and of its auxiliary organizations in the occupied parts of Sicily, and the second is the abolition by decree of the governor of all discrimination based on race, color, and creed. These two decisions will undoubtedly make a deep impression on the peoples of Europe who have suffered so long from the fascist regimes, and who have never accepted the barbaric religious and racial discriminations established by National Socialism and blindly copied by Italian fascism.

But the joy we feel about these first two acts is tempered by the fact that some concessions are already being made to fascist officials in the lower

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hierarchy, who will remain in office, and also by the fact that all political activities are forbidden. It is self-evident that if the freed territories are to return to a democratic form of government, a complete break must be made with the fascist past, and all Fascists, in whatever position they may be, must be driven from office. Otherwise, there is danger that the people will retain some of the concepts that have been inculcated in their minds for over twenty years, and that numerous fascist and half-fascist institutions may survive. The fascist regime, like the National Socialist regime, has only crimes on its balance sheet. We do not know any of the "magnificent achievements" with which General Giraud has credited these systems. We are convinced that anyone who has found it possible to serve within the framework of these cruel and tyrannical administrative, political, and economic machines has lost forever the right to participate in the administration of the democratic life of the community.

Furthermore, we find it incomprehensible that all political activities should be forbidden. We believe that the Military Government should, on the contrary, give every possible encouragement to anti-fascist activities—in its own interest, if for no other reason. For the emergence of the democratic forces will constitute the best guarantee for military and political security behind the lines and will furnish the greatest support for an effective administration of these territories. What is more important, the anti-fascist activities, freed at last from the terror of the Fascist police, will not be limited solely to the occupied territories; they will spread rapidly throughout Italy, and their inevitable results will bring encouragement to the anti-fascist forces throughout Europe. Incalculable support will thus be gained by the Allies.

But the most important observation which can be made about AMGOT is that it is at present an exclusively British-American undertaking instead of being the first step in the establishment of a United Nations machinery. It is true that the "A" in AMGOT stands for "Allied." Hence, it does not definitely exclude the other members of the United Nations. But the manner in which AMGOT was established and is now being applied certainly gives the impression that it will remain exclusively a British-American enterprise. We strongly urge that at least a few representatives of some of the other United Nations—for example, Russia, China, and one member representing other European countries—be added in order to offer a sign to the world that this is a United Nations undertaking, one of many that will assure us that the United Nations will last beyond the reconstruction period and beyond the peace.

Besides the political and moral significance of this implication to the peoples of the world who have based their hopes on the existence of the United Nations, there is an important, immediate practical consideration. It will not be long before Russia, too, will occupy foreign territories. Obviously she will be much more willing to admit representatives of the other United Nations into these territories if she herself is now invited to participate in the administration of territories conquered by her Allies. We recommend, therefore, this change in the structure of AMGOT, and we make bold to recommend a modification in its name as well—UMGOT, the United Nations Military Government of the Occupied Territories, instead of AMGOT. After all, UMGOT is just as euphonious.

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America Tomorrow

by

Vice-President Wallace

We have come far in twenty months of war. Workers on the farm and factory fronts have matched the stamina and valor of our warriors on the fighting fronts.

Our three giant sinews of combat—men, materials, and machines—have reached out to hurl back the enemy in the swamps of the Solomons, the Tunisian desert, the Aleutian wastelands, and the rocky hills of Sicily. Our assembly lines are now linked in a nation-wide chain of armament production. They are turning out in record-breaking numbers—and in record-breaking time—the planes, tanks, guns, and ships that are meeting and beating the Axis marauders. Men and women are willingly working long hours because they are determined that victory will not be delayed by even a single hour.

The flood tide of our wrath has mounted slowly—but it is rushing on in mighty torrents of offensive action to engulf our enemies. The fortunes of the Fascists are at ebb. The nazi war machine is cracking up—but we dare not stop until we have smashed and scattered it over the devastated lands it has drenched with blood.

In the sweat and sorrow of conflict—in the grim business of settling the score against the nazi plunderers and the Jap murderers—there are questions that filter through each headline we read—and each radio flash we hear.

What about the peace? What of America tomorrow?

There are some who want to stick to what they would have us believe are the realities of the present. Their quick comeback to any question on our peace objectives is, "We must not discuss anything except the war." There are others who want to stick to what they hold are the realities of the past. They have a stock reply when asked about the peace: "Let us wait and see what England and Russia do before we make our plans."

Both opinions are fighting delaying actions against our destiny in the peace—a destiny that calls us to world leadership.

When we, as victors, lay down our arms in this struggle against the enslavement of the mind and soul of the human family, we take up arms immediately in the great war against starvation, unemployment, and the rigging of the markets of the world. We seek a peace that is more than just a breathing space between the death of an old tyranny and the birth of a new one.

We will not be satisfied with a peace which will merely lead us from the concentration camps and mass-murder of fascism—into an international jungle of gang-

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ster governments operated behind the scenes by power-crazed, money-mad imperialists.

Starvation has no Bill of Rights nor slavery a Magna Carta. Wherever the hopes of the human family are throttled, there we find the makings of revolt.

The world was waiting for us to take the initiative in leading the way to a people's peace after World War I, but we decided to live apart and work our own way.

Hunger and unemployment spawned the criminal freebooters of fascism. Their only remedy for insecurity was war. Their only answer to poverty and the denial of opportunity became the First Commandment of the Nazis: "LOOT THY NEIGHBOR."

Much of our propaganda after the first World War proclaimed the ingratitude of our Allies. We had given of our best blood and our separate fortunes only to be labelled the land of Uncle Shylock. We changed it to Uncle Sap and said, "Never again."

How many of us after this *second* world-wide scourge of suffering and death will say, "Never again"?

Shall it be "Never again" to joining in seeking world peace? Shall it be "Never again" to living alone on an island of false security? Shall it be our *second* retreat from our responsibility in world co-operation.

Ours must be a generation that will distill the stamina and provide the skills to create a war-proof world. We must not bequeath a second blood bath to our children.

World leadership must be more concerned with welfare politics and less with power politics—more attentive to equalize the use of raw materials of nations than to condone the policies of grab and barter that freeze international markets—more interested in opening channels of commerce than closing them by prohibitive tariffs—more mindful of the need for a stable currency among all countries than in high interest rates on loans. World leadership must be more occupied with preventing the political house burners from setting off the fires of revolt than stopping them after they start.

But world co-operation cannot enforce such standards of international justice and security by paper diplomacy and remote control. Our choice is not between a Hitler slave-world and an out-of-date holiday of "normalcy." The defeatists who talk about going back to the good old days of Americanism mean the time when there was plenty for the few and scarcity for the many.

Nor is our choice between an Americanized fascism—and the restoration of pre-war scarcity and unemployment. *Too many millions of our people have come out of the dark cellars and squalor of unemployment ever to go back.* Our choice is between democracy for everybody or for the few—between the spreading of social safeguards and economic opportunity to all the people or the concentration of our abundant resources in the hands of selfishness and greed.

II

THE American people have brought a brave and clear conscience to this crisis of all mankind. Every family, every community, feeling the denials and restraints of war, has been forced to search for a bedrock of faith.

And in that tomorrow when peace comes, education for tolerance will be just as important as the production of television. The creation of a decent diet for every family will take as much planning as the building of new cars and refrigerators and washing machines.

Along with Britain, Russia, and China our nation will exert a tremendous economic and moral persuasion in the peace. But many of our most patriotic and forward-looking citizens are asking: "Why not start now practicing these Four Freedoms in our own back yard?"

They are right! A fuller democracy for all is the lasting preventive of war. A lesser or part-time democracy breeds the dissension and class conflicts that seek their solution in guns and slaughter.

We cannot fight to crush nazi brutality abroad and condone race riots at home. Those who fan the fires of racial clashes for the purpose of making political capital here at home are taking the first step toward nazism. We cannot plead for equality of opportunity for peoples everywhere and overlook the denial of the right to vote

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for millions of our own people. Every citizen of the United States without regard to color or creed, whether he resides where he was born or whether he has moved to a great defense center or to a fighting front, is entitled to cast his vote.

We cannot offer the blueprints and the skills to rebuild the bombed-out cities of other lands and stymie the rebuilding of our own cities. Slums have no place in America. We cannot assist in binding the wounds of a war-stricken world and fail to safeguard the health of our own people. We cannot hope to raise the literacy of other nations and fail to roll back the ignorance that clouds many communities in many sectors of our own nation. Democracy can work successfully for that future which is its predestined heritage only when all people have the opportunity for the fullest education.

The world is a neighborhood. We have learned that starvation in China affects our own security—that the jobless in India are related to the unemployed here. The Post-War Problems Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers (businessmen all) has wisely declared that *increased production in other countries* will not reduce living standards in the United States. Those twisters of fact who shriek that your Vice-President is a wild-eyed dreamer trying to set up T.V.A.'s on the Danube and deliver a bottle of milk to every Hottentot every morning should read that report. No business prospers without prosperous customers. That is plain common sense.

The average American may not be an expert on all phases of our economic and political life. He may not understand completely the complexities of money and markets. He may never feel completely at home in the intricacies of world trade as they are affected by tariffs and cartels. He may not know too much about parity farm prices and subsidies.

But the average American *does* know what happens when inflation comes—when prices rise faster than wages, and he knows that the worst lie of all is that the way to make money is to produce scarcity. The common man in America, and every American soldier overseas, wants free enterprise and full employment. He wants to see the great new war plants converted into plants producing peacetime goods. He knows that he and others have acquired new skills and they should be put to use. The average man of America knows that we can make and consume all goods which make for a higher standard of living. He wants and he must have a job, enough to eat and wear, decent shelter, his own home and automobile, and a chance to educate his children.

He knows that high tariff protection for our markets leads only to retaliation and boycotts by other countries. He knows that no coalition of nations can weather the innumerable impacts of money and trade monopolies. He witnessed the collapse of sanctions under the League of Nations and the growth of dictatorships that appealed to their peoples by promising to free them from economic slavery. He is convinced that nations must be organized by something more than trade pacts and nonaggression treaties. The peacemakers must have more daring and vision than the warmakers.

The war—the business of ghastly death—will cost this nation over 300 billion dollars. And for peace—the business of abundant living—will we be willing and prepared to pay even a tenth of that to have it endure?

III

A YEAR ago* I cited the four duties of the people's revolution as I saw them. They were:

1. The duty to produce to the limit.
2. The duty to transport as rapidly as possible to the field of battle.
3. The duty to fight with all that is in us.
4. The duty to build a peace—just, charitable, and enduring.

Millions of our people from offices and factories, from farms, mines, oil fields, and timber lands, have accepted those duties with typical American courage and fortitude. They are making heroic sacrifices to speed the victory. But if war has its duties, peace has its responsibilities. Three out-

* *The Price of Free World Victory.* Speech delivered at the second Free World Congress and published in June, 1942, issue of FREE WORLD.

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standing peacetime responsibilities, as I see them today, are these:

1. The responsibility for enlightenment of the people.
2. The responsibility for mobilizing peacetime production for full employment.
3. The responsibility for planning world co-operation.

The American press, radio, school, and church, free from domination by either Government or corporate interest, can hold up to our people the vision of the freedom and abundance of the America that is to be. These great agencies of enlightenment can educate us with regard to the fundamental decencies and understandings which are essential if our power is to be a blessing to the world and not a curse.

Labor is beginning to do its part in enlightening the public. It is beginning to make crystal clear that 99 per cent of labor has co-operated 100 per cent with our Government in the war effort. More and more in the future, labor will demonstrate that it can co-operate with both employers and with agriculture in those measures which lead to increased employment, increased production, and a higher standard of living. The people of America know that the second step toward nazism is the destruction of labor unions. There are midget Hitlers here who continually attack labor. There are other demagogues, blind to the errors of every other group, who shout, "We love labor, but . . ." Both the midget Hitlers and the demagogues are enemies of America. Both would destroy labor unions if they could. Labor should be fully aware of its friends and of its enemies.

The second responsibility, that of mobilizing the peace for full production and full employment, will challenge the best brains and imagination of our industries large and small, our trade associations, our labor unions, and our financial institutions.

When the guns stop, America will find itself with the following assets:

1. Man power by the million; skilled workers from war industries, military man power, and young people coming of working age.
2. The largest industrial plant capacity in the world.
3. The greatest resources both natural and artificial to make peacetime products —and thousands of new inventions waiting to be converted to peacetime use.
4. The largest scientific farm plant in the world.
5. The biggest backlog of requirements for housing, transportation, communications, and living comforts.
6. The greatest reserve of accumulated savings by individuals that any nation has ever known.

With such wealth who says this nation is now bankrupt?

If industrial management can bring the same wisdom in producing for peace that it has shown on many production fronts in the supply program for war, the horizons we face are bright. We have witnessed many evidences of industrial statesmanship, of co-operation with labor to increase production and cut costs. In hundreds of industries the war has demonstrated that management and labor can be friends in the service of the nation.

Our industries, trade associations, and lending institutions will open the gates of labor's participation wider. They have the choice of approaching the new world of greatly expanded production with new energies and foresight—or they can hold back and fearfully await the stimulus of their government to expand production and consumption. Whichever choice they consciously or unconsciously make, I believe they want to do their part in keeping this nation on solid ground when peace comes.

If we are to mobilize peace production in the service of all the people, we must completely turn away from scarcity economics. Too many corporations have made money by holding inventions out of use, by holding up prices, and by cutting down production. Witness 1932, with farm machinery and automobile prices cut less than 15 per cent, but with production cut 75 per cent. No wonder hog prices in 1933 fell as a result of unemployment and scarcity in the cities to a level only 40 per cent of normal. But pig production in 1933, even with the program of killing pigs at light weights, was normal. In contrast pig iron production went down by more than 60 per cent. I say that a million times as much injustice has been done to the American people by the slaughter of immature

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pig iron, the abortion of baby farm machinery, and the killing of promising inventions as was ever done by killing little pigs at light weight. But in any event, the little pigs did not die in vain. They gave the American public a complete and utter abhorrence of scarcity economics—the economics which in 1932 held up city prices, cut city manufactures in half, lengthened bread lines, and cut farm prices by more than one half. We want balanced abundant production of both pigs and pig iron with prices of both equally flexible and equally stable.

IV

I BELIEVE in our democratic, capitalistic system, but it must be a capitalism of abundance and full employment. If we return to a capitalism of scarcity such as that which produced both 1929 and 1932, we must anticipate that the returning soldiers and displaced war workers will speak in no uncertain terms.

The third responsibility—that of planning world co-operation—will stem from the open and full partnership between the people and their government.

We will face combustible realities when this struggle has passed.

Even now there are millions in Europe and Asia who have only one thought, one question: "When do we eat?" Peace does not come where starvation stays. Peace is a mockery where millions of homeless and diseased are given only the freedom to die.

America will have to fill many breadbaskets, help to restore homes, and provide medical care here and in other lands before our own peace will be secure.

We know that a combination of countries seeking to limit our air commerce could shut off our international skyways. We know that a ganging-up by a group of international cartels at odds with us could wipe out our markets and sow the seeds of war. We know that we cannot close the doors on other nations and not expect them to close their doors on us. We know that imperialistic freebooters using the United States as a base can make another war inevitable. In that knowledge we can create co-operation or conflict; unity of purpose or under-the-table dealing.

We must continue our splendid teamwork with the British. We must become better acquainted with our new friends, the Russians. We can live peacefully in the same world with the Russians if we demonstrate to ourselves and the world after the war that we have gone in for all-out peace production and total consumer use of our products to bring about the maximum of human welfare.

The Atlantic Charter with its Four Freedoms provides the broad base of general principles to safeguard our decisions. It is a Charter of Faith that must be worked out to endure and the American people intend that it shall work and endure.

Shouldering our responsibilities for enlightenment, abundant production, and world co-operation, we can begin now our apprenticeship to world peace. There will be heartbreaking delays—there will be prejudices creeping in and the fainthearted will spread their whispers of doubt. Some blueprints and many programs will be tested and found unworkable—some men with selfish motives will use the propaganda of protest and the sabotage of delay to promote disunity in peace as they have in war.

But the day of victory for humanity will come just as this night of terror and desolation will pass. Nothing will prevail against the common man's peace in a common man's world as he fights both for free enterprise and full employment.

Wherever common men are met together, it is fitting to pay tribute to that man who more than any other throughout the world is looked upon as the common man's friend —Franklin D. Roosevelt. In South America, in China, in the occupied countries of Europe, Roosevelt is the symbol of the peace to come and of the abundance and brotherly understanding which peace must bring.

That world is one family with one future—a future which will bind our brotherhood with heart and mind and not with chains—which will save and share the culture past and now aborning—which will work out the peace on a level of high and open co-operation—which will make democracy work for mankind by giving everyone a chance to build his own stake in it.

The challenge and the opportunity to win the battle of the peace has joined mankind. Victory demands our best thought, our best energies, and our everlasting faith.

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The Liberated Nations *and the* NEW ORDER

By

CLAUDE D. PEPPER

THE attack upon Sicily which President Roosevelt has described as "the beginning of the end" brings us directly up against the question, with whom are we going to collaborate in the territory which the United Nations expect to occupy? I believe all will agree that this time not even military necessity must be allowed to throw us into association with any groups save those dependably and truly democratic. We cannot temporize with fascism anywhere in the world without compromising the great aims for which we fight throughout the earth. As soon as we have made any land safe for democracy, we must see to it that democracy begins to function there. This means, of course, that we must deal with those elements of the population that believe in democracy and are representative of it, and no others.

When Mussolini is overthrown and the odious fascist system of which he is the apex is uprooted, there can be found, without a doubt, in Italy and among her exiles, men whose democracy can be counted upon and who are capable of setting up democratic institutions for the government of Italy. There must be men and women throughout Italy in whom the flame of liberty and Garibaldi has never been choked out even by the foul clutch of Mussolini. Surely, those noble and courageous men and women who have maintained the Underground movement against Mussolini, and the exiles whom Mussolini has driven out of Italy but who have worked with this Underground movement and have constantly labored for Italy's freedom, will be a stalwart and reliable nucleus around which virile representative government may be expected to rise.

Of course, one cannot say beforehand how soon after the United Nations occupy Italy or any other country such a government will come into being. This will depend upon the manner in which the freed people respond to the opportunity which will be theirs; the way they co-operate with their liberators; the responsibility and the capacity for self-government which they exhibit. For we must not forget that we shall be dealing with people in Italy, for example, who for nearly a generation have not known what representative government or democratic institutions meant. A generation of boys and girls have grown up not knowing the name of liberty, not having the experience of enjoying civil rights. The masses of the men and women who have grown to manhood and womanhood under Mussolini in Italy have never been able to write or speak their minds about public matters. Even the very means and media of forming public opinion have been emasculated or perverted.

In Germany, the suppression of individual liberty has been even more severe and complete although the period of tyranny has not been as long as in Italy. In Japan, the situation is far worse, for political freedom, in the sense that we know it, has never existed in Japan, and there is no tradition of free institutions even so proximate as the rise of Hitler and Mussolini.

Here we have, then, the difficult problem of nurturing democratic institutions in a land where they have never existed or among peoples without recent experience with them. These peoples are really politically backward peoples. Basically our task, then, is the difficult one of political education. I should have said that our problem is to help these people to educate

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themselves. The means of public information must be restored and there must be set in motion all those multiple forces which give knowledge to the people and stimulate their opinions. There shall have to be a free press. The radio must be open to the dissemination of knowledge and the expression of opinions on public matters. It must be the forum for public debate. A similar opportunity is open to the motion picture, which has the rare advantage of teaching by both sight and sound. The American motion picture industry has a rare opportunity and responsibility in this field, for in what more dramatic and more effective way could the institutions and the manner of living of the American people or of other free nations be indelibly imprinted upon the consciousness of the liberated peoples than through the marvel of the motion sound picture? Religious freedom must be beyond question. Above all things, the educational system, giving both primary and secondary education, must become the fountainhead of democracy. One can imagine the magnitude of the task of purging from the educational system of the Axis countries all the poisonous influences that have perverted at least a generation of youth, and making such school systems the dispenser of sound knowledge and training and the support of free institutions.

What must be the characteristics of the government which we should allow to exist in these occupied lands? The question will immediately arise in the case of Italy as to whether a King will be acceptable, whatever his status; in Japan, whether we will permit an Emperor. There might be even the question as to whether we would allow, to a people who wanted one, a Fuehrer. It seems to me that the important thing is not the title which either the titular or politically responsible head of the state might have. Italy had a King before Mussolini. The Japanese from time immemorial have had an Emperor. Britain has a King. The important thing is whether the government is chosen by and responsible to the people.

Surely any government entitled to be called representative must be a government sanctioned by the free choice of the people in a free election in which the citizens must be immune from any kind of intimidation either before or after the election. By free election, of course, we mean that before the election there must have been fullest opportunity for debate, for discussion in every public forum. There cannot be tyranny where civil rights and free elections are secure. If we find that a government is chosen by the people and that it respects the civil liberties of the people, then we cannot deny that such a government is democratic in character. Obviously, such standards deny the right of the government to gain or keep power by force.

It will not be an easy task to nourish representative governments into being or to restrain either the impulse or the natural circumstances which will pull us toward substitution of our will for the people's will, making such governments mere puppets in the hands of our political or occupying forces. We shall have to be wary of internal factionalism and the expected jealousies and rivalries which we shall encounter. It will take good sense and understanding and forbearance on our part to make these governments walk by themselves. We shall ever be confronted with the temptation either to carry or to drive such governments.

II

NOTHING will be more important than our relationship to the economies of the liberated lands. Our first task, of course, will be to see to it that such people get adequate food and nourishment. Then, we to be re-established; private initiative and understanding assistance in the rebuilding of their broken economies. If we disengage them from the Axis economy pattern, they will have to be fitted into the economy of the free world. They must be given a chance to live as an unregimented non-totalitarian nation. Naturally, they will be expected to help themselves, but they will be entitled to our help also. Private business will have to be re-established; private initiative and enterprise stimulated again; the spirit and the genius of invention and discovery, stifled by the totalitarian state, must be aroused again. We must remember that the strong nations will be as much responsible for the economic survival of these freed peoples as for their political and territorial security. We shall have gained nothing if we rescue them from the tyranny of politi-

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cal totalitarianism and leave them the victims of world-wide economic chaos.

There was never a more vivid example of the penalty of selfishness, which led the Western powers and ourselves to deny that we are "our brother's keeper," than what we did in abandoning the Weimar Republic in Germany. We stood by as nations and saw this struggling child of democracy go down before economic forces against which it could not possibly survive alone. We saw it gradually crushed by the bitter opposition of those old autocratic forces which were, and are, the uncompromising enemy of democracy. We allowed the inflation and the mass unemployment and the economic chaos in Germany, out of the womb of which came Hitler. We all remember the bitter breakdown in the German economy after the war and the civil strife which followed it and made even Hitler palatable. How little it would have cost us all to have saved Germany! How much it has cost us to let her be torn apart! I hope we have learned enough to recognize that the family of nations can never allow a member nation to be wrecked again. It is not charity, nor decent sentiment, but enlightened selfishness which demands that we so order the affairs of the world that either weak or struggling new Democracies may be able to live and move and have their being in it.

Let those who shall complain about a little trade concession or a loan or a grant, for that matter, to keep a nation alive and free, remember the immeasurable cost of our having let Germany collapse. We have established, through lend-lease in war, the principle that supporting another nation, helping it to survive, is a direct contribution to our own security and strength. This principle must be employed in peace as in war.

We have already made a start in this direction by the planning that is in progress for international currency stabilization to keep down destructive inflation after the war. The recent International Food Conference indicates that we are taking a world-wide point of view in respect to the production and distribution of food. There will come other conferences to deal with all the multiple materials which are the foundations of the world economy. There will have to be a sensible arrangement giving access to raw materials to all on an equal basis. There must be a way of financing public works in the areas that need to be repaired or developed all over the world. Health and housing and labor standards, intellectual collaboration, the curbing of crime, and the war against the causes of crime are, of course, all world-wide in scope. Machinery for the adjustment of all kinds of conflicts and disputes will have to be set up. Some points of clash and conflict will be juridical, some will be territorial, some political, some economic.

As nearly as possible the reconciliation of interests must come from private sources, from the recognition of sensible men in sensible groups that we have all got to "get on" with one another all over the world. But there will have to be public forums, tribunals, courts to the bar of which must come even nations with their complaints and claims. And of course, there shall have to be some effective way of enforcing the decisions of such tribunals.

III

WE cannot expect a lawful world without world law, and there cannot be a world law without a world court—a world judicial system. We have passed the point in civilization when we can continue to allow a nation to run amuck. We can no longer reliably depend upon the international posse to deal with international brigands. Surely, we will no longer expose ourselves to the humiliation of admitting that we cannot evolve a substitute for the institution of war. War is too destructive, too disastrous, as well as too revolting, to have a place in a civilized order. Yet we know that war has been resorted to by those who wanted things—from the tribe to the nation—because it was the only way or the best way to get what was desired. No citizen is safe in a lawless community. No nation is safe in a lawless world. Now, at last, we must stretch law over the boundaries of nations, as it has been drawn across the boundaries of communities, and establish a lawful world.

I do not want to overemphasize, however, an international police force. In fact, the clash of interests which makes wars can be resolved better by an intelligent adjust-

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ment of conflicts and claims, a sensible recognition of rights and duties, than by the mere repressive power of some sort of international force. The time to stop wars is before the pressure has become explosive, and the only way to do this is to have intelligent, enlightened, and sensible cooperation and collaboration among the powers and leaders of the world.

It was not the absence of an international army, police force, or air power which led the Japanese, the Italians, and the Germans, respectively, to launch their several campaigns of aggression and get away with it. It was the absence of a single will among the free nations and peoples, and the lack of determination on their part to keep down brigandage and banditry. If around the nucleus of the United States, Russia, and Britain there may be formed the free peoples of the earth with a will to keep the world safe, and the machinery for working effectively together is set up and maintained, the world will at last have not only become free, but the abiding place of permanent peace.

It is expected the United Nations will not only disarm the Axis powers, but keep them disarmed so thoroughly that not even one cannon shall be forged to threaten the peace of any people. But more than that, it is my hope that all other peoples will be disarmed, too—at least to the point where every nation shall be unable to jeopardize the security of any other nation, however weak it may be. I mean that now the dominant members of the United Nations must rid the world of the vice of armaments and relieve all nations, save those who will remain guardians of peace—and later, even them—from the crushing burden of preparation for or against war. It will take the very best the world has to restore the broken earth, and no more "sweat, toil, and tears" must be squandered upon the means of making a war.

If there is an effective disarmament—say, such as is necessary to keep the world peace—then boundary disputes and all other differences will have to be settled by peaceful means. For almost any nation would be able to defend itself against a weaponless aggressor, even if the forces charged with the responsibility of maintaining world order took no hand in the matter. Again, if the United Nations make it a condition of membership in the world community that a government be not only the representative government of the people, but that it protect the decent civil liberties of the people, border and boundary will mean less, nations will be less determined to seek territory by change of boundaries. I mean that if a minority group is allowed to enjoy its civil liberties, it may not be so resolved to detach itself from one national entity and incorporate in another. While flexibility and change in boundaries, and even voluntary transfers of population, may have to be envisaged, there is relatively little danger of consequent international conflict or chaos if all peoples are allowed a fair place in the sun economically, and civil liberties and security are guaranteed to all. What I am suggesting is that the best way to permanent peace is through an affirmative working out of world affairs and problems, so that by keeping down the conditions which make for war, we shall keep down war.

There is a growing solidarity of world opinion due to the intimacy with which the people of the world live together. Yet no international organization can be without its own forum for the expression of a world opinion and point of view. I hope to see, as soon as possible in the organization of the United Nations, provisions made for a regular forum for public discussion. I can even foresee that the United Nations, if they maintain a forum for the free discussion of international problems, may gradually work out the organizational arrangement which experience might dictate, and we might be able to get on with the running of the world in a pretty satisfactory way even before we felt ourselves able to say with certainty just what the blueprint of the world order should be.

These are some of the ramifications of those problems which will confront us when the first territory is occupied, when the first liberated people become our wards. The way in which we shall meet these problems, the breadth of vision, the understanding, the very spirit we exhibit, will indicate how much we have learned—whether we are big enough and great enough to be the architects of that noble edifice for which so many have so long suffered, fought, and died.

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COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION

Trustee of French Interests

By
JACQUES MARITAIN
(Bastille Day, July 14, 1943)

FOR the first time since the armistice and the *coup d'état* of 1940, the anniversary of the *Prise de la Bastille,* symbol of the French people's political freedom, is celebrated at the request of a central French power established on French soil, and entrusted, until complete liberation, with the destiny of all free or liberated parts of the French territory and the French Empire.

How can we celebrate this Fourteenth of July without first directing our thoughts toward those with whom our hearts are ceaselessly concerned? How can I speak of France and freedom without speaking first of the people of France, the suffering and indomitable core of our motherland?

They are starving, their little children are pining away, their sons are being stolen from them and sent to slavery, their country has been sacked, prisons and concentration camps are crowded with good citizens, fifty thousand hostages have been murdered, one million Frenchmen are prisoners of war, two million have been taken to Germany for forced labor. The liberation! The liberation! Despite any rift, all of us unite, first of all, in a burning desire for the liberation of France.

The problem for Frenchmen is to have the end of the war coincide with the end of the international civil war, which is at one with the military war and which came to the fore in France with the *coup d'état* of June 1940. The problem is to get rid at the same time of both the nazi hell and of the so-called "National Revolution." On the political plane, equity demands that we draw a line between, on the one hand, responsible leaders and collaborationists, and, on the other hand, men who have in reality labored against them or men of good will who were led astray for a moment. For this purpose, a clear definition of "Vichy men" is needed: those who assumed leading responsibility in the capitulation, the laws, the policy, the persecutions, and the propaganda of the regime which grew out of the defeat, and those who, instead of saying, "We have been misled," keep on sticking to the bitter resentments and the ideology of the "National Revolution." And honor and public morality require that no one of these men be admitted to rule the nation and exert political authority. A similar prerequisite is that the new men for whom the nation is waiting do not permit any contagion of the ideology in question to creep into their ranks. On these terms, and on condition that, when liberation has come, everyone accepts, according to the democratic rule, the decisions freely made by the people and expressed by their vote, irremediable scission and conflict can be avoided. Then the political struggle will undoubtedly be severe and ardent, but national communion will be saved.

The essential thing is that the people of France—delivered over by their Govern-

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ment to a tempest of illusion, deception, and corrupting propaganda—have spontaneously raised up their moral strength and their spirit of resistance. France has not lost her soul. The French people have come alive again.

The forerunning symbol of this resurrection was raised, on June 18, 1940, when General Charles de Gaulle proclaimed that France had lost a battle, but had not lost the war, and rallied to the cross of Lorraine those Frenchmen determined to keep on fighting abroad. The French people have suffered too much to be able to think in terms of compromise; they will think henceforth in terms of yes and no. It is because they are, first and indivisibly, patriotic and republican that French popular forces have placed their hope in De Gaulle and the spirit of Fighting France. All this is a statement of fact. It is our duty to make known the undeniable reports that are thus coming to us from France. It is our duty to say that when a man who in the hour of darkness raised up the courage and the hope of our country, and who more than deserves our gratitude, is suddenly exposed to a swarm of attacks and disparaging rumors, then our natural reaction is to be with him more than ever. French psychology is invariably determined in such matters.

It is also our duty to say, because this is also true, that the French people are aware of their obligations to the great Allied nations upon whom victory and liberation depend, and that they feel especially linked with America by a trust and friendship whose historic importance is priceless. As General de Gaulle puts it in his message of today: "To the American people, on this national holiday, tell them that nothing will separate us from them. . . . We have the same friends and the same enemies. We have the same ideal, which is called freedom."

The French people expect all of us who have supported Fighting France from the outset to understand our responsibility in this regard, aware of the primordial necessity, for the future of civilization as well as for the future of France, of wholehearted and lasting co-operation between the French nation and that great nation which we love. It would be a serious misfortune and a grave error if—by some vituperative attitude—we might let our friends believe that we may ever forget these bonds.

Criticisms and reproaches provide everyone with an opportunity for self-examination. All men and movements must at one time or another purify themselves. On our side as well, there will be mistakes to rectify. What we hope for is that it will be possible to start anew, on bases freed of every misunderstanding, and that a fresh situation clearly defined will develop between the United States and the forces which, within the French war effort, are represented by De Gaulle.

II

FOLLOWING the Tunisian victory, a united French power was established in North Africa. What is essentially significant in this event—the accomplishment of which was, as we certainly know, impatiently desired by our friends in France—is the coming together of those Frenchmen who had chosen open revolt in the name of honor, and of those Frenchmen who had preferred in the name of necessity to accept the *fait accompli* and to prepare on the spot an eventual uprising against the Axis. They had held opposite views, but for the same immediate aim: to drive the Germans out. What at first impaired the union of General de Gaulle and General Giraud was, above all, the unfortunate interference of a number of those men responsible for the trap in which France has been caught and of the profiteers of defeat, seeking to shelter themselves under a "unity" of appeasement. Now the principal high officials identified with Vichy have been eliminated. Whatever may be the crises yet to be faced by the Committee of National Liberation, the significance of the union thus painfully achieved remains, and will take on increasing clarity. In the end the atmosphere will be purified, republican liberties will be restored, and all racial discrimination will be abolished. Beneath unavoidable political differences, natural brotherhood will inevitably take shape again among Frenchmen struggling for the freeing of their country. From now on, in any case, the fact has been made manifest to everyone that France, France

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as a nation, is always in the war against the common enemy.

The wish of all Frenchmen is that the Committee of National Liberation be recognized as a central power entrusted with the French empire and the French war effort, a trustee of French interests. Since a usurping power took the reins in June, 1940, French sovereignty lost its legitimate means of expression, but it continues to exist in the French people. If today there is no government of France politically representing the French people, if French sovereignty is held by a people at present reduced to silence, there are, nevertheless, men who morally represent this people and in whom the heroes of resistance and the good citizens who saved the soul of France recognize themselves. Without pretending in any wise to constitute a Government of France, and until it will become possible for a Provisional Government to be created in liberated France, those men who morally represent the French people could and should be invested, in international councils, with the function of trustees which is suited to such exceptional circumstances.

For in the suffering and resolution of her people France is greater and more alive than in any governmental apparatus. If there is no Government of France today, there is France who struggles stubbornly through her people and her soldiers, through the men of St. Nazaire, through the warriors of Tunisia, as well as through those of Bir Hachem or Lake Chad—France whose empire serves as a basis for the splendid effort of the Allies in the Mediterranean. There is France who is preparing herself for new bloody sacrifices in order to help, on her own soil, the armies of freedom; France who is being roused with hope by the invasion of Sicily and the promise of the *beginning of the end* of the nazi nightmare. There is France who waits feverishly for the liberation of Europe, and who, outraged now by the basest enemies, is anxious for her pride no less than for her liberty. Let me recall President Roosevelt's noble words, in the statement he made this morning: "Immortal France has reaffirmed once again, in the most heroic circumstances, her greatness and her glory."

Egotistic and unbridled nationalism is the great danger which the world will have to wipe out tomorrow. We know that a deep and strong national feeling is a sound and normal basis for the task which the peoples of the world have to achieve, but we also know that nationalism is a serious peril for this national feeling itself, because nationalism is but an irrational substitute masking the lack of constructive ideals and real national strength. In the face of this peril, what is first needed is trust in the common people. It is also and essentially collective vision and inspiration growing out of a great constructive ideal.

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QUESTIONS *without* ANSWERS

BY

JANET FLANNER

THIS is a moment in our domestic American history when ignorance is not bliss. An epidemic of discomfort at what we do not know has seized our land. We democratic Americans are itching with justified curiosities. Why is it that suddenly there are no longer any answers to what several million intelligent Americans want to know? The main question we want an answer to is this: what is it that our State Department does not want to tell us? We Americans are now one hundred and sixty-seven years old, according to our national birthday this last Fourth of July. Are we too young to be told the truth? Are we too juvenile to be trusted with the facts of international life?

Since when in American history has it become part of our foreign policy to be rude to a European rebel? Our entire tradition has been one of sympathy and support for democratic revolutionary movements. To begin with, the United States of America was itself a rebel against Europe. Then, it cheered and aided the great French Revolution. The Founding Fathers and the statesmen who followed them unhesitatingly declared that we must be ready to give moral and material aid to democratic movements everywhere. We favored and supported the revolt of the Latin American colonies against Spain. Busy with our own Civil War, we took time to refuse to recognize Maximilian, the puppet of Napoleon III, who sought to abolish the Mexican Republic. Now, as in the first World War, we are again fighting a fight for democracy; in other words, we are in a war of rebellion against the doctrines of totalitarianism and racism, of militarism and imperialism.

General Charles de Gaulle started as a rebel in June, 1940—and still rebels. General Henri Giraud started as a prisoner in 1940, and is, perhaps, still escaping. Here are two picturesque, militant Frenchmen, probably both equally difficult to get along with. But why are we not given a chance to try and get along with General de Gaulle? Is his being difficult the real difficulty? An important, usually omniscient, male writer like Mr. Walter Lippmann does not know the answer, and has said so in print. An important, usually completely informed, female writer like Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick does not know the answer, and has said so in ink. The occupied French, all over France, have not, at the moment, much ink at their command, but their verbal curiosity on this point must be passionate.

According to Webster's Dictionary, the synonyms for expedient are "shift, resource." We are told that it was expedient to shift from De Gaulle, who, as a personal resource, had at his call some tens of thousands of troops, to Giraud, who had none, but who could take command of over three hundred thousand. Is there any reason to believe, in view of the enthusiastic acceptance of De Gaulle by the civil population in North Africa and elsewhere, that these three hundred thousand troops would not have as readily accepted the command of De Gaulle, hero of Abbeville, the only French victory of the tragic Battle of France? If the three hundred thousand troops of North Africa did not want to follow De Gaulle, why? What are the reasons—and who gives them? Maybe the men in North Africa who did not want to follow De Gaulle were the colonial functionaries, the desk men, of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco who have been sitting tight in honor of Vichy for the past three years.

And in any case, is this war only a war for what everyone can see, such as a certain number of marching men? Isn't it also partly a war for invisible things, which do not march, except through men's heads—things like belief, like hope, like faith—faith in your friends, who are friends of what is in your heart, friends who think and who care as you think and care? Is

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this only a war to make the world safe for expediency?

But even on grounds of expediency, wouldn't it have been more efficacious at least to have pretended to use De Gaulle, or his name and, above all, what he means to the French of France, whose democratic co-operation we want and will badly need in the peace? Need we have deliberately slapped the General's stern, statuesque countenance? Even it we had had to use someone else to do the real military job in North Africa, could we not have made use of De Gaulle psychologically? As a matter of fact, both from the psychological and the military standpoint, he was, ironically enough, our gift from Providence, so far as real expediency was concerned. If anyone had to be chosen for expediency, it should have been General Charles de Gaulle.

II

IT has been customary, over the past three years, to praise De Gaulle, faintly, by saying that at any rate he has symbolized, to his own countrymen, the spirit of resistance to the Nazis. Hasn't he also symbolized that spirit in the minds of the rest of us? In the minds of the whole world, including the Germans, the English, the Russians, and the Chinese? Isn't that something? Must he belong so exclusively to the French? We do not know whether the French in France are in love with De Gaulle personally. But we have overwhelming evidence that millions of French have learned to hate what the Frenchmen who are against De Gaulle stand for. Their hatred for those ideas and these men will not be lessened by the knowledge that they are seemingly being forced on the General, now, by democratic foreign pressure. There are now millions of Americans who hate the official wave of hate, directed against De Gaulle, which has recently broken over our forty-eight states, in order to exert that pressure and make it popular.

De Gaulle's enemy is the Germans. They are our enemy. They are Giraud's enemy. But De Gaulle's enemy, like ours, is also nazi-fascism, of whatever national brand. After the collapse of France in 1940, he was the first Frenchman to declare that he was fighting not only German nazism but also French fascism. Today he is more than ever fighting it within the French ranks in the shape of North African appeasers, ex-collaborationists, and men who were, at least pro tem, Vichyites. Can the backers of Giraud say the same thing about Giraud? Is he really against French fascism or even German nazism? Apparently not. At any rate, he has just remarked: "Not all is bad in the [German] National Socialist system. Some of its accomplishments have been magnificent." Which ones? Does he think it was a magnificent accomplishment to have deprived millions of Germans who opposed nazism of their rights as citizens? It could be. He has himself been responsible for a similar accomplishment in annulling the Crémieux Decree and thus depriving millions of French Algerians of their French citizenship.

Maybe our State Department disapproves, as many people do, of the habit oversentimental De-Gaullists have acquired of confusing De Gaulle with Jeanne d'Arc. Certainly they look nothing alike. And General de Gaulle is, we hope, no saint. But to millions of French patriots today, he represents, as she did yesterday, the *summum bonum* of resistance in the heart of France.

We wish that our State Department would tell us what is wrong with General de Gaulle's being a good fighting Gaul.



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UNITED STATES OF INDIA

BY

LORD LYTTON

WHEN this war comes to an end, there will be political problems of immense difficulty to be settled in all parts of the world. Europe, the Middle East, the Far East will all present quite different problems of settlement, and if they are to be settled by agreement they will have to be discussed at an international conference at which all the interested parties are represented. If the settlement is to be a durable one, it must not be hurried, and that is a reason for keeping separate the re-establishment of peace between the countries now at war, the final settlement of political frontiers, and the future relations of states to each other. The restoration of peace and the re-establishment of national governments in the occupied countries are urgent problems, which must be dealt with as quickly as possible after the firing ceases. The terms of the peace treaties concern the belligerents alone. They should be settled quickly, and without prejudice to subsequent readjustment by a World Settlement Conference.

After the last war, the problems of peace and settlement were dealt with at the same conference, with the result that the restoration of peace was too long delayed and the settlement was unduly hurried and, therefore, defective. This mistake must not be repeated. The next settlement must have time to be as good as human wisdom can make it.

The object of this article is to consider whether the Indian problem is one of those problems that lend themselves to settlement by an international conference. The answer to this question depends on a correct understanding of the facts of the problem.

By the Indian problem is meant the problem of establishing in India a government responsible to the Indian people, in the same way, and to the same extent, as the Governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa are responsible to the respective peoples of those countries. If the people of India were a homogeneous or united community—in fact a nation—in the sense in which the peoples of the other Dominions are nations, and were demanding a national government or an independent existence, and if Great Britain was refusing to accede to such a demand, then it might be argued that a decision between the two parties might properly be sought from an international conference, as the people of Czechoslovakia appealed for their independence to the Paris Conference in 1919. But the facts of the Indian situation are very different. India is a political state, and the peoples within that state are gradually acquiring a national consciousness; but it cannot be contended that an Indian nation yet exists, or that a unified national government could be established for the whole subcontinent at this moment. In the Provinces, where the people are more or less homogeneous, complete self-government has already been established. They have legislatures elected

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on a popular franchise, and ministers responsible to the legislatures in all matters of provincial administration. But India also includes a number of States ruled by hereditary Princes which also have complete local autonomy. The only way in which the whole of India can be united today is for the provincial Governments and the rulers of the Indian States to agree upon the powers they are willing to delegate to a Central Government for the administration of such matters as are common to the whole subcontinent.

In other words, the Indian problem is a problem of federation. The only possible form of government that could today take the place of the present government of India is a federal government, and the only people who could create such a government are the different autonomous units of which the country is composed.

Again, the suggestion that Great Britain is opposed to the creation of such a government is wholly at variance with the facts. It was Great Britain that created the Indian state, and gave to the subcontinent a political unity that it had never possessed before. The growth of the national consciousness that has developed within the state is the direct consequence of the British connection. The self-governing institutions that have been established in the Provinces are modeled on the British constitution and are the work of men who have been educated in Britain with the assistance of British administrators. Moreover, the British Government has stated its intention of treating the Provincial legislatures elected immediately after the war as "an Electoral College which will elect representatives to a Constituent Assembly whose duty it will be to draft a new constitution" for the whole of India. This assurance should dispose once for all of the argument that Great Britain is opposed to the full development of constitutional freedom for India.

II

I DO not dwell on the reasons why constitutional changes cannot be made during the war, while invasion is threatened and the enemy is actually on the eastern boundary of India. That case was well stated by Bertrand and Patricia Russell in an article in the January issue of FREE WORLD. I am concerned only with the question of whether there is anything more that Great Britain can do, and whether the problem is one that lends itself to treatment by an international conference.

The facts being what they are, the next step can be taken only by Indians themselves. They can be helped, of course, and they have already been fully assured of whatever help they may require; but they, and they alone, can decide what powers they are willing to delegate to a Central Government and what form that Government shall assume. An alternative Government to the present one can neither be conferred nor imposed upon them from without. A state can be created from without, a nation can only be created from within. If an Indian nation existed, the creation of a national government would be easy, and I have already said that no opposition to its creation exists. It is only because, as yet, there is no Indian nation that the problem is difficult. And because in the Indian continent there are many peoples, differing in race, religion, and language, and having different forms of government, unity at this stage is possibe only on a federal basis. The Congress party wants a unitary government, the Moslem League wants a separate Moslem state. Neither of them has any proposal for the inclusion of the Indian States which constitute a third of India. These facts make nonsense of the argument that "India" demands political freedom which Great Britain can either grant or withhold, or that an international conference should arbitrate in a dispute which in fact does not exist.

This does not mean that the present Government of India must be continued indefinitely, or that nothing can be done either during the war or immediately after it. A great deal could be done, even during the war; but it can be done only in India. If the Indian political leaders would recognize that their own differences make any transfer of power to one section alone impossible, and instead of trying to induce their opponents to agree to their own proposals, would come together to consider how their differences can be reconciled under a constitution that would recognize

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those differences instead of ignoring them, much could be done, even before the fighting stops. If a federal basis of the future constitution could be agreed upon, the preparatory work could be begun at once.

The first subject to be explored is how the existing boundaries of the self-governing Provinces could be adjusted so as to make them correspond more nearly to racial or community interests.

The second subject to be examined is how the Indian States might be mediatized. At present, there are some 580 Indian States, but not more than about twenty-four merit the description of States at all. Some are not even large estates. The question of incorporating the smaller ones, either in a neighboring State or in a self-governing Province, would depend on their geographical situation and the wishes of their inhabitants. This is a matter for the Indian Princes to consider, and its consideration could be undertaken at the same time that the political leaders in the self-governing Provinces were considering a possible readjustment of their boundaries. When the time came for a conference to consider the terms on which the confederate units would delegate powers to a Central Federal Government, all the parties concerned would be in a better position to negotiate than they are today.

Here is work to be done, practical, useful work, which would hasten the day of India's political freedom far more effectively than party recriminations, sporadic civil disobedience, violent conflicts leading to disorder and consequential imprisonments, hunger strikes, and emotional appeals based on irrelevant issues; all of which not only weaken the war effort of the United Nations, but increase the difficulty of finding a solution of the Indian problem.

III

THE people who ask that the British Government shall do something to break down the present impasse, that they shall resume negotiations, or make some more constructive suggestion for solving the problem, are like the irresponsible newspapers that clamor for "a Second Front now" on the assumption, which is entirely erroneous, that there is some difference of opinion as to the need for a Second Front; and in the equally erroneous belief that those who have no knowledge of the military facts involved are better judges than those who have the knowledge of the best time and place for creating such a Second Front. There is no more opposition on the part of the British Government to the establishment in India after the war of a political freedom as complete as that enjoyed by any other of the British Dominions than there is opposition on their part to the establishment of a Second Front in Europe. Any suggestion to the contrary is an accusation of bad faith on the part of the British Government, and a disservice to the unity of the United Nations, which is so essential to the fulfillment of our hopes for a durable settlement after the war.

Public opinion in all the countries that have adhered to the Atlantic Charter must be vigilant to see that their Governments do nothing that is inconsistent with either the terms or the spirit of that Charter. Public discussion, therefore, of British policy in India should not be discouraged. It is all to the good. But it is incumbent on all those who take part in such discussion to make themselves acquainted with the actual facts of the Indian problem. This is not easy, because the facts are continually being misstated, not only inadvertently by those who are ignorant of them, but deliberately by those who know the true facts but for political reasons desire to keep up a fiction. This is not the only subject on which people form opinions more flattering than the facts warrant. There are always people who falsify facts in order to justify their opinions, but such people seldom advance the cause they have at heart.

In America, the words, empire and imperialism, have ugly associations, and criticism of the British Empire arises from the prejudice that these words create. Imperialism suggests domination, and empire is thought to be the antithesis of democracy, because in the past those words have so often had that meaning. But if there is to be close collaboration after this war between the British and the Americans, who today are facing common dangers and enduring common sacrifices in the cause of human liberty, it would be well to remember that these words have in the course of years acquired a new meaning.

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The British Empire has given to the world the great Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, whose people are as free as those of Britain or America, and in which democracy is as firmly established. British imperialism has not restricted the area of democratic government—it has carried democracy to the ends of the earth. It has afforded the most conspicuous example of a union of free peoples who, without constraint, are bound together by common ideals, and whose union threatens the welfare of no other people. It is the aim and desire of all these peoples to see India included in their community on terms of equality, enjoying the same freedom, and united with them in the pursuit of the same ideals. This is a task that has never before been accomplished in the world, never even attempted. To achieve it will be the proudest chapter in the history of the British race.

Any help we can obtain from the people of the United States to achieve this great object will be sincerely welcomed. Their advice would indeed be helpful, because they have more experience than we have of a federal constitution. They, too, have solved some of the problems that India has yet to solve. They have welded together into a single nation under a democratic constitution peoples of different race, religion, and language. Their problem has not been identical with that of India, but it has been nearer to it than the political development of Britain; and they should the better appreciate the difficulties of the task to which we are committed and with which the peoples of India are confronted. Their sympathy and help will be welcomed. Their criticism of our efforts will not be resented, provided always that our object is not misunderstood, nor our sincerity doubted. But I beg them not to allow the prejudice created by words to lead them to doubt that our zeal to extend the bounds of freedom is as great as theirs, or that our policy is dictated by any wish to perpetuate domination or to promote our own interests at the expense of any other people.

INDIA

IN THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE WAR

BY HENRY STANLEY

THE grand strategy of the United Nations is beginning to unfold its offensive shape, and the day of new large-scale engagements with not only the European but the Asiatic enemy does not seem far off. Expectation and apprehension alike have been quickened in the Far East by the appointment of a new soldier Viceroy of India, by a new American and Australian assault on the periphery of Japanese power, and by the development of a great political offensive by the Japanese in Thailand, in the Philippines, and against India.

Prior to the outbreak of war, India was underindustrailized in relation to its resources of raw materials and man power. The only large-scale machine industry was concentrated in textiles. Steel production was low, and machine-tool and motor production was nonexistent. The war has changed this. The fall of France and the concentrated German aerial bombardment of Britain forced an alteration in economic policy, and in the autumn of 1940 the Eastern Group Conference assembled in New Delhi for the purpose of planning industrial development. The Japanese attack has accelerated this new trend and in March, 1942, an American Technical Mission was sent to India to assist in the solution of industrial problems and to give technical advice to Lend-Lease authorities supplying India.

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As a result of these changes in policy, heavy industry has developed rapidly. Steel production is 100 per cent above pre-war figures, and new types of steel are now being produced. Fifty plants are now producing the simpler types of machine tools. The chemical industry has expanded very rapidly. India is now meeting all its own requirements of high explosives and is exporting surpluses. Air frame production has been undertaken, and trainer and fighter types are being turned out. Before the war, India produced no seagoing ships; today Indian yards are launching small naval craft of several varieties.

These developments have altered the financial relationships between India and Britain. India's sterling debt before the war amounted to £360 million. This has been reduced to a negligible sum. The sterling assets of the Reserve Bank of India have increased from a pre-war average of £58 million to the present high level of approximately £350 million. This represents a transfer of capital almost as considerable as that involved in the liquidation of British holdings in the U. S. A. during World War I. It means that indigenous capitalist interests have been greatly strengthened. There are, however, no means available at present of determining the extent to which Indian rather than British firms have benefited by this transfer of assets.

Regardless of what groups are being strengthened by the development of heavy industry, India is physically stronger than she was before the war. Added to industrial development is the recruitment of an army of nearly 2,000,000 men. Not only the quantity but the quality of the army is improving, and men are now being trained as aircrew members, tank drivers, and masters of complex artillery and signaling apparatus.

All these new developments represent real and desirable progress, but they must not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in the absence of a solution to many broad political, social, and economic problems, these changes may only contribute to the force of the final explosion in India. The problem of food supply provides an illustration of this thesis. The growth of the army and the industrial working class, the loss of Burma, and the concentration of armies in neighboring states, such as Iran, have combined to put heavy pressure on India's food resources. In the best of times, India's production has been barely able to keep life going, and the country has been in a state of acute agrarian crisis for a quarter of a century. The principal difficulties are the multiplicity of small holdings, absentee landlordism, high interest rates, heavy debt burdens, and backward techniques.

Seventy-three per cent of the Indian people work on the land. Of these an enormous mass of 33,000,000 are landless laborers. Another 65,000,000 are tenant farmers. In the Punjab, where the best agricultural conditions exist, less than 20 per cent of the peasants are free of debt. In this same province, 74 per cent of the peasants work less than ten acres, 43 per cent less than three acres. In parts of Bengal, holdings as small as 1/160th of an acre have been recorded. Nor is farming highly capitalized. In the Punjab, agricultural capital averages $12 an acre, compared with twelve to fifteen times this sum in many parts of the United States. Yields are correspondingly poor. In 1938-39, the Indian rice yield was 731 pounds an acre, compared with 2,079 pounds an acre in Japan and 3,000 in Italy. Average wheat yields are less than five bushels an acre.

Before the war, India was producing approximately 60 million tons of food crops per annum. The war has cut this total about 5 per cent, but this reduction has been sufficient to create the peril of famine. Political and economic uncertainty, together with the greed of a host of small dealers, has aggravated the situation, and hoarding and speculative buying and selling have artificially enlarged the dimensions of the food crisis. The Government's price-control policy has failed completely, and the London *Economist* records that the cereal index rose from 112 in January, 1942, to 174 in August, 1942. The oil-seed index rose from 108 to 167 in the same period.

On January 7, 1943, Mr. M. N. Sarkar, the Commerce Member of the Government of India, publicly described the over-all situation as "truly serious." He ordered the prohibition of all exports of food from March 1, 1943, onward. The British Government has undertaken to ship "substan-

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tial quantities" of grain to India, "notwithstanding heavy calls on available shipping." In order to counter the activities of speculators, the Government has adopted a new price-control policy of buying and selling on government account, and regulating shipments across provincial boundaries.

The Welsh poet, Alun Lewis, now a British soldier in India, describes the situation thus in a letter to the London *New Statesman and Nation:*

> Bombay had great crowds at the races and long queues for food. The Governor was dispensing relief among the starving villages of his Presidency. In Bengal, the stress has shifted from politics to food; famine relief is a demand Hindu and Moslem can make together. Born and bred in South Wales, I thought I knew the face of poverty, but the poverty of India is like acid in the brain. . . . All in all, soldiering out here is a nasty job and is likely to get worse. An awful lot of people are asking for bread; and all they seem to be handing out these days is stones.

This situation is not inevitable. It stems from the fatal policy of attempting to make a modern state without getting rid of the parasitic classes and the backward social organization which doom the people to poverty. It seems as if the Paramount Power is absolutely incapable of getting to the heart of the problem. A recent reform illustrates this. The Viceroy cut through the fiction of princely sovereignty by ordering a number of tiny states to be grouped around the state of Baroda for purposes of education and hospital service. This was a desirable and long-needed change, but, in carrying it out, the Viceroy refused to do away with the princes themselves, who draw great revenues from the labor of their subjects and yet perform no social function whatsoever. The peasants still have to bear these burdensome princelings upon their backs, and the nourishing of parasites takes from the development of agriculture.

II

POLITICAL unease is as much a besetting evil as famine. Lord Linlithgow and the India Office in London seem for the time being to have accomplished their object of smashing the Indian National Congress. One thousand and twenty-eight have been killed, 3,200 wounded, 900 flogged, and 44,000 jailed. These are impressive statistics, and they indicate that for the present the prospect of democratic unity in India is dim and unsubstantial.

Not only has the organization of the Congress been broken and driven underground, but the policies of its leaders have been bankrupted by events. Gandhi's policy of neutrality vis-à-vis Britain and Japan no longer has much meaning in terms of Indian independence because it is not now likely that the British and Japanese will engage each other on Indian soil. There is no prospect of a "deal." If Gandhi wishes to use nonviolence as a bargaining weapon, he will have to recalculate his position in terms of negotiation with Great Britain alone.

Nehru's policy of democratic collaboration with the United Nations on the basis of Indian independence does not seem to be a possible policy today. Cripps, who represented a temporizing influence in the British Cabinet, has been relegated to the background. Messrs. Churchill and Amery present a resolute front to the world on the subject of an immediate readjustment of policy toward India, and American silence has not discouraged them in this. Since the single voice of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was raised eighteen months ago, there has been no official suggestion in the camp of the United Nations that authentic Indian politicians be given some real power, not in the future, but now in the moment of crisis. For a few months it seemed as if the gulf between the camp of imperialism and the camp of democratic change would be bridged. That attempt failed, and the men who tried have been discarded in Britain and jailed in India.

A curious fact belies much of the propaganda against the Indian National Congress to the effect that it fosters Hindu communalism. The suppression of the Congress has led to more, not less, communal dissension. Since the announcement by Cripps that Britain would sanction a separate Moslem state, and particularly since the jailing of the Congress leaders, the Moslem Legaue, the principal vehicle of Moslem separatism, has risen like a phoe-

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nix from the flames of political discord. Before the war, the Moslem League controlled less than 25 per cent of the seats in the provincial legislatures and less than 15 per cent of the Moslem votes. Today the League controls the governments of several provinces, including Bengal. The Moslem separatists have the whip hand, and the Moslem advocates of Moslem-Hindu unity are under severe attack. Recently the former premier of Sind, Allah Baksh, who resigned his office in protest against the attacks on the Congress, was assassinated while he was attending a meeting of Moslems who support Indian unity and independence. When questioned about his death, a spokesman for the Indian Office described the former premier as "an obscure politician associated with a political movement of no consequence."

The only heartening event in this rampaging growth of sectarian animosity has been the proceedings of the All-India Momin Conference. This conference is the representative organization of the Momin Sect, a large group of Moslem peasants and workers. It has denounced the Moslem League, and it has reiterated its stand on behalf of Indian unity and independence.

The peril of famine and smoldering political unrest are not the ingredients of victory. The United Nations have still to fight a long war of attrition against the Japanese. After an initial *Blitz* which won great victories, the Japanese have settled down to make good the deficiencies of their economy and to equip themselves for the long pull. Victory in this war of attrition will go to the nations which are the most steadfast and the most efficiently organized. It is still an open question whether India will be able to meet the requirements of such a struggle.

The appointment of Field Marshal Lord Wavell as Viceroy is a hopeful development. Wavell, perhaps more than any other British officer, has fostered the democratization of the British Army and has helped to develop that democratic discipline and initiative which has served the world so well in North Africa. The consciousness of freedom he regards as an essential ingredient of a fighting army and presumably a fighting nation. This is his testament to freedom:

> The British have been a free people and are still a comparatively free people; and though we are not, thank Heaven, a military nation, this tradition of freedom gives to our junior leaders in war a priceless gift of initiative. So long as this initiative is not cramped by too many regulations, by too much formalism, we shall, I trust, continue to win our battles—sometimes in spite of our higher commanders.

A man of such sentiments may be able to do something with India. He may be able to break through the formalism of thought which throws the onus of agreement upon Indian politicians who are denied the right to discuss their problems among themselves and with interested foreigners. He may be able to bring together those Indian politicians of every party who believe in the defeat of the Axis, to give them his trust, and to let the "priceless gift of initiative" transform India and the war effort of the United Nations in this theater.

Any steps Lord Wavell may take to form an Indian Government representing the main parties of the nation, and any broad delegation of power to such a government, will win wide support in Britain, in the United States, in the British Dominions, and in India itself. The British Labor party has indicated its support for such a policy. Important groups of British Conservatives are not unwilling to experiment boldly. In India, such action will be welcomed by Congress leaders both in and out of jail. The Hindu Mahasabha supports such a policy. The Communist party of India has recently aligned itself with this policy. The only people now opposed to such action, and who desire "to unite and drive out the British," are the leaders of the Moslem League, a few elements in the Indian National Congress, and renegade politicians like Subhas Chandra Bose, who is now operating from Japanese territory.

It would, indeed, be ironical if the war effort of the United Nations, dedicated as it is to democracy and world harmony, should fail through the shame of racial prejudice and political discord. The danger of such failure is not remote or unreal, and British and American leaders have the heavy responsibility of examining their consciences and their policies on this subject.

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Progress of the Struggle

by NORMAN ANGELL

AMERICAN opinion is now facing, in the problem of this country's relations with France, Russia, Britain, and other powers, what many seem to regard as a quite new adventure on the rough seas of international politics. The popular view is that the United States has heretofore been quite outside the orbit of diplomacy, "foreign entanglements," and the game of "power politics" (commonly regarded as discreditable activities best left to foreigners).

This, of course, is hardly an adequate view of America's past, though the internationalist aspect of America's policy ever since she became an independent state, seems to have entered extremely little into the consciousness of the American public. On the eve of tremendous developments in American foreign policy, it is timely, perhaps, to remind ourselves that America was born and has lived by grace of co-operation with other states; that if she had been "isolationist" at the beginning of her career, and had remained so, there would not have been a United States of America.

It is true, of course, that most of those who came to America came to get away from the politics and the social and political systems of Europe. But it is also, if paradoxically, true that America would never have been able to provide that haven and refuge except by constant and sustained co-operation with European nations.

It is strange how little this internationalist aspect of America's background seems to have been realized. This is explained in part, possibly, by the fact that history, as commonly taught, is presented in its isolationist aspect. The first emphasis is on independence, not interdependence; on that part of the Farewell Address which warned against alliances with Europe; on Jefferson's insistence that Europe's interests were distinct from America's. The average high school student, it would seem, emerges from his study of history with the general impression that America has always been free from the game of "power politics"; that alliances are not for her; that where she has to deal with European diplomats, she is certain to come out second best; that she has no need of the help of foreign nations, and should, broadly speaking, have as little as possible to do with them.

Yet even so, the student is aware of events which indicate that America probably owes her independence to a very shrewd bargain—virtually an alliance—with France, a nation which, just before the American Revolution, American soldiers had been fighting, side by side with the British; that, the French alliance during the American Revolution having served its entirely legitimate purpose of fighting Britain, the authors of the American Revolution were only a few years later quite ready to make an alliance with Britain against France, now become the France of Napoleon; that when the era of Napoleon was succeeded by the era of the Holy Alliance, Jefferson himself strongly favored what would have amounted to an alliance with Britain; and that the most characteristic feature of American policy during a century, the Monroe Doctrine, was based upon an unavowed alliance with Britain.

What is interesting in this history is that Jefferson, the very father, the saint of American Jeffersonian democracy, did not hesitate in the least to recommend an alliance, or an arrangement of an alliance nature, with Great Britain—a fact which American statesmen of a century later certainly hesitated to do for fear that Jefferson and "Jeffersonian democracy" would be invoked against any such arrangement. The Elder Statesman, the Founding Father, who had seen British troops burn the White House, was less afraid of popular Anglophobia than perhaps any American statesman other than the present President.

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The correspondence between Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison on the subject of Britain's offer (now a century and a quarter old) to support the United States in resisting any attempt by Spain to reconquer Latin America, has a striking relevance to the problems of America today. Monroe, in a letter to Jefferson dated October 17, 1823, puts a series of questions still put today, particularly in respect of the problems that will confront this country at the next peace. "Shall we," asks Monroe of Jefferson, "entangle ourselves at all in European politics and wars on the side of any power against others?" He then asks, "If a case can exist in which a sound maxim may and ought to be departed from, is not the present instance precisely that case?" He goes on: "Has not the epoch arrived when Great Britain must take her stand either on the side of the monarchs of Europe or of the United States, and in consequence either in favor of Despotism or of liberty, and may it not be presumed that aware of that necessity, her government has seized on the present occurrence as that, which it deems the most suitable to announce and mark the commencement of that career?"

This correspondence, it will be recalled, had arisen as the result of the suggestion made by Canning, the British Foreign Minister, that the United States and Britain take a joint and common line in respect of the projects of the Holy Alliance looking to the reconquest of the Latin American colonies. Monroe's own view about the proposal is clearly enough indicated in a passage of his letter to Jefferson, thus:

> My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British government and make it known that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us.

It is, however, the terms of the reply made by Jefferson which read so significantly today – the more significantly because this correspondence seems to be all but unknown. Jefferson himself had no doubts at all about the supreme historical importance of what he was then suggesting. "The question presented by the letters you have sent me," he writes Monroe, "is the most momentous ever offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation. This sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us." He restates the case against "entangling alliances"; repeats his opinion that America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe and peculiarly her own.

Up to this point, one might assume that Jefferson was merely once more making the case for isolationism. And up to this point, Colonel McCormick himself might cheer. Jefferson was fully stating the familiar case for a purely American policy because he was not the man to take a decision on the basis of a one-sided view, or with any of the pertinent facts omitted. But note what followed. He reminds Monroe that the American purpose is to make this whole hemisphere one of freedom, and that one nation, "most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit." He had in view probably the fact that Britain had just emerged from the defeat of Napoleon—a defeat complete and absolute that had been accomplished in the last analysis by sea power. ("Napoleon was defeated," said Mahan, "by storm-tossed ships he never even saw.") The sea power of Britain was then, in 1823, even more absolute than it had been at the time of Waterloo. It was this power that now offered to co-operate with the United States in preventing the reconquest by Spain of the colonies that had declared their independence. Jefferson saw what it meant: America then confronted a totalitarian "Axis"—that of the Holy Alliance—as she confronts one now. And to Monroe, Jefferson counseled:

> Our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit. She now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the [despotic] bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any, or all, on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship, and nothing would tend more to knit our

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affections than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars, but the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war. For how would they propose to get at their enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance calling itself Holy.

In this three-cornered correspondence Madison made a suggestion which amounted to this: Why not stop aggressions before they have become dangerous by virtue of the conquests which they achieve without interference? Why limit the principle of the Monroe Doctrine to the Western Hemisphere? Would not the United States and Britain, the predominant powers of the New and the Old World together, be able in combination to forbid the conquest of a weak state by a strong one anywhere?

John H. Latané, who has dealt more fully with this incident than have most American historians, tells us that "Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting the British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even further and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the American republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late invasion of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks, who were then struggling for independence from Turkey. Monroe, it appears, was strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took a different view."

In his "History of American Foreign Policy," Latané adds this comment: "The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in favor of an alliance with Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the world, have been severely criticized by some historians and ridiculed by others, but time and circumstances often bring about a complete change in our point of view. After our entrance into the great world conflict several writers raised the question as to whether the three elder statesmen were not right and Adams and Clay wrong. If the United States and England had come out in favor of a general declaration against intervention in the concerns of small states and established it as a world-wide principle, the course of human history during the next century might have been very different." It might indeed.

And now this same debate is on again. The counsel of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe on this point is still regarded with extreme suspicion. A closer understanding with Britain would, urge these critics, create misgivings with Russia, China, France, and the lesser states. The thirty Allied nations should be brought in before any special arrangement with Britain is concluded. Possibly. Yet the history of the Monroe Doctrine has something to tell us on that point too. Note first that it worked; it did prevent any attempt to reconquer the ex-colonies of Latin America. It began as a unilateral declaration by the United States, without consultation with the Latin American republics concerned. If it had been necessary to consult them and get their agreement, still more if it had been necessary to draw up a complete Pan-American Constitution of all the republics of the Western Hemisphere, it is extremely doubtful whether the Doctrine would ever have seen the light at all. For those republics then were in great disorder, quarreling bitterly among themselves—a not very remote analogy to the probable condition of the future post-armistice Europe. Yet this doctrine, which began as a mere declaration of the United States, backed by British naval power, developed in time into the Good Neighbor Doctrine, a mutually accepted arrangement maintained as between equals. If it had not be-

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gun as it did begin, it would not in all probability have developed as it has.

As to alienating Russia, Britain and Russia have just concluded a twenty-year dual alliance, special to themselves. Has it alienated the United States, as we are told an Anglo-American understanding would alienate Russia? What Russia seeks in her alliance with Britain is such added security as Britain's power can give. If to that power were added also the power of the United States, it is extremely unlikely that Russia would be anything but delighted. Indeed, the chances are that Russia will deem the Anglo-Russian arrangement of doubtful value until the United States is added to it.

As to France, De Gaullist forces were until recently closer to Britain than to America. Is it certain that France would prefer to deal with each separately? After all, Churchill once offered France a solemn Act of Union. Would such a Union alienate the United States or Russia? If we could imagine it taking place, so that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty became an Anglo-French-Soviet Treaty, and that in its turn associated with a close Anglo-American understanding, should we not then be on the road to the necessary unities? "Those who are allied to the same nation are allied to one another."

World Scene in Washington

by ERNEST K. LINDLEY

THE movement to obtain a declaration from Congress in favor of the participation of the United States in an international organization to enforce peace is making headway. Approximately a dozen Senators and an equal number of Representatives have promised to make speeches this summer in behalf of the Ball (or B^2H^2) resolution. Several of them intend to make quite active campaigns. Other members of the two houses of the national legislature have indicated that they will speak in behalf of the simpler Fulbright resolution. Prominent members of both major parties predict a very serious effort to agree on the core of a national foreign policy when Congress reconvenes in September.

The direction of the political wind has been revealed by the unanimous approval of the Fulbright resolution by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and by the statements in favor of international collaboration recently made by various candidates for the Republican Presidential nomination, including Governor Bricker of Ohio. The fact is that a majority of the practical politicians in the Republican party have concluded that they have no chance of defeating President Roosevelt for re-election in 1944 if foreign policy is the dominant issue of the campaign. Their only hope, as they see it, is to neutralize foreign policy as an issue, so that they may focus their attacks on Mr. Roosevelt's domestic policies. (They assume, as do most Democratic politicians, that Mr. Roosevelt will run for a fourth term.) In short, they have decided that isolationism is presently unpopular. They want to get rid of this label in 1944 and expunge it from their past records. There are two ways of going about this. One is by writing a strong internationalist plank in the Republican national platform next year. The other is by voting in Congress for an appropriate resolution. Many Republican members of Congress would feel safer if both were done. They know that they will have to defend their individual voting records. These cannot be corrected by a declaration from the national party convention, to which some of them will not even go as delegates.

The B^2H^2 resolution, however, is too detailed and therefore too controversial to muster the support of a large majority of both parties. In its present form, it would provoke bitter debate and fail in its purpose to obtain agreement on international pol-

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icy. Its reference to the formation of an international police force is open to every sort of interpretation. To some, it signifies that the United States would no longer have a navy, air force, and army of its own. That would go far beyond what probably most Americans mean by international collaboration in the enforcement of peace. Senator Ball and his associates explain that they have in mind only the formation of a small force directly under the control of the United Nations and they expect the United States and other victorious nations to maintain in addition their own national forces—at least for a long time to come. But it is difficult to reduce this concept to the terms of a resolution.

Representative Fulbright, liberal Democrat from Arkansas, set out to avoid all these controversies over details. His resolution is the simplest possible. It asks only that Congress express itself "as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein." As a declaration of intention this may be adequate. This Congress cannot bind its successors. It cannot commit itself to take any particular future action on concrete proposals. Until it is called upon to approve definite actions, it can only express its general sentiments.

Many Democrats and some internationalist Republicans feel that the Fulbright resolution is too simple—that it provides the ex-isolationists with too easy an escape. Senator Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, predicts that his committee will approve a resolution "stronger" than the Fulbright formula but less complicated than the B^2H^2 proposal. Unanimous agreement within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hardly seems politically practicable, however. This committee includes such long-standing and unflinching isolationists as Hiram Johnson, of California; Gerald P. Nye, of North Dakota; and Henrik Shipstead, of Minnesota—as well as Bennett C. Clark, of Missouri; and Arthur H. Vandenberg, of Michigan.

One of the dangers which any resolution of this sort is bound to encounter in the Senate is a clause reaffirming or defining the Senate's right to ratify treaties. This right is, of course prescribed by the Constitution. But the dividing line is vague between treaties, which the Senate must ratify by a two-thirds majority, and agreements, which the Executive may make by his own authority or with the approval of simple majorities of both houses. Many Senators feel that the Roosevelt Administration has overstepped the bounds repeatedly. They suspect also that Mr. Roosevelt will contrive to work out the agreements essential to the organization of the peace without submitting any treaty to the Senate. The Senate's concern for the last letter of its own prerogatives is likely to confuse discussion of the merits of any general declaration on foreign policy.

The main trend in Congress—which is only a reflection of what Congress thinks the public wants—is quite clear, however. How the President will make use of this trend remains to be disclosed. Some of his advisers think he should unfold more rapidly his more explicit views on the organization of the peace. Others think he should wait first for a crystallization of Congressional sentiment—that his first objective must be to unite the nation firmly behind the essentials of a foreign policy. This is a choice which he has had to make repeatedly during the last ten years. Obviously, a united front on questions of foreign policy is most desirable. But, except for temporary propaganda purposes, it has value only as it can be translated into concrete actions. The real test will not be the vote on a declaration of sentiments, but the support given to the definite steps which the President may take toward committing the United States to continuing international collaboration.

The draft agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration may provide one such test. To some Senators it looks very much like a treaty which should be subject to ratification by the Senate. The substance of the draft agreement has not been widely discussed in political circles, at this writing, although the isolationist press has opened its attacks on what it chooses to describe as "an international WPA."

Informed observers are especially interested in the international reaction to the form of organization proposed, by which all

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member governments are represented on the policy-guiding Council but the standing central committee consists only of the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States, plus the Director General chosen unanimously by them and removable only by their unanimous vote. The provision for regional councils for Europe and the Far East, and possibly other areas, also is regarded as a significant feature.

Objections from some of the smaller United Nations were anticipated. In submitting the draft agreement, on which the so-called "Big Four" had agreed, to the other United and associated nations, the State Department emphasized that the plan was still tentative and that no action would be proposed until all had been given the opportunity for full consideration and discussion. Informed officials recognize that the blending of the responsibilities of the Big Four with those of the smaller nations is not an easy problem. They admit that there may be better ways of doing it. But this is the most practicable way they have been able to devise so far, and they feel that this problem should be faced now since, until it is solved, no real progress can be made toward setting up United Nations machinery.

The tentative date for the United Nations Conference on Relief and Rehabilitation is "some time after August 15." The date will be fixed and invitations issued only after all prospective participants have had a chance to discuss and present their views on the draft agreement. Plans for conferences on air commerce, mineral sources, and other problems are still in the formative stage.

The Russian Mysteries

THE second Davies mission to Moscow is still enwrapped in mystery. It was assumed in official circles that he went to arrange a meeting between the President and Stalin. After his return, rumors spread that he had failed. However, according to an authoritative source, the mission was a complete success. The answer may well be, as one London report stated, that Stalin accepted the invitation without fixing a definite time. The truth is known only to a few and, for obvious reasons, they are bound to silence.

Washington feels moderately encouraged by the apparent trend of Soviet policy toward economic and political collaboration. But the trend is not yet reflected at the military level, where it is most urgently needed. Stalin has been kept fully informed about the strategic decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He is getting an ever-increasing flow of American and British equipment and supplies and, according to military sources, the benefit of everything we know. But American and British observers have not yet been permitted to frequent the Soviet battle fronts, where they could learn much of inestimable value, not only about the performance of our equipment, but about German tactics and weapons.

Officials here do not pretend to know the explanation of Stalin's strong hint, in his June 27 message to Mr. Roosevelt, that American and British forces should strike from the west as soon as possible. Stalin knew what our plans were and that they would not be modified by a statement from him. Nevertheless, the message was widely read as an intimation of at least mild dissatisfaction with American-British military strategy. Some thought it was intended chiefly for Russian internal consumption: to let the Russian General Staff, Army, and people know that he was using every means at his command to bring their Western allies into major direct contact with the German Army at the earliest possible time. It is expected that if the Russians become hard pressed, as they did at Stalingrad last summer, Moscow's demands will become more urgent.

In general, however, high officials and military men feel too well satisfied with the progress of the war to be unduly concerned about military hints or pleas from the Kremlin. They do not believe that Russia will be forced out of the war or reduced to military impotence. They think that American-British operations have already relieved the pressure on Russia and that although their plans may not be the most satisfactory to the Russians at the present moment, they are the plans best devised to win the war conclusively as soon as possible—which is what the Russians, as well as all the other United Nations, most earnestly want.

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I do not propose to venture far into the quagmire of controversy over French affairs. But it seems desirable, in the interest of truth and understanding, to explode one myth: that American policy toward the French is the policy of a "pro-Fascist" clique in the State Department. As in all such matters, the men down the line have their influence and are responsible for day-to-day execution. But a matter of this importance is not determined by them. Our French policy is the policy of the President and Secretary Hull and, in its essentials, is fully concurred in by Prime Minister Churchill and the British Government. They are pledged to restore the independence of France and to afford the French the opportunity to form a government of their own choosing. The notion that they are contriving to saddle the French with a reactionary government, or that they would permit them to be saddled by a fascist government, is, of course, quite absurd. If they are not the spokesmen of democracy, and its trustees, who is?

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Results of the Labor Party Conference

by JOHN CLYDE

LONDON, *June 27, 1943*

FOG obscures the British political scene. A Conservative-dominated Government is winning the war *in accord with* the Tory way of life. Recent speeches by junior Ministers, like Mr. Ralph Assheton, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, and Mr. Osbert Peake, Parliamentary Undersecretary to the Home Office, disclose their determination to win the war *for* the Tory way of life. Meantime, the essentially radical English, lacking confidence in any existing party and with little hope of developing a new party capable of challenging the Conservative-Labor political monopoly, move steadily Leftward.* And the nine sessions of the Labor Party Conference, far from clarifying political issues, merely made the fog thicker than the minestrone in pre-war Soho.

Labor's Conference took two big and mutually destructive decisions. After a perfunctory debate, in which only one relevant speech was delivered, it swallowed Mr. Morrison's policy of converting wartime economic controls into keys for realizing socialism in post-war Britain. Then it defeated Mr. Morrison's candidature for the Party Treasurership, thus banning him from the National Executive of the party and breaking the one personal instrument capable of implementing the new policy. The question is not whether the Morrison policy is good or bad. The question is whether, having accepted the policy, the Labor party desired the leadership which would attune the party machine to the tasks of putting it over to the country and translating it into legislative fact. To its clamant need for leadership, Labor turned an unheroic Nelson's eye.

The discussion on the Beveridge Plan, the only one in which the delegates maintained a high level of debate, revealed yet again this party's amazing capacity for blunting its own sword. Passionate expression was given to the demand for Beveridge. Conference was disinclined to quibble about

* A recent Gallup Poll taken by the British Institute of Public Opinion suggests that, in a General Election, 38 in every 100 voters would poll Labor; 25, Conservative; 9, Liberal; 3, Communist; and 11 for various smaller groups. Only 11 would be undecided, and only 3 would refuse to exercise the franchise.

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details, to question whether this or that aspect of the plan is socialistic enough. It reflected faithfully the British people's feeling that Beveridge is a minimum war aim, and that the Government should proceed now to build social security into the fabric of the State. It applauded the action of ninety Labor M.P.'s who, in Parliament, defied Labor Ministers in order to support Beveridge, cheered wildly every mention of the name of Mr. Arthur Greenwood, leader of the Parliamentary Labor party and ex-Minister of Reconstruction, who set up the Beveridge Committee. It made a mighty demonstration which, but for the Executive, the Government might not have dared to ignore. The Executive put up Mr. Greenwood to damp down the delegates' ardor! He pleaded that Conference should not insist upon action to an extent that might embarrass the Government! The Executive could have got its way without reducing, in the eyes of the country and the Government, the stature of Mr. Greenwood as the virile champion of the Beveridge Plan. But it chose to get its way by compromising Mr. Greenwood. Listening, I wondered how a party that places loyalty to a Coalition above loyalty to the country can expect to retain its greatness or even its power to survive.

In upholding the electoral truce and defeating decisively the Communist party's application for affiliation, Conference acted according to current forecast. It "beat the book," however, by approving a resolution fixing war guilt on the entire German people and saying good-by to its own hard-won reputation as a custodian of internationalism among the insular British.

II

LEST this judgment appear to be harsh, I ought to record that the case for differentiating between Germans and Nazis was put in the right way by the wrong person. It was argued by Mr. R. R. Stokes, M.P., a wealthy Roman Catholic who, besides confusing social consciousness with socialism, is suspected of being a near-pacifist. The debate was sidetracked by allegations about the activities of a Mr. Walter Loeb, a former German state banker who runs a richly endowed Fight for Freedom group with which Lord Vansittart and several prominent Trade Union leaders are associated. The "block" votes of the Trade Unions were organized to support their friends, just as they were organized to defeat Mr. Morrison's campaign for the Treasurership. On the war guilt resolution, nine in ten of the local Labor parties voted for Mr. Stokes; but they cast only 500,000 votes altogether. Eight in ten of the Trade Unions, holding 2,000,000 votes, backed Mr. Loeb. Altogether, a dismal performance.

Two high lights pierce the encircling gloom. One is that the British attitude to the German people cannot remain undefined much longer; and the Labor movement must assume a vigorous initiative in this matter or destroy its own mighty strength in the constituencies. The other is that, just as Mr. Churchill is the Man of the War, Sir William Beveridge promises to emerge as the Man of the Peace. Beveridge, as much as Mr. Bevin, thwarted Mr. Morrison's bid for leadership. Since the Conference, Mr. Morrison has been giving his own interpretation of its implications. He announces himself "a strong advocate of a comprehensive and unified scheme of social security." He is eager that the battle for the Treasurership should not be considered a tussle between the Trade Unions and the local Labor parties. Nobody denies that Mr. Morrison supports Beveridge, if he says so. Nobody is in a position to dispute the statement that, inside the Government, he has fought for the plan. Nobody doubts that the Government gave him a dusty answer, or that he tried to present that answer to the House of Commons as an endorsement of the plan. That Parliamentary speech, acclaimed by the Tories as a great personal triumph, took the edge off the enthusiasm with which, hitherto, the local Labor parties had upheld Mr. Morrison, and it gained no compensatory support from the Trade Union bosses who see a Morrison-run Labor party as a challenge to their domination. Mr. Morrison is fully capable of learning the lessons. The only hope of the Left in Great Britain is that he will learn them—and quickly. That Labor should cast down its one competent leader is a disaster for the party, for the country, perhaps for the world.

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THE FUTURE OF ITALY

ESSENTIAL FINDINGS

I

Italy's welfare, both in her domestic and foreign relations, depends upon her being reconstituted as a democracy. Her people want a republican form of government because the monarchy has forfeited their allegiance. They also desire cordial relations with the Vatican within the formula of a separate church and state.

II

As a democracy Italy will not seek imperialistic conquests either in the Mediterranean or in Africa, but will play her immemorial role as a bridge between the civilizations of Eastern and Western Europe.

III

A progressive program of industrial and agrarian reform, combined with a liberal international colonization policy, is necessary to solve Italy's problems of poverty and excess population.

WHEN the participants of this Round Table gathered in the office of FREE WORLD on June 24, they were aware that an attack on Italy was imminent. They discussed the future of Italy with that in mind, but they rightly dwelt on the long-range problems of national reconstruction and international relations rather than on the immediate questions of Allied occupation. However, between the holding of the Round Table and its publication came the invasion of Sicily. It pushed into the foreground the problem of military occupation, and the relationship between the armed forces and the local population.

Fortunately, the arrangement of the Round Table enabled us to cover this problem too. A number of the participants were not present at the discussion. In sending in their contributions later, they dwelt on the immediate issues. These included: Sir Norman Angell, regular contributor to our pages; General Julius Deutsch, former Austrian Minister of War, and one of the leaders of the Austrian labor movement; Miss Freda Kirchwey, editor of *The Nation;* Colonel Randolfo Pacciardi, now editor of *La Legione dell' Italia del Popolo,* and one of the outstanding fighters in the Italian Underground movement, who organized the Garibaldi Battalion, later the Twelfth International Brigade, which fought against the Fascists in Spain; C. G. Paulding, literary editor of *Commonweal;* and Don Luigi Sturzo, anti-fascist leader of the Catholic Workers organization and founder of the Popular (Catholic) party, the second largest in Italy, which held one hundred and ten out of five hundred and five seats in the Chamber of Deputies before fascism came to power.

Those present at the discussion were: Bogdan Raditsa, publicist and press chief of the Yugoslav Information Center in the United States; Count Carlo Sforza, former Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Basil Vlavianos, publisher and editor of the *National Herald.* Johan J. Smertenko, author and member of our Editorial Board, presided.

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ROUND TABLE No. 17

JOHAN J. SMERTENKO—Almost any moment now, the blow will be struck which will take the question we have before us today out of the realm of theory about the future into the field of immediate action. Undoubtedly, the Allied statesmen who decide and direct the progress of the war have before them the recommendations of their staffs of experts as to the future of Italy. We trust these are well-founded, well intentioned, and well reasoned.

What we shall try to do now, therefore, is to formulate a supplementary report by those who are competent to speak about Italy, about her place in the community of nations. We are fortunate to have among us Count Carlo Sforza, the acknowledged leader of free Italians everywhere in the world and the Chairman of the National Committee of Free Italians elected at the recent conference in Montevideo. I think you will agree that we shall profit by having a statement of his views on Italian problems as a basis for our discussion.

CARLO SFORZA — May I begin by submitting to you that the Italian problem is morally, politically, and historically most antithetic to the German problem? In Germany, there was never a tradition of democracy; in Germany, never a revolution. In Italy, we have a long story which shows that political independence and rule by democracy is an old and solidly rooted practice. I am thinking not only of our old republics, which had LIBERTAS as their motto, but of a more significant characteristic of our history and of our social make-up: the assimilation by the cities of the aristocratic and feudal families. Italy was—and is in spite of the futile attempts of fascism—the only country in Western Europe where titles of nobility are mere words without any idea of caste—and this is true democracy. When you think that in Germany admiration and servility to a Junker or to a titled German was and, alas, is the custom, the psychological reaction of the people, you will realize the profound difference between these two nations.

The movement of the Risorgimento amplified this sense of individual independence into a passion for national independence, but our Italian revolutions, successful in the political field, did not achieve a sufficient transformation in the social and economic field. This was bound to produce, one day, social upheavals in Italy. The growth of the Socialist party, and from 1919 on, the great success of the Christian-Democratic Popular party, made it clear that social equality and economic welfare for all had to be realized by the state before Italy could become a complete and perfect democracy. But was it not so more or less everywhere?

When Mussolini "marched" on Rome, he did not have more than 4 or 5 per cent of the nation behind him. This makes his case very different from that of Hitler, who had won for his program 40 per cent of the German vote in the Weimar Republic, so that he had only to burn the Reichstag and to brand the Communists as criminals in order to have a legal majority. Mussolini succeeded simply because, to the immense majority of the Italians, he appeared a gigantic joke, which would disappear by itself. At that time, I, for one, warned my compatriots that even the most stupid charlatan must be thrown out of power if one wants to avoid disaster. Napoleon III was a most mediocre fellow of the Mussolini type, but the French kept him in power, and they paid for it at Sedan.

Now, Mussolini is not only hated by the Italians but he is despised, and to be despised is in Italy much more serious than to be hated. But in spite of the fact that fascism is contrary to the spirit of Italy, we cannot avoid the brutal fact that Italy is now a defeated nation. Thus, what is the problem of Italy today? What is useful, what is desirable to do, for the peace of Europe and for the progress of Europe and for the progress of democracy in the world? What I have in mind is not to defend a lenient policy for Italy, but to see what is useful to everybody.

At the Montevideo Conference of August,

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1942, asked to formulate a program for the Italians struggling against fascism, I stated eight points, of which it may be not quite useless that I read you the essential elements:

1. As soon as they are freed from the nazi-fascist oppression, the Italian people will choose their political institutions.

2. All Italians will bow to the results of a free plebiscite. And if a democratic republic will be the choice of the nation, all I hear from Italy gives me the absolute certainty that there will be no opposition and no grudge from any side. . . .

3. Institutions matter little without men. A Free Italy will need men who know that the safest way to defend democracy and to promote the advent of a higher social justice is to impose the sternest respect for the law. These men exist even in the barren islands to which fascism has deported them.

4. The old humanistic civilization of Italy will find the necessary equilibrium between freedom of the spirit and economic organization. A decentralization based on our best intellectual traditions will help to create the new atmosphere of complete freedom of thought, of press and of cult.

5. A judicial system, completely independent, will initiate the new era with the most severe sanctions on those who in the highest ranks betrayed their solemn oath. Such severe justice will make it possible to pardon those who sinned mainly through fear or incomprehension, thus creating an Italy of peace, not of revenge.

6. The new Italian Government will have the authority to insist upon an equitable distribution of raw materials the Italian people need to maintain their admirable traditions of intelligent work.

7. We Italians know that these and other social and economic problems may be solved only in a world based on international solidarity, where there will no longer be room for the anarchical independence of the nationalistic states. That is why Free Italy will give the most ardent support to the advent of such an organized world. . . .

8. The Italians will co-operate with courage and serenity in the solution of any international problem concerning them, with only one condition: that there will be no discussion of Italian problems as such, but of Italian sides of European problems.

The seventh and eighth points contain the basis of our international concepts; I wrote them, and I quote them to you today, even more for the sake of Europe than for the sake of Italy.

Much more recently, when war—after the conquest of Tunisia—advanced to the very gates of Italy, I warned the leaders of the United Nations that they will not "win the active help of the Italians against fascism if they do not assure them that the war waged under the flag of democracy is fought against fascism, and not against Italy, and that the national integrity and honor of Italy are not menaced."

But here I want to make clear one point: The concept of national integrity does not include the Dodecanese Islands, because it is evident that the Dodecanese are completely Greek by history and nature; they do not belong in the least to the Italian collectivity; and one cannot speak of the Dodecanese as a part of the national Italian integrity. On the contrary, the old Italian colonies in Libya, Eritrea, Somaliland, should remain Italian, unless it is decided to put all the African colonies into some international pool. If this is decided, the Italians will be ready to join their colonies to such an arrangement. But to punish Italian democracy by taking away colonies that were among the best administered in Africa would simple mean foolishly to create new reasons for a future league of so-called dissatisfied nations.

It is no use to say, "But Italy is beaten and has to accept conditions from the victors." Conditions from victors, through violence, have always had a very brief success in history. What matters is to reach agreements that are accepted loyally by all parties. In reality, even for the peace of tomorrow, these supreme truths remain, which should always have been the basis of any good treaty, that the only way to have a good treaty between two nations is to share equally between them satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

But the peace of tomorrow needs, besides national considerations, something much more important — the establishment of a new international law. In the world of tomorrow, Italy must be independent, Greece must be independent, Yugoslavia must be independent, France must be independent, and so on, but one point is much more important than any purely nationalistic prob-

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lem, and it is that all the progressive nations must accept gladly a new law—the law of interdependence among nations. All the nations of Europe must remain independent in so far as their culture and economic developments are concerned; but no nation can any longer have this fragment of sovereignty which may allow a government to wage war. To wage a war must be the greatest crime of tomorrow, and the duty of the nations is to give up gladly the foolish and criminal right to make war.

Although I feel deeply my loyalty as an Italian, I think it is with the most complete objectivity that I assert that the history of Italy indicates the possession of an international mind, always ready to serve the international community. Mazzini was the first to declare, in the fifties, in the middle of the nineteenth century, that he loved Italy just because he loved all the nations and that he hoped that after the independence of Italy, we should seek a federation of Europe.

After all, the Italians have no great merit in having such a ripe international mind. Two inheritances constitute the make-up of the Italian mentality. One is the Roman Empire and the other one is the Catholic church. You may or may not like either of those two institutions, but it is evident that both have been a great educational element for an international mentality and both were an Italian creation. Of course, there has been fascism, but has fascism been a particularly Italian disease? In such important problems it is vain to introduce personal elements, but I cannot forget that I was the least important of many Italians who went on exposing fascism, fighting it, and denouncing it, and I always faced men like the two Chamberlains, men like the Socialist, MacDonald, men like the former Socialist, Laval, even men like Venizelos, who were among the most naïve and dangerous admirers of fascism.

Fascism has been a gigantic creation of propaganda, fascism has been an international disease. And it is not by twenty years of fascism that one must judge a nation which has two thousand years of history.

SMERTENKO — Now that we have heard Count Sforza, it seems to me that there are three or four points into which we can divide the discussion of today's Round Table. First, of course, is what immediate action



Count Carlo Sforza

we believe should be taken in preparation for the establishment of a free and independent, a happy Italy. What steps can be taken now, what program of activity can we suggest to avoid the mistakes made in dealing with the democratic forces of France or Austria?

We can be sure that if the United Nations bring to the Italian people sympathy and understanding and help, they will most effectively stimulate and inspire them to accept the democratic form of government and the democratic way of life. We can be equally certain that if our program and actions violate our own democratic principles, they will serve to create either another form of dictatorship or a period of bloody chaos —and perhaps both. This is the essence of the question of the future political organization of Italy and its corollary religious and social problems.

Then there is the point treated briefly by Count Sforza—the question of colonies and possessions and its related problem of frontiers. We should view these questions, not only from the viewpoint of Italy herself—and here we must defer to Count Sforza, Don Sturzo, and Colonel Pacciardi—but we

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should consider them in their widest aspect —how they will affect Mediterranean civilization, European civilization. I merely pose these questions as a beginning; you will, of course, feel free to introduce any other themes you consider relevant to this discussion.

BASIL VLAVIANOS—Of course, in a discussion like this, we are chiefly interested in the future of Italy from the international point of view, because the internal Italian problem cannot be solved by us. Representing the point of view of an average Greek liberal, I think that Italy cannot be treated differently from the other Axis peoples who took part in this war. In Greece, the Greek people had a profound esteem and respect and love for Italy until 1912, the year of the occupation of the Dodecanese.

Of course, fascism, as Count Sforza stated, is a political phenomenon of only one period of Italian history. But imperialism influenced Italian policy for a long time before fascism. This shows that the danger exists independently of fascism.

We hope that this war has been a big lesson for the Italian people as well as for every other people that took part in it. The suffering they have gone through and that they will probably still undergo may make them think seriously about the futility of all their imperialistic dreams, but the fact remains that these dreams existed before fascism. Therefore, Italy should be subjected to the same measures which will be taken generally after the war to educate the peoples who have been possessed, so to speak, by that way of thinking, by aggression and imperialism. We must not forget that, before Mussolini, we had the case of the Dodecanese, and I am very glad to hear Count Sforza express his opinion now that the Dodecanese are purely Greek territory.

Basil Vlavianos

SMERTENKO—Count Sforza, this expression is not merely yours; it is that of enlightened Italian opinion everywhere, isn't it, regarding the Dodecanese?

SFORZA—I thank you for that question, because I may add something interesting. Since my arrival in America, when Greeks whom I personally respect asked me about the Dodecanese, I always refrained from giving my opinion because I am so deeply democratic that I did not believe I had any pontifical right to express a personal view on so serious a matter. If I do express it now, it is just because I have received from the most representative elements in Italy answers stating that they share my views about the Dodecanese. Of course, it is not a plebiscite, but it is the opinion of eminent Italian personalities who agreed with me. In reply to a question of mine sent them a few months ago, they answered that it was our moral duty to express such an opinion.

VLAVIANOS—I thank you very much, Count Sforza, for that declaration. Now what are the measures to be taken? Of course, the answer to that question is not very easy. It is connected with the whole problem of the treatment of the Axis nations. But I think that among these measures, in any event, should be this one. In Italy, as well as in Germany and everywhere, there have always been sincere and purely democratic elements. They should be supported everywhere with all means, because they are the only ones able to change the mentality of their people and to give new directions to public opinion after the war. For, what-

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ever we may do, if we still have the same mentality and continue to support reactionary people, they will work against peace and we will have, as Count Sforza said, a new league of dissatisfied nations which will come out and say, "We have been maltreated by the big powers or by the victors."

The task of furthering the prestige of the true democrats—I repeat, the true democrats, who have given signs of constant practice of liberal principles among their people—is an important one.

JULIUS DEUTSCH—Fascist Italy was one of the most dangerous enemies of the independence of the Austrian Republic. Mussolini tried to gain control of the Danube region. To this end, he first subdued Horthy's Hungary, and then reached for Austria. But in Austria, he came up against the opposition of the democratic forces of the nation, especially the Social-Democratic working class. And so he bought out such Austrian politicians as Prince Stahremberg; he equipped the fascist *Heimwehr* as a fascist army. With their help he set up the clerical-fascist dictatorship of Dollfuss.

Later on, Mussolini became too weak to maintain his fascist officeholders in Vienna. He was forced to hand them over to Hitler, who had his own ambitions for the control of the Danube region. But it cannot be ignored that it was Mussolini who first attacked Austrian democracy. It was at his command that Dollfuss, Stahremberg, and Fey carried out the blood bath of February, 1934.

The future development of Austria depends upon the disappearance of the dictatorships in Italy and Germany. Only then can Austria live in peace and freedom. The Austrians certainly feel no enmity toward the Italian people. When Italy is no longer fascist, we may expect rapid development of friendly and neighborly relations. The Austrian working class has a long tradition of friendly relationship with the free and democratic labor movement of Italy. I am confident that in the future the labor movements of both countries will co-operate and will constitute one of the chief influences for the democratic development of central and southern Europe.

SMERTENKO—What in your opinion, Colonel Pacciardi, are the views of liberal Italians concerning the territorial question?

RANDOLFO PACCIARDI—There is not an Italian who does not believe that the actual and natural frontiers of Italy are just in principle, subject, of course, to mutual agreement of all concerned parties on details. Every great power of Europe has within its frontiers alien minorities, because the geographic and ethnic boundaries can never coincide perfectly. In democratic countries, where the rights of the citizens are respected, the problem of minorities is never acute. Thus, the numerous Basques and Catalans who live in French territory have never constituted an insurgent minority; and the same observation holds for the Italians of Nice, Savoy, and Corsica. On the other hand, an insurgent Italian movement, uncompromising and often violent, existed in Trentino, in Istria, and in Dalmatia when they were under the domination of the autocratic Hapsburg Government. A reverse irredentism—that is to say, a German and Slavic irredentism against Italy—has exploded under the barbarous fascist regime. As a matter of fact, the Slavic and German minorities were treated only slightly more harshly than the Italians themselves.

But in the United States of Europe all these questions will have no importance. The neighboring free and democratic regimes will reach an agreement like the accord between Italy and Yugoslavia. Naturally, cultural, religious, and administrative autonomy of minorities will have to be guaranteed, not merely by the laws, but also by public opinion and the enlightened self-interest of the countries to which these minorities belong. As for Albania and the Dodecanese, there is no question. They are not Italian.

In regards to frontiers, as in other matters, the future of Italy will not be very different from the future of the world and, particularly, from the future of this continent of which Italy is a part. The time will soon come when we shall no longer have in Europe grave national problems, but only the problem of Europe as a whole and as a continental entity. Long before the Italians were a nation their great minds thought of a United States of Europe. Today when the Allied armies are victorious in the Mediterranean and have already penetrated into the advance posts of the Italian peninsula, the solution of Italy's future is

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the beginning of the solution of the problem of Europe.

BOGDAN RADITSA—I hope that is possible. The Balkan peoples have always desired and will always accept complete collaboration with a truly democratic Italy which has no imperialistic ambitions. Upon the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire following the first World War, it would have been the most natural thing for Italy to assume the role of political and economic intermediary between the Balkan states and Western Europe if Italy had based her policy of collaboration with the Balkan people on friendly relations with Yugoslavia.

Even though the frontiers between Yugoslavia and Italy failed to give complete satisfaction to the former, we hoped that the democratic elements of both nations would succeed in establishing a sincere, honest, and intelligent relationship between the two countries. But even before the coming of facism in Italy, all that occurred in Istria, Trieste, and in Gorizia served to arrest the development of such relations. And the tradition of Mazzini, which inspired the best among the Yugoslavs and the Italians to work toward peace in the Adriatic, was, of course, brutally interrupted by the coming to power of Italian fascism.

SMERTENKO—That was only one of the many elements in the Italian revolutionary tradition destroyed by fascism.

RADITSA—That is true. One of the reasons for contemporary catastrophe has certainly been the rise of fascism in Italy. It separated Italy from the democratic West. We must look to Rome, *"ville égarée de l'Occident,"* as Ferrero said, to find the causes for European agony on the eve of the second World War.

I saw in all the conversations I had with Italian personalities, both of democratic and fascist Italy, that the latter had become anti-European and terribly anti-internationalist. The only possibility for the former, the liberal Italy, was to continue in exile the great tradition of struggle for freedom, to fulfill the role assigned to her by Mazzini upon the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was the dream of the best Italians and of the best Yugoslavs from Bissolati to Supilo.

Mazzini said: "Italy should be the ally of the people subjugated under the Austrian yoke, of all those who still have to win their liberty and independence. Our war should be the people's war. Raise our banners high. Upon them, no slogans of local interest should be inscribed, but the battle cry of the principle that for half a century now has been inspiring and stirring every European movement. Write out on your flag the sacred words, 'For us and for you,' and wave your banner unfurled, followed by all the swords that Italy possesses. Wave it in front of the eyes of Czechs, Rumanians, Serbs and South Slavs, and the peoples under the yoke of the Austrian and Turkish empires. There lies our fate and that of Europe."

Naturally, all these visions and ideals were destroyed by fascism. Peace on the Adriatic between Italians and Yugoslavs has today been greatly compromised and will be difficult to achieve because of the sad experiences of this war. Perhaps the Mazzini vision will revive and be realized by the Italian Underground and by the Yugoslavs, fighting in a new brotherhood.

DEUTSCH—It is possible that after the war Austria will become part of a Danubian federation. I do not need to assure you that such a federation of the Danubian states will have no truck with the old Hapsburg monarchy. Consequently—since any thought of imperialism is far removed from this organization—a democratic Danubian federation will almost automatically be the ally and collaborator of a democratic Italy.

PACCIARDI—The ideals of Mazzini, no less than the position of Italy, have influenced profoundly our conception of international politics. Italy is at the crossroads of the three races that people continental Europe: the Latin, the German, and the Slav. Italian democracy has always recognized the necessity of Latin fraternity as the primary step in establishing a European federation. Italy is destined to feel the full force of Pan-Germanism and of Pan-Slavism unless she promotes with all her strength a new political organization of Europe. By her very situation Italy is forced to follow a policy of international accord, of disarmament, and of peace—precisely the opposite of all that Mussolini has done. We may be sure that the democratic elements within Italy as well as outside will, therefore, take the first opportunity to reverse Mussolini's

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ignorant and anti-Italian international diplomacy.

SMERTENKO—That raises the question of how far the Italian Underground has made its will for the future known at this time. Has that movement expressed any plans for future reconstruction of Italy, vis-à-vis the other nations, in its Underground press, and in whatever private information you receive?

SFORZA—The task of the Underground forces in Italy is so tragic, so fraught with practical, material necessities, that at no time is there any possibility for congresses and exchange of ideas. They only fight, and they do that quite well. There is, however, a new party that has been coming to the fore in recent times, the *Partito d'Azione,* which is composed mainly of young fighters of the Underground but has at its head some intellectual and moral leaders of great political significance. They are in close contact with me. They have accepted completely the eight points that I presented at the Montevideo Conference.

In foreign policy, and especially in relation to any territorial question that may arise, such as in Libya, the intellectual leaders of the *Partito d'Azione* have notified me that they agree with me completely in principle; that just as the friendship with Greece was endeared to us after the crimes of Mussolini against Greece—and that is why we are glad to give consent, to acknowledge a spontaneous consent, that the Dodecanese must go to Greece—so it is with Yugoslavia. But since that problem is much more complex, we Italians can come to agreement among ourselves only on this point, that anything must be accepted with joy which brings friendship, cordiality, and collaboration between Yugoslavia and Italy, but on condition that we look forward and not backward.

To change frontiers every twenty years would simply mean the creation of new possibilities of wars and disorders. What we must think is this, that in place of frontiers written with ink, we must substitute the idea of frontiers written with pencil. If we do not think of Europe, but go on thinking in our own nationalistic ways, there is no possibility of peace.

SMERTENKO—That is a beautiful phrase—in place of frontiers written with ink, we must substitute frontiers written with pencil.

SFORZA—It is continuing my thought, if I make a remark about what Mr. Vlavianos said. Mr. Vlavianos cited a few cases of Italian imperialism previous to fascism. He is quite right; only he has forgotten that only two nations were immune from this reproach in pre-war Europe, and they were Switzerland and Denmark. If Mr. Vlavianos will admit that everybody is guilty, I quite agree with him.

VLAVIANOS—I really don't remember any case of imperialism in modern Greece.

SFORZA—Well, you went into Smyrna.

VLAVIANOS—It was not imperialism; it was merely a war of liberation. Smyrna is Greek. Everybody knows that. There is a difference between striving to get back something of your own and seeking to take something from others.

SFORZA—Yes, but it was imperialism to try to make conquests by war, because it was evident that it was bringing everything to disaster. By the way, when you say that Smyrna was Greek, you are quite right, but it was more or less like Dalmatia, where proud Italian cities were surrounded by a country essentially Slav. Smyrna is a Greek city in a Turkish world.

If I had been a Greek—this is not a historical excursion into the past, it is the very essence of what we must think now—the Greeks being so much more active than the Turks, and Smyrna being essentially an old Greek center, I should have hesitated very much to annex Smyrna to Greece and so to destroy the tremendous Greek influence which the old Greek colonies were exerting in Asia Minor. Nothing is more childish than the idea that the nation is only where the flag is.

VLAVIANOS—I think we have in Greece the case of a nation that has yielded its rights in order to obtain the friendship and collaboration of another nation—Turkey. In order to maintain peace in the future I hope Italy will show the same spirit. There was never a question, as you admitted yourself, that Smyrna was not Greek. Speaking impartially, I don't know of one case of Greek imperialism. I cannot admit that the desire to get back Smyrna was imperialistic.

SMERTENKO—All right. With certain outstanding exceptions, I think the amount of

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Bogdan Raditsa

imperialism exhibited by the nations of Europe was proportionate to their strength.

RADITSA—Yes, but as Count Sforza mentioned Dalmatia, I must say that question is now settled forever.

SFORZA—Of course, of course!

SMERTENKO—We can sum up the question of frontiers, as Count Sforza did in his conclusion, with the postulate that the future must produce some sort of international order in which these questions of frontiers, minorities, and outlying possessions will be amicably solved, if for no other reason, because they will no longer matter, because they will be subordinated to more vital common interests.

PACCIARDI—The same holds true of colonies. Italy, of course, has already lost her colonies in this war, and it is a fact that they not only failed to solve the problem of her excess population, they also constituted an enormous liability in her budget. But the problem of the lack of essential materials and of excess population will continue to exist for whatever regime may be set up in Italy, and it will be a permanent cause of international disturbance unless it is properly solved.

For this problem, as for others, the United States of Europe will facilitate the solution. The more so since there is not much hope of having the countries of the Western Hemisphere open their doors to another transoceanic immigration. The internationalization of the colonies and the settlement by European stocks may seem like an obvious solution, but unfortunately, that is merely a theoretical solution. There are enormous political and economic obstacles to be overcome before it can be realized.

Similarly, the Atlantic Charter guarantees to all peoples free access of essential materials, but it still remains to be seen how this principle can be practicably realized. In any event, Italy is too small and too poor a country for her constantly growing population. The necessity of finding an outlet for this excess cannot be evaded short of killing ten million Italians. There can be no other than an international solution to her problem.

II

FREDA KIRCHWEY—Would it be inopportune, in the midst of this talk of the internal and international relationships that must follow the defeat of Italian fascism, to inject a question about the role the invading Allied powers may play in this development? Italy, perhaps unfortunately, is not going to decide her future course without interference. The interference may be benevolent. I think it will be. But benevolence is often one of the most painful forms of tyranny. As the Allied armies advance, they must set up, or accept and act through, certain administrative agencies. Even under an army of occupation, the routine work of government is carried out through local elements. And the people who are maintained or established in positions of power—however subordinate to the occupying forces—become an important determining factor in the political development of the country. How important, we have seen in German-occupied France.

Whether Italy achieves through defeat freedom from the corrupt and brutal clique which rules her today, or whether on the contrary the Quisling elements of the fascist regime remain in power, depends on the decision, not of the Italian Underground or of the people as a whole, but

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of the victorious armies of invasion. This is inevitable. Since it cannot be otherwise —since, in short, no government-in-exile exists or would be recognized by the Allied powers—the hope for the peaceful and early establishment of democratic power in Italy rests with General Eisenhower and—behind him—with the Governments of Churchill and Roosevelt.

NORMAN ANGELL—If frontiers are to be written in pencil, most certainly any regime which the victors may set up on entering Italy should be so written. It may be necessary, for all that we can tell, for the Allies to maintain an "occupation government" for a very considerable period, a period, conceivably, measured in years. It will have to work in large measure through administrative officials who have been appointed by the fascist regime. If it is not made quite plain, if the fact is not emphasized over and over again, that the Allied government of occupied territory is essentially provisional, completely neutral as between rival plans for a future Italian constitution, we are likely to prolong the period of chaos and make future peace ever harder to establish. It should be made clear that the Allies are not choosing and setting up the regime which they—the Allies—believe the Italian people ought to have; that the decision as to what Italians want really will be left to Italians to decide. Although the Italian people have lived under a fascist regime longer than the Germans have lived under Hitler, the Italian people have never been "conditioned," as the Germans have been, to totalitarian theories. All the facts, so far as an outsider can judge, taking Italian history into account, seem to indicate that the Italians have a natural predisposition to democracy which the Germans do not possess. Sforza has emphasized that point repeatedly, and Italian history confirms him. We must be careful to make it clear to the Italians that we do not enter Italy to impose upon them, from the outside, any political constitution of our choice, that our forces are not there to impose any political theory, however attractive the name we may give to it, upon the Italian people from outside. For a political theory or principle which might be entirely acceptable to Italians, if applied by Italians to Italians, would almost certainly become inacceptable to many if imposed from outside by invading troops.

SMERTENKO—It is the only way we can prove that our purpose is to liberate the Italian people from the fascist regime.

ANGELL—Our first purpose is to liberate ourselves from the dangers which the existence of fascist regimes constitute for *us.* If our safety were not involved, we should have no real grounds of intervention. In so far as we can say with truth, "This thing of fascism has threatened the peace and security of many peoples outside Italy—Spanish, French, Abyssinian, Albanian, Greek—and for that reason these neighbors of Italy have a right to see that it does not continue"—in so far as we can say that, we have a right to take steps to prevent the building up of a system which threatens *us,* as well as Italians. But so long as the Italian form of government does not affect *us,* it is a matter purely for the Italian people.

Russia has, very wisely, just dissolved the Comintern—an organization, directed in fact from Moscow, for intervening in the

Colonel Randolfo Pacciardi

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Freda Kirchwey

party fights of other countries, an organization for bringing about in countries other than Russia a form of government which Russians favor but which other peoples, accustomed to the right of free political opposition, believe to be tyrannical. *Chacun à son gout.* Let the Allies, particularly the Anglo-Saxon Allies, in our relations with Italy or France or other non-Anglo-Saxon countries be careful that we do not become suspected of maintaining a new kind of Anglo-Saxon Comintern for imposing our form of government or democracy upon countries that prefer some other.

SMERTENKO—I disagree completely. This concept of nonintervention in the internal political affairs of any country violates the concept of the interdependence of nations which you, Sir Norman, have so eloquently advocated. It is time we accepted as an axiom that a non-democratic or anti-democratic government in any country is a menace to all countries without waiting for that menace to materialize in increased armaments, territorial aggressions, or war. Otherwise, where do we draw the line? When a nation begins to inculcate a *Herrenvolk* philosophy or teach the goose step to its children and youth? When it begins to bully its weaker neighbors or occupy disputed chunks of territory? Unless this is a war for democracy—and democracy is secured to all as a result of this war—we are fighting it in vain, and we shall have to fight it over again.

KIRCHWEY—In this hour, as the Allied armies advance in Sicily, it should be the concern of all who recognize the importance of a democratic Italy for the future peace of Europe, to insist on the necessity of dealing with uncompromised and anti-fascist elements in the liberated areas. They will not be too difficult to identify. If careful political preparation for the invasion has been made, they will have been located and reached in advance. Several of the persons at this table are in a position to put the occupying forces in immediate contact with leaders who could be trusted to represent the real interests of both the Allies and the Italian people. We must hope this has already been done. If it has not, the process of democratizing Italy will, I fear, be delayed, and will be accomplished in the end through revolution rather than the natural emergence of the democratic forces which exist throughout Italy and only wait to be called into service.

LUIGI STURZO—Since I write this now that the Allied armies are in Italy, I ask permission as a Sicilian to thank President Roosevelt for his note to the Pope, affirming that "our soldiers have come to rid Italy of fascism and all its unhappy symbols, and to drive out the nazi aggressors who are infesting her soil."

This will be the first test of the United Nations in their effort to restore liberty to civilized countries. I hope that it will be met in a true democratic spirit, and that Sicily will soon enjoy freedom of assembly and of expression—limited, of course, by war exigencies. I trust that through voluntary reorientation the people of Sicily will soon achieve a true understanding of present democratic and foreign problems. One of the most important means to this end, at the same time that we send relief of food and clothes, is providing Italy with new educational material, new and old Italian books that are not permeated by fascist theories and adulation of the Duce,

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books of democratic and Christian sentiment.

But above all, the Italian people must be shown the support of the United Nations for democracy. The Allied military authorities in Sicily must cleanse the towns and cities and provinces of fascist leaders and must dissolve all fascist organizations. Both the appeal to the Italian people made by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill and the proclamation of General Alexander seem to indicate that this policy against fascism and Fascists will be followed. The Italian people, like the peoples of other occupied countries, may not be able by themselves to overthrow the fascist government; nevertheless, this clear-cut statement of policy will call forth the collaboration of all freedom loving Italians with the armies of the United Nations.

PACCIARDI—In the opinion of all free Italians, the United Nations have not done all that was possible and necessary in their propaganda to distinguish between Italy and fascism or to separate Italy from the Axis. While Mr. Churchill spoke in a general way of respecting the "native soil" and President Roosevelt of the "nationhood" of tomorrow's Italy, no specific pledge has been made to the Italian people. Similarly, the invasion of Sicily has been an act of force, and assurances have been given to the Pope, not to the Italian people.

Italy could have been won with ideas. The Allies seem to have preferred to take her by force. It was necessary, it is necessary to speak officially to the Italian people, making clear what the United Nations' policy toward the Italy of tomorrow will really be. It was and it is necessary to offer a symbol and a rallying point to the movement of opposition in Italy. By using some millions of Italians abroad and in the former Italian colonies set free from fascism, a great Free Italy movement might have been and still can be organized. That movement would spread out to the first lands set free. Free Italians have offered to organize an Italian Legion to fight side by side with the United Nations. Around that political and military core all the anti-fascist and anti-nazi forces could be rallied to begin the political, social, and spiritual reorientation of Italy. Not only can Italy repudiate the German alliance, but she can ally herself to the United Nations for the prosecution of the fight against fascism in the world. Unfortunately we lack such a policy.

ANGELL—Please consider the kind of situation likely to arise again and again. American and British troops enter an Italian town and find that our bombardments have pretty well destroyed the water system upon which the town is dependent for daily supply of water; that the sewage system has gone; that food cannot be got into the town because railroad bridges, viaducts, and what not are down; that criminals have escaped from the prison and are terrorizing the neighborhood, organizing bandit gangs; and that, as a consequence of the foregoing, the place is threatened by typhoid, cholera, famine, and criminal terror. It will be a problem of finding the engineers most familiar with the water and sewage systems, and most likely rapidly to restore those things to working order; the police and prison authorities most likely to be able to put their hands on the bandits holding the countryside in terror. Are the occupying authorities to concern themselves first of all with such questions as whether these technical agents, through whom the occupying authorities must work, are free of all fascist taint?

SMERTENKO—There seems to me to be a much bigger issue involved than whether some hamlet or town will suffer from typhoid or bandits. What we do in Italy will have repercussions in every occupied coun-

Sir Norman Angell

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try of Europe. If the Underground movements of France and Norway and Czechoslovakia find that the Fascists, who are now their mortal enemies, are accepted as collaborators by the occupying forces, are kept in positions of power, they will be disheartened and demoralized. Can we expect them to come out of hiding and aid us if the men who sought to imprison them still hold the reigns of government and still occupy the seats of justice? Besides, if we work through officials hated by the people, we no longer come as deliverers; we, too, will be hated by the people.

ANGELL—If an official is hated by the people, he is likely to be an extremely bad agent for the purposes of the occupying forces, and should, and probably would, be rejected for that reason. It is clear that the Italian situation is not similar either to the French, or the German, or to that which we shall find in, say, Norway or Holland. France is an ally whose government entered the war on our side. She possesses a highly organized Underground movement of resistance to the conquerors.

C. G. PAULDING—There is a point that must be more clearly defined. I have just heard the word, Darlan—the word and not the name—used as another word, the word, Quisling, is used, to denote a type. Are we to deal with an Italian Darlan? Well, we will never get anywhere until we cease looking at the European countries as if they were all the same, and particularly at France and at Italy as if they were the same, as if one had produced a Darlan and the other could and quite probably would produce a Darlan.

The difference between any Italian leader who might be persuaded to assist us in invading his country and Darlan, the Frenchman whom we prevailed upon to assist us in invading North Africa, is fundamental. We could accept the support of Darlan because he represented nothing but a government which had been imposed on France by defeat. He represented a government which could not conceivably endure for a day as soon as the French people were free to overthrow it. And France was a nation that possessed—even if they were momentarily suppressed—all the autonomous forms and machinery for a democratic revival of her national life. Accepting the support of Darlan, there was a minimum of danger of our serving to perpetuate the regime he represented. Accepting anything that would hasten the day of France's liberation meant, on the contrary, hastening the day of the liberation of French democratic forces. We could count on them to overthrow the Pétain regime.

But an Italian amenable to lending us his influence would be the representative of a fascist government which had held power for twenty years. He would be compromised not with the deplorable period of confusion and despair which in France followed defeat, but with a tenacious, and for a long time successful system which had held his country under its domination for a long period without remorse and until it was clearly impossible to do so any longer.

Any dealings with a member of the Fascist Italian Government obviously would be impossible, obviously would be of an entirely different nature and would produce entirely different and appalling results, because such dealings would lend support to an element in Italy which might still hope to maintain power. The fascist leaders in Italy have acquired too great and too indivisible responsibility to permit any one of them to survive in a position of influence in the new Italy, whereas many of the men associated with the Pétain Government—a handful of traitors excepted—cannot be removed permanently from the life of French democracy. They can be reabsorbed into the life of Republican France. In Italy, it will be necessary to rebuild from the ground up.

III

RADITSA—Don't you agree, gentlemen, that the great question of tomorrow for Italy as well as for all of Europe is the question of the form of government? If we shall have in Italy real democracy for the first time—

VLAVIANOS—That is very good.

RADITSA— —the relations of Italy and her neighbors will improve. We did not realize peace between Italy and Yugoslavia because, for instance, fascism put Italy in a very different position toward Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia could not achieve unity because of

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fascism. For twenty years Yugoslavia could not realize her democracy because of fascism, because in Yugoslavia there was always an element which said, "We will have war with Italy, so we must be prepared; we must put aside the normal, logical tendencies toward democracy." What I hope is that this Mazzini vision of the great Italian spirit that has been envisioned by Ferrero, Croce, Salvemini, Sforza—that this idea of free democracy can finally be realized, and that there can be created a democratic government in Italy.

When we shall see in Italy a people who will choose a free and democratic government, we shall feel that with such a government the question of frontiers will be a secondary question, because the Europe of tomorrow will either be nationalistic and imperialistic, or it will be some kind of European federation—and a European federation cannot be set up without a real democratic government in each country.

That is the greatest question, and I should like to say that Ferrero, who died in exile because of his opposition to fascism, discovered that. He once said to me that "no European problem can be solved in the future if the Italian people, the French people, the German people, as well as all the other peoples of Europe, are not able to express freely their opinion, as the British and the Americans do, to say what they think and wish in the organization of a free world, in which the dualism of justice and power will be harmonized and synchronized in liberty."

SFORZA—I quite agree with what Mr. Raditsa has said and with the ideas of my lamented friend, Ferrero, but I should go even a little further. Yes, democracy is necessary in each country, but we must look at the reality as it is. We have seen more than one example where the Democracies became infected by a nationalistic pride and by a nationalistic disease. Democracies, by themselves, are not a complete certainty.

I come back to what I said, perhaps not clearly enough, in the course of this conversation. The great problem of tomorrow is twofold: one, each nation, being a miracle of civilization, of art, of thought, must remain independent because the loss of its independence is just like destroying an element of beauty in Europe. Therefore, we must have independence of all the nations, governed in a democratic form. But—and this is my second point—since democracy in itself is not sufficiently safeguarded against warlike adventurers, we must proclaim the interdependence of nations. The peace of tomorrow will be a real peace only if we create this double concept: independence of nations, and interdependence of nations. When we have created interdependence of nations, we shall have arrived at the form of federation which will spell salvation for the world.

SMERTENKO—Everyone is aware that Count Sforza, in his struggle for the freedom of Italy, has always envisaged a true democracy in Italy. His criticism of many movements supposedly sympathetic to Italy has been based chiefly on the fact that they did not understand how greatly important it was to establish complete democracy there.

SFORZA—Yes.

SMERTENKO—But it is naïve to speak of establishing democracy in Italy or in any other country of Europe as if we were planning to introduce a new style in clothes. There are scores of specific problems that touch every aspect of the lives of the people concerned which must be given thorough consideration. In Italy, there is the question of the monarchy, of the relation between church and state, of the elimination of the bureaucratic incubus of fascism, of the introduction of agrarian and industrial reforms to correct both fascist and prefascist evils. I consider these questions the chief topic of our discussion today.

STURZO—I do not believe that after the war all nations will become democracies overnight. The new League of Nations must accept as members only those states which have democratic constitutions and a genuine popular expression of approval for democracy. The others must remain outside of the League until they have met these tests of their good faith and sincerity.

SMERTENKO—We in FREE WORLD feel this is a fallacy. It was one of the weaknesses of the League of Nations that those powers that violated the Covenant were free to withdraw. The future League of Nations must insist that they remain, and that they conform to its laws. We fought a long and bitter civil war in this country for this

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very principle of federalism. While our victory did not necessarily justify this principle, the progress of the United States since that war certainly has.

SFORZA—Before the coming of fascism, few in Italy thought that it would be necessary to oust the King, because the King was like the King of England—a decent president of a republic. He had no influence. Now the Italians are obliged to become republicans because the monarchy has destroyed itself; nobody can be monarchical in the face of a monarchy which has gone, destroying itself by betrayals and criminal wars.

PACCIARDI—Italy will be republican. The monarchy has no roots in Italy. The only argument in its favor is that of "supreme and permanent power" above factions and parties. But the collaboration between the monarchy and fascism has destroyed this concept.

The history of Italy from the time of the ancient Roman Republic—which in its social and civic aspects was far more glorious than the Roman Empire—up to the Communes, the maritime Republics of the Middle Ages, and the Risorgimento, which achieved national unity, is a republican history. But the very geography of Italy imposes upon her a democratic republic in which authority is largely decentralized. Everyone knows how greatly the various sections of our country differ from one another and how important is the distinctive mode of life in our communities. The community and the region are the vital centers (political as well as administrative, linguistic, and economic) of the Italian nation. The *provincia* is nothing more than the French *département* transplanted to Italy by the monarchy in order to serve its needs of centralization and administrative uniformity.

A truly Italian political constitution cannot fail to take into consideration this fact, that the history, the art, the language, the work, the needs of one region are completely different from those of another. Hence, the bases of such a constitution must be the following: Political and administrative autonomy for the regions and the communities; regional councils determining questions of local interest; a Parliament in Rome, not too large, for the questions of national and international interest; rights of referendum and initiative, such as exist in countries like Switzerland that have absolute democracy; no change of ministries except through elections.

The Government must not be permitted to do what it wishes. The true sovereigns are the people and the Parliament. The government is merely an executive organ. The frequent crises of the Latin Democracies, which have so greatly discredited representative democracy, can be avoided by a constitutional form like that which has been developed in Switzerland.

STURZO—I have always been ideologically republican but not militantly so. At present I feel that only the Constituent Assembly can decide whether Italy will be monarchical or republican. My feeling is that in Latin countries true democracy can be effectively achieved by means of the republican form of government.

SFORZA—As far as religion and the Catholic church are concerned, I would say that the immense majority of Italians are for not raising the question of the Vatican state. We have had for seven hundred years in Italy the Republic of San Marino, and we may have another Republic of San Marino. That is not the case with the Concordat. The Concordat, giving a condition of privilege to the Catholic church, I think will be suppressed. But I hope, since I hate any form of religious struggle, that in place of the Concordat, a series of specific minor agreements will be made with the Catholic church, avoiding the possibility of any religious controversy, which is always the most damaging element in a country.

Many ardent Catholics agree with me that a regime of solemn general Concordats is in the long run more dangerous for the vitality of the church than for the prestige of the state. Catholic scholars know the old saying of great Catholic writers: *"Historia Concordatorum, historia dolorum."*

PACCIARDI—There is some difficulty in envisaging a future for Italy without speaking of the relations between state and church, all the more so since there is an internationally recognized Vatican state at Rome. It is very probable that one of the first acts of the Italian Republic will be the abolition of the Concordat made between the fascist Government and the Vatican, which

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Don Luigi Sturzo

presented the Church gratis with a favored legal position in the Italian state. There is no doubt that the Italian state will be a lay state; consequently the different religions will be put on the same footing. "A free church in a free state," used to be the slogan of liberal Italians. I prefer to say, "Free churches within a sovereign state."

Quite a different matter is the Vatican's position as a state, which was recognized by the fascist Government in the Lateran Treaty. The Italian people would be morally justified in not recognizing this treaty, since the fascist dictatorship need not be considered a government that is legally binding on Italy. But from the political and international points of view, it would perhaps not be wise for the Italian Republic to open the Roman question anew.

STURZO—I do not agree with Pacciardi in the proposal for a unilateral denunciation of the Concordat. That would be an act of hostility to the Church. I am not sure that the majority of Italian people is against the Concordat. At least, even Professor Salvemini is for an amicable solution of all ecclesiastical questions in order to avoid a dangerous religious conflict in Italy after this war.

DEUTSCH—The majority of the people of Austria are Catholic, just like the Italians. The influence of the Catholic church in the past has been tremendous; and it has played a large role in the rise of clerical fascism. It is to be taken for granted, however, that the Vatican has profited by the experiences of the last decade. The Catholic church has been severely burned in playing with the fascist fire. Therefore, we may hope that after the suppression of fascism, the Catholic church will recognize that democracy is the imperative form of government in our time.

SMERTENKO — As an American Catholic, Mr. Paulding, do you have any comment at this point?

PAULDING — I appreciate Col. Pacciardi's moderation in merely suggesting the unilateral abolition of the Concordat and postponing until more auspicious times the abolition of the Papal State. But I am not unaware of the indubitable fact that a certain anti-fascism is also intensely anti-clerical, and I also know that many Italian anti-Fascists in America will think first of Italian relations between church and state —even before they think of agrarian reform, social reform, or various other primary tasks of government. I know the historical reasons for this attitude. And I know that Count Sforza's wisdom and Pacciardi's moderation—or is it reticence?—cover, as an impossible subject for discussion, the extreme violence which exists in certain sectors of Italian opinion. I agree that any really sincere analysis of this revolutionary state of mind would lead to bitterness, and it would seem to me that Count Sforza's desire to avoid raising at once the religious issue in the new Italy is a statesmanlike desire.

Surely no one wants to see Italy re-enact the Spanish Civil War. But the question then becomes one of turning aside from extremists of all sorts, the blacks and the reds, and of determining what can be the truly democratic Italian basic support for the new regime. There would be no use in replacing the local village Fascist by the local village atheist; there is no use hoping that a stable Italian regime can be built up using a personnel entirely outside the Catholic Italian tradition. No Catholic in America

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

General Julius Deutsch

expects or desires the new Italian state to be a clerical state. Some of us are worried at the thought that, forgetting the true and valid sense of anti-clericalism, it should be influenced by some of its most ardent supporters into becoming anti-Catholic. Not for any intellectual reasons, but because you do not turn a country upside down, you do not substitute one extreme for another without perpetuating disorder. I hope that more and more insistence will be made to attract to the task of building the new Italy the plain Italian citizen who has resisted fascism but who has not committed himself to any old-fashioned revolutionary ideology. There are such men. If there were not—if all Italians were either Fascists or clericals or extreme radicals—there would be no point in even attempting to rebuild Italy. I suspect that these men, with or without the tessera which they may or may not have been forced to wear, are the permanent body of Italy.

VLAVIANOS—Do you think, Count Sforza, that there should also be social reform in Italy after the war?

SFORZA—Sweeping reforms. We must admit that while the Italian Risorgimento has been one of the most wonderful events of modern times, it has been mainly a political, intellectual, and moral revival. But it did not go far enough into the anonymous mass of the peasants.

The social problem in Italy is very difficult because our long history has solved, more or less, many of the problems in northern and central Italy, but not in southern Italy. There is a social, agrarian problem in the south of Italy and in the islands. It is a great problem of reclaiming lands that have no water.

In my personal opinion, the task of the Italy of tomorrow will be to transform the anonymous, unhappy, agrarian proletariat of southern Italy into a dignified community of small landowners, each of them proud of being at last master of his soil. We should follow the example of Czechoslovakia, where the great landowners were indemnified in a modest way, and out of the great *Besitze* of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovaks became probably proportionately the nation with the greatest number of small, happy landowners. When this will be done in Italy, a great peaceful, social revolution will have taken place.

PACCIARDI—As regards the social problem, we must consider Italy as she actually is. Italy is an agricultural and seafaring country. The industries of Italy—almost organically, I should say—are agricultural industries. Foreign trade is for the most part a trade in agricultural products. Forty-eight per cent of the Italian population, according to the 1936 census, is an agricultural population.

The industries are, generally speaking, concentrated in northern Italy (Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria). In southern Italy and especially in the islands, agriculture constitutes almost the sole income of the population. Eighteen million people in Italy live on agriculture, which accounts for 34 per cent of the national revenue. Small landholders form 42 per cent (before fascism 49 per cent) of all agricultural workers. The rest are *mezzadri* (sharecroppers), and agricultural laborers. The big proprietors absorb 43 per cent of the total agricultural income, although they comprise only 160,000 of the four million families employed in agriculture.

As all the world knows, Italy lacks coal and iron. The heavy industry of northern

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Italy can exist solely through the importation of essential raw materials. The agriculturalists and the rest of the country pay the cost of the tariffs necessary to protect the life of our industries.

Basic to the social problem in Italy, then, is agricultural reform. (Five hundred thousand small landholders disappeared between 1921 and 1936, under the fascist regime, which was pretending to "ruralize Italy." That means that every month almost three thousand small landholders were "liquidated" in the centralization of agricultural property.) To give the land to the peasants in the form of individual ownership or of agricultural co-operatives is to build the social foundation of the democratic republic.

In regard to industry, it will be necessary to nationalize public utilities like electric power, transporation, banks, and so on. By means of social legislation, credits, etc., the Republic ought to promote the development of syndicates with the final aim of transforming them into economic organisms capable of managing the factories. The order of evolution is as follows: worker control, participation in profits, direct management.

PAULDING—I am extremely interested by Count Sforza's statement that "sweeping reforms," social reforms, must be instituted in Italy, and by Pacciardi's tentative outline of their nature. Here again—as throughout this discussion—you say something about Italy's specific problems and you find yourself speaking of Europe's problems and America's problems. The whole problem for Europe and for Italy is to carry out these social reforms within the framework of and subject to man's essential freedom. To carry them out without sacrificing man's personal freedom.

The progress from political democracy into industrial and agricultural democracy has been the problem for the world ever since and wherever political democracy was achieved. The problem is still there, in Italy as it is in all Europe—despite the communist solution, the nazi solution, the fascist solution, which are inacceptable because their solutions have the grave fault, the unforgivable fault of cheating with the problem. They merely leave liberty out of the problem. But I call your attention to the example furnished by England. England is showing very strong signs of being able and determined to integrate extremely radical social reform into her traditional framework while maintaining the traditional liberty of her people. I hope that in the new Italy there will be this sense of continuity with the best of the past and, specifically, with the best tradition of political liberty and personal freedom. For the danger in Italy will be very great that the new men will see in the reforms that must be accomplished an end in itself, separated from the past, from the freedom of the past. The danger is that they will see in a new doctrine an exclusive doctrine, a doctrine on which to found the new state. And in that case they may be tempted to exclude all the men of the past, all the freedoms of the Italian past which existed before fascism. There might then be created a sort of schematic Italy in which men would be shifted round to fit the pattern, with or without their consent.

If there is to be democracy, there must be the willingness to advance slowly through democratic process. Leadership, of course. But at times I am dismayed at the sight of a revolutionary impatience which can only lead to coercion, for the best, naturally, for



C. G. Paulding

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the best of motives—but to coercion all the same.

I am aware that remarks such as these will be attributed to a reluctance in me to accept the reforms, the radical social reforms which are proposed. I can do nothing about that. But I suggest that Italians should watch what goes on in England very closely. In that direction, in the direction of prudence, compromise and patience, is the path Italians should follow. If for no other reason, out of charity toward the people of Italy who need a respite from being told what to do. Italian leadership should accept the provisional, should accept the duty, the heavy responsibility of leadership. They should reject the false and easy responsibility of imposing a blueprint on the people.

VLAVIANOS—This social revolution will also facilitate closer relations among the Mediterranean nations because the people rather than the landowners and the vested interests will determine these relations.

SFORZA—Absolutely.



Johan J. Smertenko

RADITSA—May I introduce the question of relations between Italy and the Balkan peoples? Particularly in connection with Russia and the Slavs, I should like to say to our Italian friends that there is no need for anyone in Italy to fear Pan-Slavism, which is not at all the same thing as Pan-Germanism. Pan-Slavism has never been aggressive. It has always expressed itself in nationalist resistance against oppression by others and in a nationalist effort to retain a valuable ethnic and cultural heritage.

I always believed that there would be some kind of region between the western Democracies, represented by Italy and France, and the vast eastern territory of Russia. I never felt that the Russians would dominate the Slavic people of this region to such a degree that it would extend Russian influence to the Adriatic. But there are many Italians who feared such a situation, and although the present history of Slovene and Croat martyrs to fascist aggression may have served to strengthen Russian influences in the Balkans, I do not think that it has irretrievably compromised the position of Italy in the Balkans. Those of us who know the profound humanism of the Italian people find it easy to distinguish between the Fascist and the Italian. Do you think, Colonel Pacciardi, that this fear of Russian domination in the Adriatic will be reflected in the foreign policy of democratic Italy?

PACCIARDI—As you rightly conclude, under the influence of Mazzini, friendship with the Slavic peoples will remain one of the basic principles of our foreign policy. Both our common history and our community of interests will propel the Italian and Slavic peoples toward a fraternal relationship.

SFORZA—That would be my view. I would say, after all, this problem is connected with the major problem of our time. What is the future of Russia? This, of course, is a matter of speculation, but I firmly believe that we are going to see in Russia a phenomenon more or less analogous to, only much wider than, that which took place in this country, in the United States, let us say, between 1850 and 1880. The great romance, the great adventure of the United States was the exploitation of the Middle West and of the Far West. I firmly believe that the great event of the Russia of tomorrow will be the

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exploitation of the riches of Siberia, perhaps of Mongolia and other regions. And this gigantic adventure will take such a long time that at the end of this period we shall probably see another Russia. I don't want to seem sarcastic, but it may even happen that Soviet Russia will be so enthusiastic and so proud about this marvelous adventure of making Russia into a much richer nation than the United States that she will be only too happy to look West to capitalistic countries, because it is from capitalistic countries that one gets loans.

SMERTENKO—This does suggest a question. Do you suppose that the next event in Italy is a revolution of the people? Do you feel that there is any likelihood of achieving these democratic aims in a peaceful fashion, or do you think that some upheaval will precede that?

SFORZA—Since revolutions are a loss of time and a danger, I hope that the transformation of Italy will be made without revolution. Fascism has taught the Italians, even the richest Italians, the wisdom to make willingly concessions to the advantage of the more modest classes; but if, here and there, a few acts of violence take place, it will be, after all, a question of proportion. I will not be the least scandalized over a few acts of revolt, if they are only a reminder to statesmen that they must not forget their promises when these are on the point of becoming a reality.

The social transformation in Italy must become a reality in order to make Italy a stronger element of the European community. We cannot have a healthy, important Italy, a powerful contributor to a new international mentality, when our peasants, especially in southern Italy, are in a much less happy position than the peasants of other nations.

RADITSA—It is, naturally, difficult for a Yugoslav or a Greek to offer a prophesy on this point, but it may not be amiss to indicate that this war is a war not only between nations and peoples, but between the different elements within the nations and peoples. It is a war between the Fascists and the anti-Fascists; it is a war between those who desire totalitarian domination and those who seek to strengthen democracy. The Balkan people, as well as the people throughout the world, will support the Italian people in any movement dedicated to the complete destruction of fascism.

SMERTENKO—Do you feel that certain what we have so often called "vested interests" are likely to retain enough strength to oppose the popular upsurge of the people toward a democratic regime?

SFORZA—Of course there is also the problem of big business, of a few great industrialists, great lords of industry, who may try to dictate the law of the state. But before fascism, when Italy was a democracy, this was only a problem of strong government. When we had strong governments like that of Giolitti, for example, all those great leaders were just crawling about like bugs in front of him, but when we had feeble governments like fascism—because fascism has been, in reality, a feeble government—well, of course, at that moment, the great lords of industry became too important. But this is a minor problem, really. Any decent government will know how to put them in their places. The great problem is the agrarian problem.

SMERTENKO—May I state the conclusions of this illuminating discussion? We are all agreed that by virtue of her traditions, her recent experiences, and her vast army of uncompromising fighters for freedom, Italy is particularly receptive to democracy. We differ, however, on the immediacy with which the democratic forces in Italy shall be permitted to take over the reins of government. Sir Norman feels that there are circumstances which justify delay; the rest of us disagree; Count Sforza and Colonel Pacciardi believe this action is long past due.

Similarly, we are in agreement that thorough-going reforms in the political, economic, and social spheres are necessary to the welfare of Italy, and will be demanded by the people. Don Sturzo and Mr. Paulding have offered a word of caution about excessive zeal in the introduction of these reforms, pointing out the danger of chaos that lies in a complete break with the past. Count Sforza, on the other hand, is confident that a vigorous democratic government can safely institute sweeping reforms, thereby averting a revolution.

Finally, we welcome the assurance that liberal Italians are determined to redress the wrongs that fascist Italy has inflicted on her neighbors.

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MODERN AERIAL WARFARE

by

Nikolai Lazarev

THE Soviet tactic of aerial warfare has for a long time been the elaboration of a devastating criticism of the theory of exclusive aerial warfare developed by the late Italian General Douhet. Modern variations of this theory are even less effective at the present time, when the "arm of criticism" has been replaced by the "criticism through arms" now being practiced on such a gigantic scale. During the Battle of Britain, in the many heavy bombings of Germany, and throughout our great patriotic struggle against fascism from the Barents to the Black Sea, it has been conclusively proved that it is impossible to expect decisive results from a *Blitzkrieg* strategy carried out exclusively by military aviation.

Manifestly, it is even less possible to achieve a decisive victory in the war solely through heavy aerial bombardments or, as they are called, "strategic bombardments" over large areas. This in no way minimizes the important role that has been played, and will continue to be played, by aerial bombings of enemy bases far behind the front, of lines of communication, and of industrial and political centers, in order to strike a death blow at the enemy's war potential and to destroy both civilian and army morale. It is, moreover, recognized that once a crushing aerial superiority is assured, certain military and aerial operations can be carried out.

This was illustrated by the nazi occupation of Crete. However, only the lack, on the British side, of a sufficient number of medium and heavy tanks permitted the German parachutists and transport-borne troops to occupy the airdromes and to hold the territory until they had broken the resistance of the British fleet. Deprived of the support of the fleet and of an air force, and lacking tanks, the ground forces—already exhausted by the Battle of Greece—were not able to hold out. The departure of the British ships allowed the Germans to transport to the island new troops and equipment, which finally decided the outcome of the battle. Despite the important role played in the Battle of Crete by dive bombers and air transports, one fact remains: not a tank was sent by air.

Mr. Churchill was absolutely right when, answering a question as to whether the occupation of Crete was not a rehearsal of the invasion of the British Isles, he pointed out that it was the kind of rehearsal after which one abandons the show. The events that followed supported Churchill's conclusion. The Germans did not undertake an invasion of Britain. The combined forces of Germany and Italy could not even ensure the occupation of the Island of Malta, so close

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to their base of operations. A surprise attack like the one on Pearl Harbor and the aerial sinking of the "Repulse" and the "Prince of Wales" were serious blows, but they did not and could not determine the issue of the whole war.

The Germans have so far preferred to use their air power to effect a point of penetration through which they try to overwhelm the enemy defenses. Mass utilization of air power opens the way for tank divisions and motorized infantry. The use of aviation as an independent arm proved a failure in the Battle of Britain and turned out to be absolutely useless on the Russo-German front, where the enemy encountered powerful resistance, crowned by the success of Soviet aviation. Even on the Pacific front, Japanese aviation has achieved some independent success but, on the whole, has served merely to cover the action of ground and sea forces. And the fact is that the air force of the United Nations, which was technically superior to that of the Japanese, although smaller, was not able to prevent the many Japanese invasions.

One of the most serious errors in the action of the Allies against Japan consisted in the absence of clearly defined strategic plans and the lack of co-ordination among the various arms of the service. On the other hand, the operations of the Japanese were marked by complete collaboration of the services planned in advance. With its numerical superiority and benefiting by shorter and safer lines of communication, Japanese aviation was able to facilitate army and naval operations. In turn, the Japanese ground and sea forces enlarged the sphere of aerial action by the occupation of new bases. The blows struck by Japanese aviation were resented all the more because they were an elaboration of methods first used in the United States and Britain.

The United States Navy was the first to base fighter planes and dive bombers on aircraft carriers. Torpedo planes were first used by the British Navy. The production capacity of British and American airplane factories is much greater than that of the Japanese. Nevertheless, during the first phase of the Pacific war, Japan was able to undertake several operations in which aviation played a significant role. Very often the Japanese air forces did not play a decisive role, but they were used more cleverly and effectively than expected, considering their technical inferiority.

This was the basis for the growth of a belief that the use of air power was the chief factor in Japanese successes. Articles emphasizing and popularizing such ideas appeared, not only in the daily British and American press, but in technical publications. In the United States, an intensive campaign was started for the establishment of an independent air force destined to deal the enemy crushing blows. A whole series of special conditions have favored the support there—up to the present—of a theory, propagated by all kinds of experts and politicians, to the effect that the determining role in modern warfare is to be played by aviation. Proponents of this theory claim that it will make it possible to avoid a long war, or to avoid "losing the war through the use of outmoded methods."

It is not always easy to penetrate the motives of such pseudo-partisans of progress, who claim to be leading a fight against generals "who never learn anything," and against "armchair strategists" and prejudiced official British and American circles. Sometimes their motives stem from their business connections; at other times the purpose of these "innovators" and "progressives" lies hidden in their liaison with the opponents of a Second Front, who wish to make the United States a superarbiter ready to impose its will the moment the other belligerents are exhausted, while America is still in full possession of its powers. But all these "new ideas" on the decisive role to be played by aviation have long since betrayed their inconsistency in the light of hard experience in the Old World. The theory which maintains that it is possible to win a final decision through aerial bombardment belongs to the category of ideas discredited by experience—and not new to begin with.

II

THE significance of strategic bombardments depends on aerial activity in general, and especially on the action of fighter planes against the enemy on, and immediately behind, the front. Moreover, the strategic importance of aviation as a whole in modern warfare is subordinate to its rigorous co-

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ordination with the other arms of the service. There is not and there cannot be any single method, any one way to gain victory, valid for all times, all peoples, and all conditions. Several American technical journals published articles interpreting the striking defeat of German aviation in the Battle of Britain as due to nazi tactics and defects in matériel rather than to the use of aviation as an independent arm.

We must admit, however, that despite the erroneous character of all these theories, discussions about the possible use of aerial bombardment have evoked several useful ideas. What is more, familiarity with the arguments of certain politically influential Americans is important, not merely theoretically, but also practically. It is quite true that responsible Americans do not share these points of view, which are dangerous to the national defense. In September, 1942, President Roosevelt declared that only the co-ordination of all the armed services would obtain the desired decision in the war. This did not prevent certain elements from continuing to foster the idea that the war should be fought first, not on the decisive fronts of Europe, but against Japan in Asia and at the gateway to Australia. Among these groups are former isolationists and appeasers of the Lindbergh type, who either cannot understand, or refuse to understand, the extent to which Hitlerism menaces the entire world and particularly the United States. Public opinion is beginning to react against those who insist that it is possible to obtain victory through air power if mass bombardments are undertaken. It is on the European Continent that the mortal blow must be struck.

While rejecting the independent use of air force and the decisive role of strategic bombardments, Soviet military theory takes into account all the innovations that the use of aviation has brought about in the conduct of war. Thus, for instance, the outcome of the Battle of Midway was determined by planes based on aircraft carriers. Aviation continues to be a major factor in the Pacific. Accelerated construction of aircraft carriers at the expense of battleships—heavily armed and protected carriers possessing wide range and capable of great speed—is the result of these experiences. Aerial superiority of the Allies stopped the Japanese advance at the gateway to Australia; and on the Burmese front British aviation has been more active than Japanese.

The recent bombardments of the Reich open new perspectives for striking at the vital centers of enemy power; the improved results are due to greater bombing precision and to heavier bombs with increased destructive force. Combined British and American air activity assures us that the promise made by Air Marshal Harris in an article published in *The British Ally* will be kept. Harris declared that this summer Germany and the German Army will definitely feel the force of British and American air power.

The United Nations already possess all the prerequisites for an offensive in the principle theater of war. The strength of the enemy and his allies is still concentrated on the Soviet front, while the British Empire and the United States have been accumulating equipment and plans for launching military operations of great scope. According to the British periodical, *Fighting Forces*, the United States in 1942 produced more planes than all those possessed by the Reich at the beginning of 1942.

The United Nations, including the U. S. S. R., Great Britain, Canada, and the other Allies, produce more than twice as many planes as the Axis (including Japan), whose factories turn out about five thousand planes a month. It must also be remembered that the Axis has lost more planes than have the United Nations. For example, during the Battle of Britain, the Axis lost 3,692 planes, as against 887 British. The proportion of Japanese losses in the Pacific is markedly in favor of the United States. On the Eastern front, the record at the end of the first year of war was as follows: Germany, twenty thousand planes; Russia, nine thousand. It is in the sphere of air personnel that the enemy is suffering the greatest losses, losses that cannot be recouped. According to the calculations of Colonel Denisov, the Eastern front imposed a loss of forty thousand men on the German air force during one year. Germany and her allies are less able to replace air force personnel than are the Allies.

As to the replacement of the planes themselves, Germany is in a somewhat better condition. It has ceased to issue new models and concentrates on perfecting the planes

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and the motors already used by the *Luftwaffe*. By utilizing the productive capacities of the occupied countries, Germany can still turn out a formidable quantity of bombers, fighters, and transport planes.

III

FORGETTING the idea of aviation as an independent arm, capable of forcing a decision alone, we can see that the air power of the United Nations plays an extremely important role, not only at the front, but in action against the enemy's vital centers and also in the struggle to safeguard the shortest sea routes. On all sides, domination of the air is a necessary condition for success. On the whole, Germany and her allies in Europe have lost strategic superiority in the air.

With the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, the Reich was forced to forego all further aerial offensive in the west. Even in the south of Russia, where Germany concentrated its air power, it had to use a new technique. The days marking the early stages of the war, when German planes attacked far behind the lines and tried to break our morale, have passed. On no sector of the Soviet-German front is German aviation performing with its old vigor. Bombers no longer venture onto Soviet territory alone.

Mass use of air power occurs only on isolated sectors of the front, where the enemy succeeds in obtaining air superiority. The bombers JU-88, JU-87, and Haenkel III are used as an attack force, in the attempt to paralyze defenses that might prevent the advance of land forces. Actually, bombers are used like artillery. In some cases they open the way for tanks. Bombers aim at two kinds of targets: first our front-line force and important points immediately behind, such as river crossings; second, important population centers in the rear and railroad junctions leading from the rear to the front.

After the bankruptcy of its *Blitzkrieg*, the German High Command took to using its air force chiefly for the support of its land force. These tactics were in accord with the experience of the Ethiopian and Spanish wars; there was nothing new about them. But the intensive resistance of Soviet aviation makes it impossible for German air power to achieve decisive success.

Soviet air production during the course of the war has been able to undergo a complete transformation, replacing the matériel of our air force entirely and giving it military planes of an altogether new type. Qualitatively, Soviet planes are better than German planes. If in certain sectors the Nazis are still able to obtain quantitative superiority, Major Seversky himself admits that quantity without adequate quality is useless when it is confronted with a well-armed and stubborn enemy.

The feverish changes in nazi aerial tactics were not very original after the defeat of the old methods, which had grown out of the venturesome *Blitzkrieg* strategy and out of the desire to strike fear into the heart of the enemy. As is known, the Germans changed their tactics continually during the Battle of Britain, passing from aerial preparations for invasion to the attempt to destroy British air power in the air and on the ground; then trying—with the independent use of all the air power at their command—to deal England a crushing blow, and finally limiting themselves to bombing the most vital centers of the country. Confronted with a determined enemy, the Germans took a beating. They are taking an even greater beating in Russia, which has a better air force than Britain had in 1940–41. Thus, every attempt on the part of Germany to utilize its air power as a decisive arm has ended in defeat.

During September, 1941, the Germans used a thousand planes against Leningrad, but this preparation for assault ended in a smash. The mass concentration of air power on Moscow in October and November, 1941, produced no triumph, either. The Battle of Moscow was lost by Hitler at the beginning of December as the result of the heroic resistance of all the Soviet forces, including aviation. A thousand planes did not bring a decision at Stalingrad, although more than once the Germans tried to transform a tactical success into a decisive strategic success. We do not underestimate the strength of German aviation, but we know—in the light of experience—that even the mass use of air power cannot obtain a decision. Leaping from one adventure to another, undertaking a new campaign without finishing an old one, the enemy has proved, not his strength, but his weakness.

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COMMENTARY

by

Francis Vivian Drake

THE Soviet desire for a major Second Front against the Nazis on the Continent of Europe has the sympathy of all who reflect on the magnificent performance of the Soviet armies, and indeed of the whole nation. However, if this desire is to serve as a springboard for a constructive discussion of strategic air power and its bearing on the situation, there is all the more reason for tackling the subject from available facts, and not from the standpoint of prejudice or unsupported opinion. Air power has become far too important an issue in the fate of all the warring nations, *including that of the Russians, to be approached* without accuracy of fact.

Mr. Lazarev's article does not seem to me to fulfill these requirements. It contains so many inaccurate statements that it tends to invalidate the author's obvious sincerity and to reduce any discussion of his work to the cheerless routine of correcting a series of elementary facts. In many instances, what the author presents to his readers as categoric fact turns out to be nothing more than vehement opinion.

At the outset of his article he states: ". . . it has been conclusively proved that it is impossible to expect decisive results from a *Blitzkrieg* strategy carried out exclusively by military aviation." Since heavy strategic air power was demonstrated highly successful on the one occasion on which it has been used in this war, to wit, on the capture of Pantelleria,* it makes such pronouncements a little difficult to penetrate. The scale of the strategic air offensive against Pantelleria, furthermore, represented only a small fraction of the air power now in the control of the United Nations. What would happen if this vast air power were massed into one striking force and allowed to project titanic blows against an objective such as the Ruhr is a point on which our most advanced military leaders are not sure themselves. They realize all too well that, headlines notwithstanding, air power has still not begun to fulfill its ultimate potentialities, because its operations have still not attained anything like the ultimate scale of equipment now available. In these circumstances, it is not particularly invigorating to be told that Mr. Lazarev, at least, remains untouched by doubt.

Mr. Lazarev states that the use of aviation as an independent air arm proved to be a failure in the case of the Battle of Britain, which leads him, in a single bound, to the *conclusion that any and all independent air* arms are predestined to failure. Because the first fumbling experiment in the use of independent air power was not decisive, he unhesitatingly considers the discussion closed. Offhand this seems to me a line of reaoning rather on a par with dismissing the potentialities of offensive naval warfare on the score that the Spanish Armada missed its step in regard to England.

I do not think it could be called overstatement if an averagely informed reader ventured to suggest that there appeared to be no little confusion in Mr. Lazarev's article regarding the nature of modern strategic air power. While the *Luftwaffe* which operated in the *Blitz* of Britain could accurately be described as an "air arm," it certainly did not represent in any sense "strategic air power" as we understand the term today. Only heavy, long-range, armored bombers, concentrated in considerable numbers and capable of carrying from three to ten tons apiece, can qualify nowadays as "strategic."

The 1940 *Luftwaffe* was a small, highly efficient air force designed for *tactical* use, to co-operate specifically with mechanized ground forces in land battles. The *Luftwaffe* bombers would not even qualify as medium bombers by today's standards. So long as the Nazis confined their air arm to ground sup-

*Mr. Lazarev's article was written before the Allied offensive in the Mediterranean.—THE EDITORS.

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port use, as in the conquest of Europe, it was spectacularly successful, in fact much more successful than it could hope to be today, when the United Nations are amply equipped with proper weapons with which to repel it. In the Battle of Britain the Nazis attempted to switch this tactical air force to *strategic* use, to offensive bombing missions for which these planes, with their poor armament and small bombloads, were totally unsuited. They were shot down by the much smaller British air force at the rate of nearly five for one, sacrificing a fantastic proportion of their total strength in a few desperate weeks. The first pioneering attempt to subdue a country by air power when the aggressor controlled, in fact, no true air power at all, was thus a conspicuous failure. It is not unlikely that, had the Nazis at that time commanded the sort of strategic air power that the United Nations command today, there might have been a grimly different ending to the story.

Mr. Lazarev seems unaware that this *Blitz*-of-Britain average of five bombers for one fighter is a ratio that has long since become obsolete. Our powerfully armed strategic bombers have in fact reversed the ratio and for the past six months have been shooting down an average of 4.6 nazi fighters for every United States bomber lost. It is a further compelling fact that our production of these formidable bombers dwarfs anything that the *Luftwaffe* ever dreamed about, let alone achieved. In short, the condition of air power has undergone such prodigious changes in three years of costly trial and error that to cling to the *Blitz* of Britain as the last word on the subject of independent air arms is somewhat benighted. Mr. Lazarev states that the island of Crete was captured because the British lacked tanks with which to mop up German parachutists, which leads one to the suspicion that he was carried away by the early news flashes instead of studying the official records. As a matter of fact, the parachutists *were* mopped up. Crete was captured because German air power routed British naval forces, which were without adequate air protection, and thus left the island wide open to land occupation. But in any event, Crete was assailed by a tactical air force, and the subject is not even remotely related to the subject of strategic bombing.

There are some other misconceptions on which Mr. Lazarev rests his case concerning the restricted function of air arms: that improved results against Germany are due to heavier bombs (actually, blast effect goes down as the inverse cube of the radius, which means that four 1,000-lb. bombs have more destructive effect than one 4,000-lb. blockbuster); that the Battle of Midway was determined by carrier-based planes (U. S. Flying Fortresses, land-based, played an emphatic part in the action); that the Nazis and the Japanese produce about 5,000 planes a month (if he means combat planes, his estimates are nearly 100 per cent higher than those of competent Allied authorities); and that in the first year of war on the Eastern front, the Nazis lost 20,000 planes (a figure which exceeds well-informed estimates of the entire German combat output for that year).

Mr. Lazarev darkly holds that the motives of air power proponents stem sometimes from business connections, sometimes from a desire to keep American forces untouched so that "the United States can impose its will the moment the other belligerents are exhausted." Since he omits to name any of his commercially minded or will-imposing suspects, it is hard to escape an impression that Mr. Lazarev is perhaps a little overwrought. The idea that air proponents are sustained by nest-feathering impulses is rather naïve, for every airplane plant in the country is groaning under the weight of orders for years ahead, and if any of them could accept another order, the Government would force them to do so, whether or not they insisted on writing a piece about air power.

My own impression is that our proponents of air power are speaking their minds from a motive no more sinister than that of honest conviction, and that perhaps their most significant habit is that of sticking to the facts and girding against the fancies. Whether Mr. Lazarev's statement that "the United Nations already possess all the prerequisites for an offensive in the principal theater of war" is correct or not, I do not know. He does not say "successful offensive," and his approach to air power inclines one to accept his view on land power with some reserve.

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Death of the dictator

The dictator will sprawl on the stairway
of the neo-classic palace;

The eyes that reviewed the armored divisions will glaze

On the marble step, the voice expire in the rattle
the world waits.

The celebration will be a stillborn feast: nothing will end

But the crudest shot in the dark, the figure with cape.

The death of the dictator is the beginning of war
against him.

He was noise on a street corner; by indifference
we fed him, by every cruelty

Clothed him for war. The abandoned village was his,
the vacant man in the city;

He was the child of colonies, of the treeless border
under arms.

The dictator is in us, his filaments explore the
stony brain;

He is suckled by the fear of man, the fear of change
that locks the will.

His statue is by default in the public park: he lives
while we breathe on his violent mouth.

DON GORDON

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Reconstruction in France

EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY

by

HENRI LAUGIER

DURING the last war, several university instructors in military service, inspired by the comradeship of the trenches on the Somme and at Verdun, founded an association called *"Les Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle,"* an association which planned to bring about absolute educational equality for all French children through what they called *"l'Ecole Unique."* The organization published two books and sponsored conferences throughout France. When the parties of the Left, which had incorporated *l'Ecole Unique* into their programs, came to power in 1924, the organization thought its goal achieved. But problems which seemed more urgent harassed this and succeeding governments, well-disposed though they were toward a reform whose profound revolutionary nature frightened the privileged groups in education. The projected reform was lost in the red tape of commissions, reports by specialists, and disagreements among the advocates of classical languages, modern languages, and the experimental sciences. As a result, the minor changes made in the educational system by later ministries left the basic problem posed by *Les Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle* completely unsolved, and no real progress was made toward a solution.

What is this problem?

Under the laws of the French Republic, there was no restriction whatsoever in regard to the educational opportunities offered by France to its children, no discrimination based on social or racial status or on any other criterion. In letter as well as in spirit, French law established educational equality for every child.

The reality, however, was quite different. A whole series of restraints, emerging from family traditions, outmoded habits of thought, and imperative economic conditions, produced a situation in which all the ruling groups in France were drawn from a strictly limited section of the population. Few Frenchmen were aware of the serious restrictions imposed by the structure of French society on real educational equality and consequently on the universality of access to the administrative ranks of the country.

As director of a labor research institute, one of whose purposes was to study the professions in their various aspects, I found it useful to investigate the social origins of those who were engaged in many important professions. Somewhere in France there is actually a statistical study of mine, ready for publication, presenting clear evidence, even for the most obstinately blind, of the profound inequality to be found in our country—under the Republic, among Frenchmen—regarding the possibility of access to the leading professions. I regret not having at hand the tables of figures relating to the diplomatic and university groups and apologize for having brought with me only that part of the document that I carried in my memory. But the conclusions were so clear that I have retained the most vivid memory of them, if not of the precise figures involved.

As to those members of the diplomatic

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and consular personnel whose posts at the time led me to examine their individual records, a statistical scrutiny of the social origin of ambassadors, ministers, councilors, secretaries, consuls general, and consuls revealed that about 35 per cent were sons of members of the Quai d'Orsay, 20 per cent sons of military men, and 20 per cent sons of men from the liberal professions or holding the highest government posts. The rest were distributed among the sons of the upper or middle classes. A picturesque and highly significant touch should be added. In the directory of the Quai d'Orsay, names written with a prefix (authentic or not) appeared several hundred times more frequently than in the telephone directory (itself a selected list) and several thousand times more frequently than in the population at large. I leave it to the reader to draw his own conclusions as to how this situation could affect the foreign policy of the French Republic. Here we are concerned solely with the fact that, in the matter of their social background, the chiefs and personnel of the French diplomatic services were in no way representative of the nation.

An analogous study of the enrollment of the *Ecole Normale Supérieure* gave similar results. This school is unquestionably one of the most important, if not the most important, in France, since it trains practically all the secondary-school teachers—in all the various fields—who, in turn, mold the greater part of French youth in the high schools and colleges. On the other hand, because of the high quality of the normal school students, a certain number of them have been drawn into the administrative ranks of the most diverse professions—politics, journalism, banking, diplomacy, and so on. It should be added that it is one of the most democratic of schools, since it is theoretically and actually possible for a child without means to continue his duties, with state funds, from the time he enters the high school until he completes his courses of studies at the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*. An analysis of the social background of normal-school students, however, produces results as surprising as the analysis of the diplomatic service. Of these students, 40 per cent are the sons of university men; 30 per cent are sons of members of the liberal professions, the army, the navy, or the upper ranks of commerce and industry; 20 per cent belong to the petty bourgeoisie of small traders and petty officials. The enrollment of the *Ecole* penetrated humbler social levels than did that of the diplomatic corps; but even here, the sons of manual laborers and of industrial and agricultural workers were not represented except for isolated individuals who, because of exceptional circumstances, were permitted access to its superior curriculum.

Similar but often even harsher conclusions may be drawn from a study of the other professions—medicine, law, finance—which exert a dominant influence on society. Despite legislation that in theory provided absolute equality of opportunity in all spheres, the controlling framework of the country was drawn from a category varyingly limited but nevertheless representing only a narrow segment of the population and never including salaried, industrial, or agricultural classes.

Deep-seated reforms would have to be instituted before the equality provided for in theory could be translated into fact. The need to realize these reforms is imperious, not only because social justice demands that a Right of Man be translated into reality, but also to assure the utilization, in the directive framework of society, of the best abilities of all social classes. Thus far, experience has proven that it is almost impossible to realize structural reforms during the tranquillity of peace, and that great social upheavals alone constitute a propitious background for them. It will be an explicit duty of those who shape the new structure of France after the war to provide equality of educational opportunity for its children.

II

LET us, first of all, specify several points that are self-evident to many, but that ignorance, prejudice, or bad political faith have often encompassed with confusion. Those who affirm the equal right of all children to education as a natural right in no wise assert that children are born alike and equal. They are not unaware of the innumerable biological differences, physical and intellectual, which divide children at birth; nor do they deny that aptitudes may be extraordi-

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narily diverse. They merely declare that all children have an equal right to an education, assuring to each the development of his talents and faculties—equal opportunity to participate in the benefits of culture. They demand only that society refrain from superimposing additional inequalities, based on wealth, race, or other forms of discrimination, upon the biological differences evident at birth.

The term *"école unique,"* which has enjoyed an unfortunate popularity, is most confusing. In the minds of those who placed it in circulation, the term signified that there ought not to be parallel curricula for children of the same age, contemplating different goals according to their families' economic station or social rank. At once, two-by-four minds interpreted this to mean an educational system that would keep all children in the same seats at the same schools for as long as possible (some said up to the age of eighteen), with the same instructors and the same programs. Actually, the equality it hoped to achieve was not so superficial and mechanical; it was a biological equality, requiring as wide a variation in instruction as possible. To give a fish and a bird equality, one must place the fish in water and the bird in the air. If the palm tree and the fir require different climates, variations in aptitudes among children are likewise great enough to demand different pedagogical climates.

The problem is therefore clear; it is to achieve a national educational structure that will grant to all children, regardless of social class, the full development of their talents and access to culture and to the ranks of those who direct the nation.

Granted that French legislation provides for perfect equality, what are the obstacles standing in the way of genuine equality among children? They are of several kinds.

The first is based on the existence of two parallel types of primary instruction—that of the public schools and that of the first years in high schools (*lycées*) and private schools. The programs are similar enough, but the distribution of children between the two is essentially determined by social status. Since the *lycées* and private schools are all situated in the cities, large or small, the children of peasants are absent, if not excluded, from their elementary classes. On the other hand, in the cities themselves, the manual workers and the small artisans send their children to the public schools. Consequently, elementary instruction in the *lycées* is received almost exclusively by children from the upper, middle, and lower bourgeoisie.

Practically from infancy, then, two groups of children, belonging to different backgrounds, having immediately different interests and eventually different futures, go to school in different places and with different teachers. The children who attend the free elementary schools are destined to move as quickly as possible into some vocational apprenticeship or toward technical training preparing them for modest careers in commerce, industry, or inferior administrative posts. It is imperative for these children to acquire, as quickly as possible, some technical ability permitting them to earn their own living, so that they will no longer be a burden on their families. On the other hand, pupils in the elementary classes of the *lycées* and private schools come from families intent on providing secondary, and if possible higher, schooling for their children. They are ready to make all the necessary material sacrifices to assure their sons an extensive cultural education, and to equip them for professional academic careers, or for important directive positions in administrative, industrial, or commercial fields.

The second obstacle lies in the separation of secondary education into different types of schooling (the various sections of *lycées*, private schools, public schools, trade and technical schools, and continuation schools) and in the economic and psychological difficulties of reorientation of courses to permit students to follow their aptitudes. There is no provision made for shifting from one form of education to one that is more suitable to the individual character of the pupil. After they finish their primary education, the choice of secondary courses for the children is determined by social status, financial means, and family ambitions, considerations that are often completely irrational and unrelated to their real talents. And once the choice has been made, the children are held to the path selected, whether it leads to success or failure. Lateral interchange among the various second-

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ary school programs is practically nonexistent; vertical partitioning is practically watertight.

The third obstacle has an economic origin. At the end of the primary course, there are competitive examinations for scholarships. These permit the children of the common people to enter upon a secondary education providing them with an extensive general background and access to the advanced technical schools and the universities. But these scholarships are exceedingly few in number and because they may be withdrawn after one or more years, they are uncertain; so that poor families hesitate to start their children off on such a problematical future. They prefer their children to take a course of studies that will quickly assure them a modest livelihood in the manual, industrial, commercial, or agricultural occupations or at minor government jobs, in the postal and telegraphic services, in tax and customs bureaus, and so on.

Consequently, the scholarships, already limited in number, usually find their way to children of modestly situated families (petty office holders, small merchants, country doctors, and so on) to whom they are unquestionably useful but who are already in a relatively comfortable position. *Except to a ridiculously small extent, the scholarships are unsuccessful in drawing from the masses those children capable of becoming the administrative framework of the nation.*

Finally, all these obstacles, all these concrete difficulties, have created a psychological difficulty. Only those groups already possessing a certain measure of material comfort are sure that all the strata of society are accessible to their children; the poorer classes know that only in dreams can they hope for any but the most narrowly limited of occupations. It would never occur to a farm worker or a miner that his son might become a doctor, lawyer, professor, prefect, or the head of an industry. These psychological limitations, created by genuine obstacles—which can sometimes be overcome—are found even among the members of the highest levels of society. The brilliant *lycée* students, who usually spring from families having at least a modicum of financial ease, almost invariably turn to the advanced technical schools or to the universities. Exceedingly rarely does a young *lycée* student prepare for a diplomatic or government career unless his family already belongs to one of these groups or to a similar group.

III

WITH the problem thus stated and the difficulties evaluated, the program for establishing equality in a reborn democratic France is immediately clarified. It includes the following points:

1. The setting up of a system of unified elementary instruction, eliminating the primary classes in the *lycées* and assuring common primary education for all children in every social category. This should be basic instruction, covering mastery of the tools of knowledge (reading, writing, and arithmetic), historical concepts and civic training to create an effective national solidarity, habits of observation, and the elementary use of experimental methods.

2. The establishment of a secondary program comprised of common cultural elements and of various sections which, though few in number, would provide precise and effective opportunities for training diverse aptitudes.

3. The organization, at the outset of the secondary courses, of as accurate and complete a study of the child's personality and endowments as modern biological, psychological, and pedagogical sciences permit—this study being the essential basis for assigning the children to the various sections of the secondary program according to their real aptitudes rather than according to the irrational considerations which so often decide the choice of a career today.

4. The establishment of a system of readjustment enabling children to switch from one section of the secondary program to another in order to allow for the correction of initial errors and the utilization of talents that were slow to appear.

5. The development of a system of higher education, cultural, professional, and technical, to fill the innumerable lacunae found in our present-day system, and the creation of administrative schools so universal in their enrollment as to ensure that the administrative structure of the country reflects the composition of the nation.

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6. The organization, as a state service, of well-endowed institutes for scientific research, created as much for pure as for applied study, and guaranteeing that the large enrollment of research workers should come from the entire nation.

7. The creation of an effective system of scholarships, stipends, and maintenance fees sufficient to guarantee that no child be kept by his family's economic status from access to secondary and higher schooling, or to the administrative posts of the nation.

The program appears simple, and actually it is. Nevertheless, it meets vigorous resistance from all the educationally privileged classes. Educational privilege assures the privilege of ruling. Both are stubbornly defended. Only the revolutionary circumstances accompanying the post-war fermentation will permit the realization of the outlined program. That is why it is essential that the future leaders of France, who will rise from among the heroes of Underground resistance, take clear cognizance of this vital need. Actual educational equality is the true foundation of that democratic revolution which will bring about the reconstruction of France.

Those who will bear the thrilling burden of remaking a new France will first have to relieve the terrible physical misery of the liberated French people. They will have to recreate a healthy, strong, and vigorous population out of children emaciated from prolonged undernourishment; out of parents weakened by heroically borne privations and exhausted by anguish and the Underground struggle; and out of prisoners whose health will have been undermined, sometimes irreparably, by years of cruel incarceration. But when this primary and protracted task, surpassing all others in urgency, has been set under way with the powerful aid of our great allies, the first duty will be to establish in France that equality of access, for all children, to education, to culture, to the ranks of those who direct the nation, which existed in law but not in fact in the Third Republic.

The Third Republic hesitated to make those changes demanded by justice and the national interest. The Republic which will be established by a liberated French people must tear down the Bastille of educational and cultural privilege.

—Translated by Libby Benedict

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R. J. THOMAS

THE National Council of the American Free World Association is happy to announce the addition to its ranks of R. J. Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers of America. Mr. Thomas, who entered the automobile industry in 1923 and very rapidly became a leader of auto workers. He is one of the founders of the UAW—CIO, which he has headed since 1939. In addition to being a vice president and a member of the National Executive Board of the CIO, Mr. Thomas is an employee member of the War Labor Board and a member of the President's Victory Committee of Labor Leaders. He is also chairman of Labor's Non-Partisan League in Michigan, and is at present helping in the organization of packing house workers. We are sure that Mr. Thomas's outstanding ability and breadth of outlook on labor affairs will be of great value to the Free World Association.

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THE FRONTIERS OF THE FUTURE

by

Hans Ernest Fried

EVEN while, through travail and heroism, the redemption of Europe draws ever nearer, the fear that the problems of the European frontiers are insoluble looms ever larger. If this shadow is allowed to grow it will finally imperil the very alliance of the United Nations. We must resolve to divorce the coming victory over National Socialism from the bickering about boundaries. This is an urgent task, and not an impossible one. Territorial problems *can* be made obsolete, thus relieving world politics of one of its heaviest mortgages. If the traditional approach to boundary questions stubbornly refuses to yield results, the only liberating action is to adopt new principles and find new goals.

One idea which must be given up with regard to post-war problems is that it is possible to find all-purpose boundaries. All-purpose boundaries are frontiers which simultaneously satisfy the demands of history and tradition, the variegated aspects of industrial production and commerce, the needs of land, sea, and air transportation, military exigencies, nationalistic aspirations, political stratifications and idiosyncrasies, and the distribution of agricultural and mineral resources. There can be no blinking the fact that in many regions which are precisely the danger zones and contested areas, satisfactory all-purpose boundaries do not exist. Boundary lines which are perfect from, say, an agricultural point of view may, for example, not concur with the rivers, mountains, and arteries of communication; the "natural" or compromised boundaries may cut cities into two (as happened in various European storm centers) or isolate seaports from the hinterlands without which they must die, or railways from their centers, or nationals from their brothers, or coal mines from the industrial regions.

The drawing of all-purpose boundaries is particularly hopeless in areas with mixed populations, mixed languages, mixed religions, mixed feelings, and mixed necessities. There is much error in the notion that in these regions people are living to the right and to the left side of a dividing line which, however, has eluded discovery; and that plebiscites and boundary makers have merely to find this hidden line and then insert it with black ink on a multi-colored map. Frequently, it would be as difficult to draw a line between Hungarians and Rumanians in the contested areas of Transylvania as it would be to draw a line between Republicans and Democrats in New York City. Also, to consider the national affiliations indelible is a doctrinairism which even chauvinists have been unable to prove. As long as statesmen stick to the idea that linguistic demarcations have to coincide with, and, indeed, to determine the all-purpose boundaries, any secessionist movement of splinter groups is capable of shaking the foundations of world peace.

There is another point. The administration of European affairs needs to be elastic and of a size adequate to our age. Too many economic, technological, social,

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national, and cultural aspects of life reach in various ways across the borders, however drawn, of too many European countries. Vital functions and services can be performed only on a scale which transcends geographical frontiers. Certainly, the really important issues—the ones which make for international conflicts—cannot be solved by transferring this city or that river, or even entire regions, from this country to that. Thus, in a world of functional interdependencies, it is vain to continue to search for the just all-purpose frontiers. However hard we may try, we shall not find them because they do not exist.

The Territorial (One-Layer) State, and Functional (Multi-Layer) Regions

WHEN it comes to redrawing the map of Europe, the peacemakers will find that, to be fair to even the most urgent economic, political, military, and linguistic needs, they would have to set up three or five or eight *different* frontiers between country A and B. In other words, to find *various* satisfactory demarcations, it will be necessary to have a different line for each of the different problems to be solved. In many cases even one-purpose boundary *lines* would be difficult to draw, and it would be better to organize boundary *regions* than to draw boundary lines. Where necessary, the all-purpose frontier must be supplemented by two, or five, or as many single-purpose demarcations between any two or more countries as may be appropriate and expedient.

It is not argued here that territorial states or federations of states need be abolished. This would be not merely utopian but undesirable. However, while separate countries will continue to exist, there will, at the same time, be an urgent need for a variety of single-purpose areas, each designed to fulfill a special public function. The "one-layer" state—the geographical red or green spot on the map—must cease to be all-important, though it would not cease to exist. But, in addition—and largely overshadowing individual states (or federations)—"functional organizations" must be created, as machineries for co-operation beyond frontiers.

What is a functional organization? It is an organization, a board, an agency, a committee (or whatever it may be called) which deals with one particular aspect, one particular function. This particular job might be of a political or military nature, such as protection against secret rearmament, or building up of a machinery of collective security; or it might be of a social character, such as the handling of the migration of a particular minority; or again, of a technical nature, such as the modernization of Balkan agriculture or tobacco industry.

Such specific boards or agencies would be called upon to administer all those activities which cannot or, in the interest of peace, should not be handled by any one state alone. These organizations would be superimposed upon the individual states (or federations) whose territorial boundaries they normally would override. That is to say, territorial boundaries of the traditional type would not affect these functional organizations; thus, whether the Balkan Tobacco Board should or should not include Albania would depend on whether Albania cultivates tobacco, not on the territorial boundaries of Albania, Greece, or Bulgaria. The whole approach can be compared with the preparations of a person touring Europe for a specific purpose: if he is interested in Gothic cathedrals, he will prepare itinerary A; and if he is interested in mountain climbing, itinerary B. Whether the cathedral is situated in Flanders or in Holland, or whether the mountain happens to lie in the French Haute Savoie or in the Swiss Tessino, will be of minor importance to him. It must be emphasized that the two travellers would not only plan their tours regardless of borderlines, but that in certain cases they would both visit the same places. Nevertheless, it will be a matter of complete indifference to the mountain climber how large an area the art student includes in his itinerary, and vice versa.

In a similar way, the specialized boards would not be handicapped by state frontiers. Each of them would cover as large or as small an area as its particular function required. Furthermore, it would be inconsequential to any of them whether or not, and to what extent, the area covered by one board might overlap the area covered by other boards.

There would evolve, as it were, a *multi-*

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layer administrative pattern over one and the same territory. A political map would no longer consist merely of green, red, and blue spots. Over them, there would lie various layers of different regional administrations. These would only loosely be connected with, and would not be directly dependent on, the states or federations (the colored spots). The map would look like a meteorological map of different isotherms. Isotherms are of different shape and size. Many an isotherm would, to a smaller or larger extent, overlap one or more other isotherms. Each isotherm would indicate the administration of, or control over, one of the factors of human activities which so far have been international storm centers.

Here are some practical examples. In order to develop full use of the water power of the Alps, a Central Alpine Electricity Board would have to assume management over the water supply, and the generation and transfer of power. Therefore, the board would contain delegates from the Alpine regions and, in addition, from the main consumers of the electricity, including the Rhine Valley and the Po Valley industries. Thus, in terms of a pre-1939 map, the "area" or jurisdiction of the Central Alpine Electricity Board would cover large parts of Switzerland, a considerable part of Austria, and important regions of Germany, Italy, and France.

The Board of European Airways would cover a different territory, be composed differently, and provide for a different machinery. A commission for the co-ordination of higher education and text-books would again vary from both the Regional Electricity and the European Airways Board.

Such supranational bodies would diminish the orthodox "sovereignty" of the states. But the power and sovereign rights of the peoples would increase, and not decrease. The populations of every region would elect their own delegates to all agencies handling some of their affairs. * Thus, they would make progress in democracy. For until now, the people have had very little to say in the administration of affairs which transcend the boundaries of their own land. This is particularly true of international manipulation of markets and raw materials. The supranational boards would differ significantly from the usual cartels and international production schemes of pre-war days. For they would give democratic representation to duly elected delegates of consumers, technicians, and workers, whereas heretofore extra-boundary affairs have been all too much in the hands of special interests, with democratic control almost wholly absent.

Co-determination for Europe

THE moment we abandon the narrow concept of the one-layer map and the territorially sealed state, great vistas open: a harmonization of the interests of large and small nations; a victory over the limitations of geography; an answer to "geopolitics" (which seeks the exact opposite of what is here advocated); the promise of individual opportunities unhampered by jealous governments; and democratically controlled administration by experts.

The up-to-date form of *self*-determination is co-determination. Especially in anguished and devastated Europe, the nations must not be compelled (nor, indeed, allowed) to withdraw into their shells, inadequate, outmoded breeders of hate, greed, and poverty. The way to decontaminate "foreign affairs" is to divest them of their mysterious character, and to establish interregional solidarities on lines which are natural and self-asserting. The great need is for solidarity, but combined with autonomy; and for internationalism, but strengthened by a novel sense of national security.

There is no doubt that an extended system of supranational bodies would create many a pressure group and much lobbying; that complications would arise, especially out of questions of election and jurisdiction; and that, in general, frictions would be unavoidable both among the boards themselves, and between them and state agencies. But a supreme league, modeled on the League of Nations, would have to exercise final qualified supervision and veto power over the various boards and

* The composition of these agencies would be based upon specific charters or constitutions. These should be framed even now—the United Nations acting as a Constituent Assembly. At least, these constitutions should be thoroughly discussed and be prepared even while the question of territorial frontiers would be intentionally left open.

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commissions. First of all, it may be hoped that the difficulties arising from a multiplication of agencies would be offset by a really great gain: namely, that the discussion of changes in international affairs would at last cease to awaken the ghost of "territorial" changes. If a system of supranational boards seems bold, it must be pointed out that the only alternative to new paths is a catastrophic armament race, mutual suspicion, and frantic drives for territorial expansion.

Some of the principal differences between the League of Nations and the system envisaged here are that these new commissions would be specialized, self-governing, and largely independent of the orthodox ways of diplomacy. But, first of all, the protection of the peace would be incomparably easier to administer than under the system of sanctions. For each of the new commissions or boards would take its own precautionary or sanctionary measures against breaches of that particular section of international law which it would be charged to protect. For them, it would be easy to take such measures because they would derive real power from the fact that they would supervise important parts of the economic and cultural life of their areas.

Even with a well-functioning League, sanctions had to be decided upon in an intricate process. They were affairs of highest politics; in essence, they were judgments passed by governments against governments—with no machinery for execution ready. But in the future, the specialized commissions would themselves take action. They could actually cut a country off from air traffic, or invalidate diplomas of chauvinistic schools. For example, on the board of the Eastern European Railway Council would sit executives and employees of all Eastern European railroads. Hence, were Hungary to develop an illegal arms traffic, the council, to begin with, would know it and would be free to publish the facts—whereas diplomats could only report confidentially to their respective governments. The council would, finally, take the appropriate measures within its own powers and responsibility. It would, like every personnel department of a corporation, dismiss the ill-behaving railway officials merely by writing a letter of dismissal. Or should Italy, for instance, begin clandestine rearmament, the Alpine Electricity Board could, by turning one switch, deprive the Po Valley of its main source of light and power. A state, and especially a small state like Austria or Switzerland, could never take so drastic a step.

And thus, too, the extremely difficult questions of the right of "intervention in internal affairs of a foreign country," would solve itself. Until now, this problem has been the crux of world politics. And this very problem would, in a way, cease to exist. For the internal affairs of foreign countries would to a large extent become the field of activities of the various supranational co-ordinating committees.

The Test Case: Post-Hitler Germany

ANY system claiming to deal adequately with a defeated Germany must promise at least the following conditions: (1) to give formidable safeguards against a return of National Socialism, inside and outside of Germany; (2) to create, in the victorious countries, as few burdens and as little domestic controversy as possible; (3) not to be repugnant to the victims of nazism, because of undue leniency toward the Germans; (4) to take into full account that fascism is bound to remain a threat to the world even after the downfall of Hitler, and that Nazis will be feverishly at work in many countries; (5) to eliminate, or at least isolate, storm centers instead of creating them; (6) not to lead to the formation of blocs; (7) to encourage the anti-nazi forces in Germany, and gradually to reintegrate a purified Germany in the comity of civilized nations; (8) to allow for changes—but only for such changes as, if they come, will not imperil the peace.

But there is a primary dilemma. These goals—which, it must be repeated, are a minimum program—appear to be mutually contradictory. And yet, the achievement of any of them is dependent upon the achievement of the others; none of these goals can be reached unless all are. This is why any scheme which would overemphasize one of these eight points at the expense of another will fail.

It appears that a system of joint admin-

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istrations and functional co-ordination across Germany's borders would meet all the divergent requirements to satisfy the eight points. Such a system should, therefore, become a cornerstone of the grand strategy of pacification and reorganization of Germany. Germany's economic activities, her cultural life, her natural resources, her transportation system, and many other aspects of her public life link her with the affairs of other nations. Hence, the creation of a network of joint boards, all reaching across Germany's borders, would give direct influence and concrete responsibilities to non-Germans interested in those German problems whose range and repercussions transcend German territory.

A joint board can be envisaged to co-ordinate the eastern French, the Belgian, the Dutch, the Luxembourg and the western German heavy metal industries; another for those of German Silesia and Poland. Another joint board could be formed for the co-ordination of the machine industries of Saxony and Czechoslovakia. And so on. These boards would possess considerable autonomous power. Their members would be present constantly in the offices, plants, and storehouses of German (and other) enterprises. Three experts, one French, one Belgian, and one Dutch—each politically reliable —who shared responsibility in the running of a German factory, would exercise a more drastic control than three companies of French, Belgian, and Dutch soldiers, standing before the gates of that same plant.

Since it is vitally important to clean up the miasmic moral and intellectual atmosphere of Germany and of the other dictator countries, functional co-ordination should not be restricted to political and economic affairs. The Germans and their allies must not be allowed, after their defeat, to bog themselves in the mire of their own "explanations." Hence, regional school boards, text-book conventions, and regional agencies for migration, occupational training, and recreational activities—all these and many others will be urgently needed.

The dangers which have always resided in the special problems of the border regions would be greatly reduced. The creation of joint boards would make the border regions, in a certain way, mixed areas. The number of "layers" would be greatest in the border regions. And the peoples who have been the main victims of nazism would give effective aid in checking such political movements in the regions adjacent to their own countries. It can be assumed that they would eagerly accept a mandate to do their share in protecting and healing the continent.

Under a system of *direct* and *technical* links with non-Germans, the Germans would always be a minority on the joint boards; for the portion of German territory contained in the area of every board would always be smaller than the non-German territory linked with it. Thus, the fact that Holland or Czechoslovakia is smaller than Germany would be irrelevant in the regional administrations. In addition, as a protection against unacceptable delegates from Germany—or any other state —the boards would need to have the right to reject candidates and to exclude members. The traditional diplomatic device of rejecting *personae non gratae* would at last be used to democratize international affairs.

In short, this scheme, while having nothing of the artificiality of a partition of Germany, would contribute to that pluralization of Germany (by bringing her into close and variegated relations with other nations) which is necessary as an antidote to the racism and megalomania infused into the Germans in the last two decades.

The Example of the United States of America

THE need of neighboring states for a special machinery of regional collaboration is fully realized in the Constitution of 1787, which provided for "agreements or compacts" between two or more states (Art. I, sec. 10: 3). So far, several scores of regional compacts have been concluded, ranging from establishment of areas for common supervision of parolees to co-operation in the construction of the Boulder Dam. Moreover, practical experience in federal administration has proved the usefulness of administrative regions which are independent of state boundaries. The Federal Reserve System, the National Labor Relations Board, the Office of Price Administration, and other important federal agencies have

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decisively improved their work by dividing the national territory, *not* into forty-eight states, but into a smaller number of regions. Two features stand out: First, the regions of the different agencies do not necessarily coincide. In most marked contrast to traditional state boundaries—where one and the same frontier halts the mail carrier and the sheriff and the judge and the school teacher and the tax agent—the jurisdictional areas of the Federal Reserve System need not coincide with those of the different army corps or of the Office of Price Administration. Secondly, this technique of American government excels in the easiness with which the administrative "frontiers" can be changed. No redrawing of boundaries is necessary. How difficult it would be to persuade Texas or Wisconsin to give up pieces of territory! And how easy it is to change the administrative regions of the Army or the National Labor Relations Board!

The mother of federations puts increasing emphasis upon regional administration. This is evidence that pluralistic functionalism and specialization are by no means superfluous even *within* a federation that covers large territories. But more than that, the United States has carried this system into the field of international co-ordination. A comparison of the alternatives that have been open to the United States since September, 1939, shows the superiority of the "multi-layer" over the "one-layer" approach. War demanded that this country combine its efforts with those of other nations and, characteristically, there were proposals for territorial fusions, But even assuming that "Union Now" with the British Empire, or a federation with Mexico or with Canada or even with Central and South America could have been formed, that would still have been both too much and too little.

As it was, the United States, in common with a great *variety* of nations, created a *variety of specialized* policy-making and administrative machineries. There exist now an ever increasing number of specialized agencies, all of whom are reaching beyond national frontiers. Each of them is in charge of a particular region and concerned with one particular aspect of that region. To mention only a few on this impressive list: common defense agencies with Canada and Mexico; the Pacific War Council which unites delegates from U. S. A., China, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the Netherlands; lease-lend machineries; organizations administering the good neighbor policy with Central and South America. Here, *a new art of supranational government is being born,* and what emerges is a *network of functional and regional co-operation and co-ordination*—or, even more, of *overlapping* networks of *varying* numbers of such specialized and regional co-operations. This new method of large-scale organization and solidarity, properly explained, might find no less an echo in Europe than did the principles of the American Declaration of Independence.

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WALTER WANGER

IN adding the name of Walter Wanger to our International Honorary Board, we are proud to welcome to FREE WORLD *a representative of the motion picture industry. Mr. Wanger, who produces Universal Pictures, is president of the Motion Picture Academy of Arts and Sciences and is a member of the newly formed Independent Motion Picture Producers Association. One of the most widely quoted authorities in the industry, he has to his credit such films as Eagle Squadron, The Long Voyage Home, and Stage Coach. Mr. Wanger's affiliation with* FREE WORLD *is an active one. He is taking a prominent part in the work of the Free World Association on the Pacific Coast.*

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BRAZIL

Laboratory of Civilization

BY AFRÂNIO COUTINHO

THIS report on Brazil's solution of the race problem presents the developments of several centuries, regardless of the political forms of government which to date have been chiefly undemocratic.—THE EDITORS.

THE recent outbreak of racial antagonism in the United States has many repercussions. It will be widely discussed in Latin America, and particularly in Brazil, where the problem of racial relations has been happily solved for a long time. Perhaps Brazil's chief contribution to the establishment of a sound society in the future lies in this particular field, for Brazil may truly be said to be a laboratory of civilization on the Negro problem, on the problem of Negro and white relations.

This is no mean contribution. One of the underlying causes for the present world conflict is undoubtedly the lack of equilibrium in race relations. It has antedated Hitler by a long time, but it was brought to a head by the nazi racial doctrine; and in the future, it may be one of the explosive forces which will bring about the next world war. Certainly, an understanding between white and colored peoples is necessary if we are to gain a complete victory in the fight for freedom. "Can the white man and the colored man ever come together in any sort of co-operation?" asks Pearl Buck in her eloquent plea to the white race to grant equality to the colored races the world over. "And the answer to that question is the answer to where and when this war will end," she concludes.

Brazilian civilization is characterized by a fusion of three very different races and cultures, no one of which has had absolute predominance over the other two. What happened in Brazil was a process of fusion through intermarriage and miscegenation, a fusion which took place without sacrificing any of the original elements. In no case has there existed a separate group fated to become the enemy of other groups within the nation. National unity has been achieved both culturally and racially as a result of this process of fusion over the course of four centuries. The spirit of tolerance shown dates back to the Portuguese colonizers, who, from the first, accepted the anthropological view of racial equality. The result was a *mestiçagem,* or race mixture. Intermarriage between whites and Negroes was so complete that at present we constitute a mixed civilization.

The character of present-day Brazilians is the result of both racial and cultural mixture. As Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco stated in his work, *"Conceito de Civilização Brasileira":* "The culture and civilization of the white people is like a lake to whose borders have flowed two rivers, the water of one being green and the other black. The green river and the black river flow into the lake, changing the former uniformity of its depth and the erstwhile calm of its surface. The Afro-Indian rivers have modified the Euro-Portuguese lake, and the final perfecting of this process is now in sight."

This mixture—the largest tropical experiment to succeed—has created a new species. The example of Brazil bears witness to the fact that the mixture of races does not result in the corruption or degeneration of the white race, as the false doctrine of racism claims. Intermarriage did not weaken the white race; on the contrary, it strengthened it, as Gilberto Freyre says, "by giving it more richness of aspects, and a new dynamism which changes the color of the emotions and feelings."

In Brazil, that immense "laboratory of civiliation" (as Rudiger Bilden called it), there is nowadays no specifically Negro problem. The problem of the colored people in Brazil is being gradually solved by educating the *mestiço* and raising his standard of living. The whole situation is quite different from that in the United States, where the Negro is a racial minority, as also from that which we find in India, where the social order is based upon caste. This has been pointed out by the American sociologist, Professor Donald Pierson, whose splendid book, "Negroes in Brazil," is the result of two years'

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observations in the Brazilian seaport of Bahia, where the process of racial and cultural assimilation is most typical.

> Both in Brazil and in the United States the Negro, pure or mixed [writes Mr. Pierson], has . . . advanced . . . until today [he] is represented there and here in all the professions and in many, if not most, of the occupations . . . The differences, however, are profound. Whereas in the United States the rise of the Negro and of the mixed blood has been principally within the limits of the Negro world, in Brazil the rise has been with reference to the total community; that is, the Negro in Bahia not only competes freely with all others of his own color but can and does compete with all aspirants to the same class; and, if he has ability and gives evidence of definitive personal worth, he will be accepted for what he is as an individual, and his racial antecedents will, at least to a considerable degree, be overlooked.

In one respect the difference in conditions has operated in favor of the Negro in the United States. Having to overcome racial prejudice in addition to the normal difficulties of advancement, the talented Negro has to be more industrious, more aggressive, and more ambitious. Nevertheless, the Negro in the United States does not emerge from his own group to participate in the national life even when he is a man of superior attainments; whereas in Brazil, he is an integral part of the entire community. One cannot speak in Brazil, as one does in the States, of a Negro singer or poet, Negro literature or folk songs. Those expressions would not make sense to a Brazilian. A Negro who is a poet in Brazil is not classified as a Negro poet but as a Brazilian poet. He belongs to our general literature, he expresses the feelings of the people as a whole, his emotions are our emotions, his language is national. All our literary movements and currents have produced Negro representatives. Our greatest novelist is a mulatto, Machado de Assiz; one of our most splendid poets, Cruz e Sousa, a symbolist, was a Negro. We admire them, and we are proud of them in our midst. The Negro is as much a representative of our civilization and our national soul as any white man. There is no difference at all between Negro and white feelings and behavior.

This is because in Brazil interbreeding has broken down social discrimination and done away with motives for conflict. It has integrated the colored man into everyday life—and made him a common element of society. The difference in pigmentation has not remained a barrier in social organization. In Bahia, it is not race but class that determines one's social standing. "Today one finds at Bahia," writes Dr. Pierson, "a freely competitive order in which individuals compete for position largely on the basis of personal merit and favorable family circumstance. Individual competence tends to overbalance ethnic origin as a determinant of social status. . . . The fact [is] that if a person has ability and general competence, the handicap of color can be, and is constantly being, overcome. . . . In Bahia color is subordinate to other indices of class identification. . . . All these are characteristics which define status in a society based upon class rather than upon caste distinctions."

The extreme social mobility, both in a vertical and in a horizontal sense, which is characteristic of Brazilian society, affords vast opportunity to change one's social status, no matter what one's race. As racial barriers do not exist, the colored man can reach, and has reached, the highest positions and social levels. The race problem has turned into a plain class problem in Brazil. A popular saying in Bahia reflects this fact: "A rich Negro is a white man, and a poor white man is a Negro."

This attitude makes it absolutely impossible to consider the Negro as an element susceptible to exploitation by sectarian demagogy. All the advantages we can offer him he can freely obtain through his own efforts. Some reactionary Brazilian sociologists foresee a complete absorption of the Negro element by the European, a "progressive whitening," of which the *branco da Bahia* (Bahian white) is considered a forerunner. But this is a false understanding of the problem, based on the assumption of white superiority, and it is not generally accepted in Brazil. The sociological truth is that the *mestiços* (mixed breeds) constitute a new people, both culturally and ethnically. Therein lies the advantage of our position. In some regions of Brazil, such as Bahia, we cannot speak of biological or cultural pureness, either from the Negro or from the white point of view. What exists is a thorough mixture, and the new Brazilian generation has a broad-minded understanding of this phenomenon.

Anyone who knows anything about Brazil knows how many colored men, both Negroes and mulattos, have reached the highest level in society and have occupied eminent positions as men of letters, judges, lawyers, doctors, artists, and so on. "Race mixture," it has been said, "has added to the intelligence and the creative capacity of the Brazilian people." For instance, André Rebouças, a dark mulatto, was one of the greatest engineers of the Brazilian Empire. Once at a court ball, Princess Isabel, noting that a lady had declined to dance with André Rebouças, asked him for the next dance, "to com-

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pensate for the affront to this illustrious man."

It is true that "blacks and the darker mixed-bloods ordinarily occupy the lower economic levels, the medium and light mulattoes the middle position, and the whites (including the *brancos da Bahia*) the upper stratum." But this is a matter to be dealt with in the field of economics, and its solution is a technical and political problem. It involves the problems of education and of improving group standards of living. It belongs to the contemporary movement of social valorization and emancipation. It is not a race problem. No white family has scruples about calling in a Negro doctor. He is not regarded as a Negro doctor, but simply as a doctor.

III

THE story of how this situation evolved is a long one. It did not occur without a struggle in this melting pot of many races that is Brazil. There were many hardships and injustices during the colonial period. I cannot agree with the present tendency to consider slavery a picturesque condition of the "good old days." However, slavery did bring about a kind of contact between Negroes and whites that was generally "personal and harmonious." The absence of white women at the beginning of the colonial period, the early experiences of the Portuguese in their contacts with colored people in Africa, and, finally, constant association in the *casa-grande* and *senzala* resulted not merely in formal relationships between master and slave, but also in sexual relations between the master and the Negro women of the *senzala* and in personal relations between the white lady and her Negro *mucamas*. This process tended to break down the formal barriers between the races, modifying the character of slavery and "crumbling the color line." Referring to this humanizing tendency, Professor Parks affirms that "the people of Brazil have somehow regained that paradisaic innocence, with respect to difference of race." Perhaps this attitude, as it relates to the Negro, is inbred in the cordiality of the Brazilian, who is averse to violent feelings. In any case, Brazil provides the best example in the world, from a racial point of view, of a social democracy, whose dominant principle should be to annul social separatism and to bind together all the races within the state in a spirit of tolerance, co-operation, and humanism.

The many and various aspects of this racial amalgam have been studied with scientific care by Nina Rodrigues, professor in the Faculty of Medicine of Bahia, who in 1890 initiated the study of Africanology in Brazil. The school of sociology thus set up is being kept alive today by the work of Arthur Ramos and Gilberto Freyre. The studies in Africanology and social history have pointed out the function of the Negro in our civilization. He provided a dynamic element, without which it would not have been possible to solve the problem of agricultural production. But his contribution has not been only of a material nature. Our culture, psychology, character, and habits have been deeply influenced by the Negro, and all the manifestations of our civilization reflect this influence: religion, folklore, language, material culture, techniques, dance, music, painting, sculpture.

In the field of religion, the most typical phenomenon among the people is a religious syncretism resulting from the fusion of Catholicism and Negro cults. Short stories, proverbs, sayings originating in Negro folklore dominate popular life. Our most typical dance is the *samba,* which is of Negro origin. There are similar contributions to dress and cooking, to industrial and fine arts. Another field in which Negro influence manifests itself, perhaps more strongly than elsewhere, is that of language, which has undergone many changes in vocabulary, idiom, syntax, and phonetics as a result. This list can be greatly extended. The fact, however, must be now apparent that the Negroes have enriched our civilization. Their blood circulates in the veins of our nation. We are thankful for what they have done for our country.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editors:

In your kindly if critical comments on my article in the July FREE WORLD you credit me with pointing out that "the role of neutrals in this war is selfish and ignoble."

Forgive me for correcting you on this. My remarks were stated to be "with reference to wars in general, after an international system has been solidly established, and not with reference to this particular war." It is true that I have criticized Irish neutrality in Ireland, but I prefer not to do so elsewhere.

I am sorry if I seem "defeatist" about certain ideals that you have at heart. Some of them seem to me difficult to apply and interpret and likely to cause quarrels and disappointments, especially when they overlap and conflict. Therefore I would put first things first, feeling that if we succeed in eliminating fear of war, all other issues will be easier to handle. I notice already a clamor in some quarters for amending the Atlantic Charter. Such contentions fill me with misgiving.

FRANK MACDERMOT
New York City

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PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE

One of the striking ways in which the present war differs from the last is the existence of wide-scale post-war planning during the course of the struggle. The conclusion of World War I was followed by economic dislocations from which business interests suffered severely and which caught them largely unawares. To avoid a repetition of this experience, trade associations, chambers of commerce, and many private corporations are making a serious effort to map the shape of things to come. For the fifteenth of our reports on post-war plans, we are presenting the activities in that sphere of two typical groups of American business men: the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers.

XV—Business Plans for the Post-war World

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America

National Association of Manufacturers

THE United States Chamber of Commerce, which embraces within its membership more than 1,800 national, regional, state, and local business men's organizations and speaks for nearly one million business men, has consistently interested itself in post-war problems. A few months ago this interest crystallized in the formation of a Committee on Economic Policy which is issuing monthly bulletins on the subject of post-war conditions and policies. This committee is headed by Edgar V. O'Daniel, vice president of the American Cyanamid Company, and its secretary and economist—and the author of the bulletins—is Dr. Emerson P. Schmidt. It is interesting to note that this group of business men has chosen to write the bulletins, which are being distributed to local Chambers of Commerce, not a business man, but a professional economist, for Dr. Schmidt is a professor of economics on leave from the University of Minnesota. Other committees and departments of the Chamber are also engaged in activities bearing on post-war problems. The Department of Construction and Civic Development is collaborating with business and governmental groups in the development of a post-war construction program. The Field Division has made a survey of estimated consumer demand in the immediate post-war period and is analyzing the extent of the reconversion problem faced by American business. The Committee on Foreign Commerce is studying methods of promoting foreign trade. A special Committee on Social Security is inquiring into post-war needs in this field, and the formation of local committees to consider future problems is being promoted by the Commercial Organization Department.

The National Association of Manufacturers states that it "was one of the first organizations to become seriously concerned about the problems of post-war readjustment." It has been actively interested in the study of long-range economic problems since 1935, and its Post-war Committee, established in 1942 and now headed by Wilfred Sykes, president of Inland Steel, continues the work of several preceding committees. Before the war, analyses were made of the basic causes of booms and depressions, and in 1941, a poll of the membership of the Ameri-

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can Economic Association resulted in a booklet entitled, "Can We Avoid a Post-Armament Depression?"

The Post-war Committee, which deals with broad, over-all problems, is divided into subcommittees dealing with international relations, the transition period, and distribution. The International Relations Subcommittee deals, on the one hand, with specific problems such as lend-lease, trade agreements, migration, and on the other, with the basic principles of international organization. The Transition Period Subcommittee makes recommendations as to what businessmen and the Government should do now to prepare for the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities. The Distribution Committee deals with broad distribution problems, such as the relationship between the prices received by manufacturers and those paid by consumers. A closely related committee, the Economics Principles Commission, has for its province a general study of the principles of the private enterprise system as related to the transition and post-war periods. In addition, there has recently been formed a Corporation Peacetime Planning Committee, which concerns itself with the specific problems that individual industrial firms will have to meet after the war.

Why Plan?

IN the first of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce's bulletins on "Post-war Readjustments," Dr. Emerson P. Schmidt answers the question, "Why Plan for the Post-war Period?" He takes pains to explain that by "planning" he means, not government control, but "an appraisal of the maladjustments which prevented active business in the pre-war period with a view to correcting the obstacles which then stood in the way and which in the post-war period may stand in the way of a sustained high level of output." He continues:

> To illustrate: For nearly two years after the last war we enjoyed feverish business expansion and inflation with no conscious over-all policy. In that post-war period the explosive forces of high money incomes from the war, spending war savings, and filling deferred demand, exhausted themselves quickly in an inflationary spiral which, if properly controlled, might have given us four to six years of prosperity, instead of two. The deflation of late 1920 and 1921 brought needless suffering. Millions of men lost their jobs; business mortalities rose to new peaks and the inventory losses of many other businesses were so staggering that to this day not all companies have recovered from those losses. Armour Packing Company is said to have lost about $1 million a day for 150 days; Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and Proctor & Gamble suffered enormous inventory losses. Had we understood more thoroughly the nature of the post-war period during the last war, we might have set in motion forces and controls which would have avoided these losses and prolonged prosperity. . . .

Another reason for post-war planning, according to Dr. Schmidt, is the tremendous task with which we shall be faced in reconverting our economy to a peacetime basis:

> It is anticipated that by the end of 1943 we will have perhaps 9.7 million men in the armed forces, of whom all but perhaps one or two million will look for work in private employment. We will have approximately 20 million men engaged in direct war industries, making a total of 29.7 million men and women, nearly all of whom will somehow or other have to be reabsorbed into private jobs. In 1942 we devoted 55% of our production to war; the figure will rise to about 66% for 1943. In spite of a war-created demand for goods and services, the ordeal of conversion to war production caused many dislocations; after the war not only will we have to reconvert some 60% of our resources back to civilian production, but uncertainty may prevail as to the size of the consumer demand and the direction it will take. Many businesses and, in fact, whole industries will face new kinds of competition. Thus while the conversion task was difficult, the reconversion task is likely to be more difficult.

But perhaps business would not be so alarmed at the magnitude of its post-war task, perhaps it would expect to muddle through somehow, were it not that a gross failure to solve economic problems—the existence of mass unemployment, for instance—might cause a popular revolt against the entire system of free enterprise. This specter seems to haunt the sleep of business men.

"If employment cannot be provided by private employers, the government will attempt to take over this function," writes Dr. Schmidt. The reason he gives for disliking this prospect is that he believes that liberty cannot be reconciled with authority. "When the government takes over, the area and scope of liberty tend to shrink. . . . There is substantial evidence that over-all planned societies must not only be regimented societies but must be constantly engaged in war or preparation for war as in the case of Italy and Germany. . . . After the war, we must determine whether private business is to resume its historic role of providing em-

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ployment and output, or whether we will impose upon government these responsibilities and risk the loss of the great human values for which this country was founded—freedom from governmental compulsion of body and mind."

The Post-war Outlook

WHAT kind of a post-war world do business men envisage? In an address before the War Congress of American Industry last December, published in a NAM pamphlet, Dr. Ralph Robey, associate editor of *Newsweek,* spoke as follows:

"There are four broad economic ingredients that make prosperity: (1) purchasing power in the hands of the public; (2) demand for goods; (3) productive capacity to turn out the goods; (4) an adequate labor force to use the productive facilities. Add to these four elements the proper political and social environment, and prosperity is assured—prosperity in the sense of a job for everyone who is able and willing to work, at good wages and under good working conditions. In the post-war period all these economic ingredients will be present in the United States in sufficient volume to make prosperity a certainty, provided we have the proper political and social environment."

A less optimistic view was taken, in an address before the same Congress, by David C. Prince, vice president of General Electric, who saw "forces tending toward a violent boom immediately following the war," resulting in "violent inflation with an immediate loss of purchasing power followed by shrinkage in production and employment."

A more scholarly treatment of probable post-war conditions is provided in the Chamber of Commerce's bulletins on "Post-War Readjustments." Bulletin No. 2 lists some short-run favorable factors, such as the reduction of private debt, accumulated purchasing power, deferred demand for goods not now available, technological developments, and requirements for foreign rehabilitation which, if properly controlled, may bring sustained prosperity for years. But, according to subsequent bulletins in the same series, many unfavorable factors, some of them transitory, others of a more deep-seated nature, indicate that after the first few years of peace we shall be in for serious economic difficulties unless strict measures are taken to counteract them.

Among the more transitory difficulties are those attending the reconversion of industry to civilian production, with its attendant problems of unfilled war orders, unexpired war contracts, the absorption of inventory losses, and the disposition of government-owned plants and equipment. Other short-range problems likely to prove troublesome are the disposal of the armed forces' surplus supplies, the procuring of equipment and raw materials by small manufacturers, and the threat of inflation during the reconversion period.

But war produces more serious difficulties than these. It tends to "upset the relative position of various groups in society" in such a manner as seriously to disturb the exchange of goods and services. "During this war we are expanding agriculture, many lines of industry, foreign trade facilities—but the expansion is unequal. Prices and incomes are rising—but the increases are spread unevenly. After the war these differentials and spreads may plague us for years to come—may reduce our ability to exchange goods and services between industries, between capital and labor, and between countries."

It is thus evident that business groups view the post-war future with grave misgivings. What, then, do they propose to do about it? Perhaps the prime function of the associations, as such, in this regard, is to collect and disseminate appropriate information. The Chamber of Commerce's Committee on Economic Policy has stated its program as follows:

1. To identify, analyze, report and get action upon economic problems, nation-wide and international in their post-war effect.
2. To promote the analysis of local problems and conditions by local organizations and develop means of accomplishing desirable objectives.
3. To encourage the analysis and study by trade and industrial associations of problems and opportunities within their respective fields.
4. To stimulate the analysis and study by State and regional organizations of problems within their respective jurisdictions for future action.
5. To urge local, State, and regional bodies to analyze and get action upon national and international economic policies that bear on the attainment of local and national objectives of high production and employment.

The National Chamber has issued a number of publications on post-war problems in addition to the bulletins by Dr. Schmidt. The Chamber's Foreign Commerce Department has summarized "Various Current Proposals for Post-War International Economic Action." The views of government officials, economists, business leaders, and various planning groups are quoted on a wide variety of topics, from reparations to rehabilitation and from monopolies to migration. Last winter William J. Moll, field

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director, published two reports of a survey to determine the post-war needs of consumers. This survey was conducted by asking thousands of families all over the country whether they intend to buy houses, automobiles, refrigerators, and so on, after the war is over, and whether they are setting aside money for such purposes.

Estimates based on the survey indicate that 53 per cent of the families in the United States intend to make major purchases within six months after the close of the war, and that 34 per cent of home-owners intend to improve their property. It is estimated that 2,590,000 families will buy automobiles valued at $2,331,000,000, and that household appliances totaling $860,185,000 will be purchased. A total of 1,015,000 families intend to build or buy homes costing $5,000,000,000, and an estimated $709,905,000 will be spent on home furnishings. Improvements and repairs on home and farm properties will account for $6,000,000,000.

Attitude Toward World Affairs

THE American business man has come to realize that his own welfare is intimately bound up, not only with that of other strata in his own country, but with the welfare of the whole world. Therefore, even the narrowest self-interest dictates that he be concerned with international affairs. "Eric A. Johnston, president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, has repeatedly pointed out that our exports have always been largest to those countries which are the most prosperous and the most advanced industrially," writes Dr. Schmidt. "For this reason, it would appear that the long-run interest of America consists in a rapid post-war development of the less advanced nations throughout the world."

The American businessman, then, is going to do his share in shaping the world to come; but what kind of a world does he want? Colonel Willard Chevalier, publisher of *Business Week*, asked in a Symposium of the War Congress, "Do we want to live and do business in a world organized for peace or for war?" And his answer is probably typical of the attitude of many business men: "My own view is that we can prosper more in a world at peace, and that a prosperous world is more likely to be a peaceful world."

The NAM states that "some framework should be established through which the political and economic relationships between nations of the world can be developed and maintained on an orderly basis," but it does not envisage anything as binding as a world government. The views of Dr. J. O. Downey of General Motors, as expressed in the War Congress Symposium, are perhaps representative:

> While I am not particularly sold on the proposition of operating the world as a global whole, the interdependence of the several parts of the world is certain to become much more accentuated in the future. . . . I think one of the reasons we are in the mess we are in today is because we did not consider the political events going on in Europe and other places to be any of our business. Unfortunately, they were very much our business.
>
> It is certain the world will be policed. If we do not participate importantly therein, the British and Russians will do it and perhaps to our detriment. From the present wars three great industrial nations will emerge—America, Britain, and Russia. All have great populations and resources essential to great industries, the hallmark of great nations. The policing should be the joint responsibility of these three; but it would be desirable to have America and Britain dominate, so that the pattern of the future world organization would be more in accord with our views.
>
> The policing by the strong powers should continue only until a permanent world organization can be formed and assume this function. . . . The permanent world organization that would succeed the policing by the great powers would be of the nature of a community of states, with precedents therefor in the International Postal Union, the International Telecommunications Union, the economic and World Court activities of the League of Nations, and the regional precedent of the Pan-American Union. This community of states would not be a superstate with supersovereignty, and there would be no appreciable surrender of sovereignty by the member states. . . .
>
> Following the restoration of world political stability, American businessmen will become interested in the long-term industrialization of the populous and raw material regions of the world, which would be undertaken in accordance with the established principles of free enterprise and international business. . . .
>
> Wars in Europe in the future are highly probable. The rivalries of the several racial and cultural groups are traditional, the hatreds are deep-seated. Therefore, Europe must be dealt with sternly and rendered impotent so far as war-making is concerned.

Colonel Chevalier differed from Dr. Downey to the extent that instead of a "world organ-

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ization" he recommended "separate international agencies, each charged with explicit responsibility for some one problem or group of problems and each having, of course, administrative and executive powers limited both in field and degree as required by its specific assignment." He believed, however, that "patience and wisdom would, in time, convert such co-operation between agencies of limited scope into a more effective form of international union."

"Job, Freedom, Opportunity," speaking for the NAM, outlines some of the more important international problems that will exist after the war, and suggests how they should be met so that our domestic prosperity will be assured. Some international agency should be set up to reconcile conflicts of interest in international investments, so that capital may move freely. The United States Government should take appropriate action to protect the property, rights, and interests of American citizens in foreign countries. Arrangements should be contemplated looking forward to drastic scaling down of lend-lease interest charges, together with repayment of interest over a long period of years. U. S. Government corporations in foreign countries should be liquidated as rapidly as is consistent with national security. International co-operation in the realm of communications should be extended into the fields of aviation, radio, and shipping. International transportation should be carried on under private ownership and without subsidies except so far as these may be necessary to maintain a sufficient volume of American shipping. No peoples should be forced to emigrate and no country should be forced to accept immigrants against its will. Surplus food products should be promptly shipped to countries needing them under such terms of settlement as the circumstances warrant. Contracts between nationals of different nations should be fully upheld and enforced. World-wide efforts should be made to raise the standard of living of underdeveloped peoples through the more intensive use of their natural resources. World trade should be facilitated by mutually advantageous tariff policies and by the freedom of all peoples to purchase raw materials and food without discrimination. Fair competition should obtain in respect to imports and exports. Foreign trade should be in the hands of individuals and private corporations rather than conducted by government agencies. In respect to colonies, new ones should not be established; the inhabitants should not be exploited; there should be no unrestrained monopolies; and all nations should be treated on an equal basis in such matters as investments, trade, and travel.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

IT is extremely encouraging to know that the business organizations of the United States are giving so much attention to developments in the post-war period. We are not able, in this installment of Plans for the Future to examine the domestic policies of the business organizations, but we shall deal with them in a later issue.

Two aspects of their post-war plans seem outstanding: (1) a study of their publications reveals a deceptive tone of conformity to the views of all organizations advocating international collaboration and the establishment of a world federation. Underneath the surface, however, runs a white thread of chauvinism and antagonism to labor and government. (2) Despite the excellent work which has been done by these organizations, there is a definite reactionary tendency in the desire to leave the economic life of the various peoples at the mercy of individuals. There is also the contradiction between the desire, on the one hand, to establish true economic prosperity after the war and, on the other, the strong opposition to "government interference."

Another important weakness in the plans we are discussing lies in the superficial consideration of the problems of tariffs and the international monetary agreements. These representative business organizations are content to express the hope that voluntary international agreements will counteract the evils of tarriff barriers, a hope which past experience has sufficiently proved to be unrealistic. The business man must realize that his well-being stands or falls, not only with that of the national community, but with that of the international community. He must desire the welfare of the world, not because it is incidental to his own prosperity, but because he is part of this world.

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Powder Magazine of the Balkans

By Pierre Dupont

IN Yugoslavia, Chetniks, partisans, and members of the Slovenian Front of Liberation, encouraged by the victory in North Africa, are carrying on the struggle against the Axis with renewed vigor. In Underground newspapers, as well as in those sold to the Axis, accounts have multiplied in recent months of battles between patriots and German-Italian troops reinforced by service detachments of puppet men from Belgrade and Zagreb.

The problem of communications becomes more complicated every day for the Axis. Everywhere bridges are blown up and derailed trains lie on the embankments. A hundred and fifty Italians are killed every day protecting the open traffic between Germany and Italy via Slovenia.

In the Underground papers there regularly appears an item that sows terror in the heart of traitors. It is the list of traitors executed after judgment by the Underground. The reasons are briefly enumerated: Notar—a Gestapo confidential agent, Sutej—an informer. *Slovenski Porocevalec (The Slovenian Informer)*, organ of the Front of Liberation, gives two lines to each traitor executed.

The collaborationists are warned of the fate awaiting them. A public notice in the same journal proclaims: "There shall be punished by the death penalty: those who, directly or indirectly, betray Underground secrets; those who deliver a patriot to the police; those who furnish the enemy with means of fighting the liberation movement; those who enter into relations with the enemy, directly or indirectly."

Members of the Italian minority in Slovenia are warned that the Underground will pass sentence on all collaborationist traitors, Italian as well as Slovenian. Men known to be Fascists are executed without pity. Recently Giovanni Princi, a member of the municipal council of Goriza, was executed by two men who entered his apartment at ten o'clock in the evening. One of them was carrying a big package of letters supposedly addressed to Princi, who was killed before he had a chance to cry out. A member of the fascist party since 1923, Princi was conducting a campaign for the forced Italianization of the Slovenes.

The Front of Liberation *(Osvobodilna Fronta)* takes in large areas of the population, but does not include certain clerical circles which, while wholly opposed to the Axis, do not share the point of view expressed by the Front in respect to domestic and foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is admitted that the Front reflects the most vigorous forces of the Underground. While collaborating with the Government-in-exile, it maintains great independence of spirit, as can be seen by reading its press.

Osvobodilna Fronta has thus defined its *raison d'être:*

The leadership of the Slovenian national movement lies in the hands of new men, men

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of the people, while many would-be leaders from former times have spat upon their people and sold out to the occupying powers, or have abandoned them and gone abroad. The latter are thinking only of reinstating themselves, once the fascist invader has been driven out, so that they can deceive the people again.

The aims of the National Revolution are as follows:

1. To stiffen the struggle against the invader.

2. To prevent the former leaders and all anti-popular elements, of whatever nature, from returning to the positions of power that they used to bring about the ruin of their country.

3. To act in such a manner that the Slovenian people can decide its own destiny.

4. To establish collaboration between Croats and Serbs.

5. To practice a policy of friendship with the Russians.

Revolutionary Fervor

WE see in Slovenia the same phenomenon that in Serbia and Croatia resulted in a division between Chetniks and partisans. The occupation has brought about, not only a strengthening of national sentiment, but also a profound thirst for change, a sharp criticism of past mistakes. The popular masses that were formerly deprived of power have been drawn into the struggle against the invader, and it is therefore natural that their aspirations should find expression in the program of the Underground, which is fighting not only the collaborationists but also the old-guard reactionaries who have left the country. Actually, the clandestine movements call for a rupture with the politics of the past and a placing in power of young men who will pursue a progressive policy without ulterior motives. Moreover, Pan-Serbian tendencies should disappear to make way for a true federative spirit. To co-ordinate all the movements of resistance, the Yugoslav Government in London should declare its intentions without sticking to generalities.

Among the problems not yet solved, the question of relations with Russia demands particular attention. The clandestine newspapers of the Slovenian Front of Liberation express on every page an undivided admiration for the Russian people's struggle. These papers demand that friendship with Russia become one of the bases of tomorrow's foreign policy. Envisaging the possibility of a federation of Balkan countries or of Central Europe, they stipulate that such a federation maintain a close understanding with Russia, and that every scheme of an anti-Soviet flavor be condemned in advance. Appeals in favor of Slavic solidarity are very numerous, and relations between Slavic countries will doubtless become closer as a result of the war, if the voice of the Underground is heeded.

Slovenia, like the rest of the country, contains followers of Mikhailovitch and detachments of partisans, the latter being far more powerful than the Chetniks in this part of Yugoslavia.

One must go back to 1941 to grasp the origin of the dissensions that have occurred in this part of the Balkans. The Russo-German war started just when Mikhailovitch was organizing his movement of resistance against the invader by appealing to the spirit of secular independence. It gave a vigorous impetus to the resistance and provoked manifestations of Slavic solidarity mixed with the feeling that Europe had reached a turning point in the war, that the Fuehrer by his rash act had tipped the balance in favor of the anti-nazi coalition.

As early as July, 1941, the

LIBERATION FRONT

ORGAN OF THE SLOVENIAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

↓

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UBITI DENUNCIANTI

V Brezovici pri Starem trgu v Beli Krajini je bil ustreljen denunciant hitlerjevec gostilničar Sutej.

V Jelovici pri Sodražici je bil 22.IX. ustreljen konfident Kovačič Leopold.

V Ljubljani je bil za Bežigradom ustreljen gestapovski konfident Notar.

KAZEN ZA IZDAJALCA RUPNIKA

A Translation of the Above

INFORMERS EXECUTED

In Brezovici, near the old Beli Krajini market, the Hitlerite informer Gostilnicar Sutej was shot.

On November 22, in Jelovici near Sodrazici, the Gestapo agent Leopold Kovacic was executed.

In Ljubljani, in the vicinity of Bezigradom, Gestapo confidential agent Notar was executed.

THESE MEN WERE EXECUTED FOR BETRAYING RUPNIKA

National Front of Liberation circulated leaflets in Yugoslavia reading:

The fate of greater Russia is now being decided. Consequently, the fate of all Slavs—Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Slovenes, Czechs, and Poles—is being decided at the same time.

To arms, brothers! Let us develop the war of the partisans. Like our Russian brothers, we must destroy the German Fascists, blow up bridges and railroad stations, and attack trains.

Honest patriots of Yugoslavia! In the name of the country and the Slavic fraternity, take the only road possible to victory, that of destroying Hitlerism. Forward, for a free Yugoslavia!

The first to respond to this appeal, as to that of Mikhailovitch, were the Serbs. But these new detachments of partisans quickly let it be known that their platform did not envisage a return to the past, but the reconstruction of a strong Yugoslavia on a truly democratic and federative foundation. In consequence, the Slovenes and the Croats, who had had to wrench their right to autonomy piecemeal from the former government at Belgrade, joined up more readily with the partisans than with the Chetniks, led by Mikhailovitch, whose entire attitude smacked too much of the past.

Underground Fighters

A GLANCE at the partisan newspaper, *The Struggle*, suffices to show that every level of the population is represented in the partisan army of liberation. To be sure, the Communist, Costa Nadj, and several anti-Fascists who fought for the Spanish Republic have acquired a reputation as valiant partisan chiefs. But the same is true of Vladimir Zecevic, priest of the town of Krupan, who, together with peasants, workers, and intellectuals, formed one of the first partisan battalions. After months of convalescence following a severe wound in the chest, this priest resumed his post in 1942 as head of the Radjevsk battalion.

Among other chiefs whose glory has spread across the country must be mentioned the Duditches, father and son, who were leaders of the revolt in the Valevsk region. Dragoilo Duditch is a peasant writer, the author of an autobiography published in 1939, in which he wrote: "I remained in the village to work the soil. The heavy labor and the difficulties of life did not destroy my thirst for knowledge. It often happened that I held the handle of the plow in one hand and a book in the other. Walking behind the plow, I read by the hour, because I lacked time during the day and light in the evening."

In the first World War, he showed himself a magnificent fighter. Wounded, he returned to the village and led the life of a poor peasant, that life which one day he set about describing with so much eloquence. After the Axis invasion, he and his son Michel, who had become a lieutenant in the army, put themselves at the head of a detachment of partisans.

Such are the men whose offers of collaboration Mikhailovitch rejected, thus marking the inception of future dissensions. Despite these dissensions, both the partisan and Chetnik movements grew stronger, and in 1942, the Axis was obliged to keep thirty-five divisions in Yugoslavia.

Nothing can describe the savagery of the German repression. The towns and villages razed by the German invader could be counted by the dozen, and it looked as if he had set himself the task of exterminating the Serbs. According to the testimony of those who escaped this inferno, the destruction of the regions through which the Germans passed was extraordinary. "I crossed one of the districts of Bosnia on foot," relates a witness of nazi atrocities.

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"I went through villages where everything was dead, empty, and destroyed. The only living creature I met was a cat that had gone wild."

Despite considerable efforts on the part of Axis troops, the partisans and Chetniks kept vast territories free from the invader during 1942. The chief positions of Mikhailovitch were in western Serbia and southern Bosnia, while the partisans were spread through Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Montenegro.

The partisans have proved to be the more active, and the number of their troops has increased rapidly. Mikhailovitch has held back, explaining his position on the grounds of his desire to spare his troops hazardous ventures. This nonactivity has been violently combated by the partisans, who, moreover, reproached the Minister of War and chief of the Chetniks with mansuetude in regard to the collaborationists in the reconquered regions. It was asserted later that General Mikhailovitch did not attack the Italians, and moreover, that certain Chetnik detachments attacked the partisans just as the latter were about to engage Italian forces. The absence of an Allied strategy destined for the Underground has brought on disastrous results.

The Russians evidently encourage the partisans because the unabating activity of patriots keeps in Yugoslavia Axis divisions which would otherwise be on the Russian front. London and Washington seem to stand behind Mikhailovitch, who has for months followed a "wait and see" policy.

Civil Strife

THE official break between the two movements of resistance occurred on November 27, 1942, when the partisans convoked at Bihac the Constituent Assembly of the Anti-Fascist Council of the Yugoslavian liberation movement. Ivan Ribar, an important member of the Independent Democratic party, an old associate of Pribicevitch and Davidovitch, and former chairman of the first Yugoslav Constituent Assembly in 1920, was elected chairman of the Council. Though he is a convinced liberal, he was immediately branded as a Communist. The fact that his son professes extreme leftist views does not make Ivan Ribar senior a Communist.

The beginning of 1943 witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of a large-scale attack by the Axis, which launched 75,000 soldiers against the partisans, who were not supported by the Chetniks either directly or by acts of diversion. From Bosnia, the partisans effected a retreat to Herzegovina, which has become one of their strongholds. At the same time, the peasants of Croatia and Slovenia everywhere intensified their attacks against the nazi and Italian garrisons, and the army of partisans, reorganized and reinforced by tens of thousands of peasants, had by the beginning of June been able to resume the offensive in Slovenia and Croatia.

During all this time, Mikhailovitch has kept proclaiming that a force of 250,000 Yugoslavs is only waiting for invasion to take arms from secret hiding places in a co-ordinated uprising against the Axis. This attitude is opposed to that of the partisans, who advocate an unceasing struggle against Axis troops. It shows once again how Yugoslavia's internal resistance has been split in two. Nevertheless, the Italian press has just admitted that it cannot crush the revolt that has eliminated the invader from numerous sections of the country outside the big cities.

It is up to the United Nations to put an end to a state of affairs so prejudicial to the Allied cause. At a time when the Allied victories in Sicily are preparing the way for the coming battle of liberation on the Continent, the Underground ought to know exactly what is expected of it and what those who have taken up arms may look for from an Allied victory.

The Slovenian Informer

Bulletin of Information of the Liberation Movement

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Toward Freedom—Forward!



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BOOKS

The Guiding Principle

THE WORLD OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS, by Sumner Welles. 121 pages. Columbia University Press; $1.75

"THE World of the Four Freedoms" is a collection of twelve speeches made by Under Secretary Welles from September, 1939, up to February, 1943. Even for those who have closely followed Mr. Welles's thinking through his speeches, this book is extremely valuable because it summarizes essential ideas on world affairs.

One of the ideas which appears as a guiding principle in all his speeches is the author's insistence on the absolute necessity of a world order based on morality and on law. As far back as September 25, 1939, speaking before the foreign ministers of the American Republics at Panama, Mr. Welles insisted on the importance of this principle despite the fact that at that time the Western Hemisphere was observing strict neutrality.

On July 22, 1941, the author made one of the important statements of this war concerning the necessity for an association of nations. In that speech, he established some essential principles, which are as valid at present as they were at that time, by stating that no real disarmament is possible before the abolition of offensive armaments and the limitation and reduction of defensive armaments, and unless some rigid form of international supervision and control is effectively functioning. He stated further that no peace can function effectively as long as "the natural rights of all peoples to equal economic enjoyment" are not established. He concluded his speech by referring to the necessity of having, as the basis of an association of nations, a notion of security—security not only from war, but security from want, disease, and starvation, and security from fear.

In later speeches dealing with post-war commercial policy, the Under Secretary was inspired by the same conception of international co-operation and particularly underlined the problems of post-war reconstruction.

A few weeks before Pearl Harbor, on Armistice Day, 1941, Sumner Welles made one of his most brilliant speeches, which he commenced by indicating that at any moment war might be forced upon the United States. In the course of that speech, he put forward a question that we must still ask ourselves, namely "whether the world in which we have to live would have come to this desperate pass had the United States been willing, in those years which followed 1919, to play its full part in striving to bring about a new world order based on justice and on 'a steadfast concert for peace.'"

A few weeks after Pearl Harbor, the Under Secretary explained to the Latin American Republics what had happened, and laid the groundwork for co-operation between the Americas, which has since made great progress.

In other speeches, particularly in his Memorial Address, the author again stressed the necessity for the American people to grasp the great historic opportunity that will exist after this war to bring about the liberation of all peoples. Mr. Welles put forward the ideals which the Allied Governor in Sicily, Sir Harold Alexander, has put into effect, namely, the abolition of discrimination between peoples because of their race, creed, or color. On that same occasion, Secretary Welles made his famous pronouncement that "the age of imperialism is ended." But this has still to be translated into reality.

Later, at the Herald Tribune Forum, the author explained the necessity of the United Nations' reaching agreements based on the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms before the Armistice is signed. He warned the people of the United States, and he might as well have warned all the peoples on earth, against two extreme schools of thought—the school of isolationism and the school of disguised American imperialism—and he suggested opposing to those two schools the philosophy of the Four Freedoms.

And finally, in his address on December 6, 1942, at the dedication of the Sara Delano Roosevelt Memorial, Secretary Welles again implied that the objective of decent international relations can be achieved only if the United Nations stand together.

At this particular moment, when the military prospects appear so much brighter than when the author was making his speeches—but when the political prospects contain fears and uncertainties—it is well to remember, to read and re-read, the words of the Under Secretary of State. Nothing at all that has happened in the course of the war justifies the abandon-

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ment of any of the principles that Mr. Welles, together with the other United Nations leaders, have proclaimed. Quite on the contrary, it becomes more evident every day that it is those progressive principles which have gathered around the United Nations more than 70 per cent of the inhabitants of the earth. To the people of the subjugated countries of Europe, as well as those in the free fighting countries and the people in Asia and Latin America, those ideas are firm promises for the future, and nothing would be more disappointing to them, and nothing would endanger more the war effort or the prospects of the organization of a lasting peace, than the abandonment of the slightest of those principles.

That is why the publication of "The World of the Four Freedoms" at this moment is particularly opportune and will encourage all those who have learned the lesson of the past, and who have understood that national self-interest, in the truest sense of the word, is identical with the interest of the world.

LOUIS DOLIVET

Religion and Our Times

IT'S YOUR SOULS WE WANT, by Stewart W. Herman, Jr. xv + 315 pages. Harper; $2.50

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL ORDER, by William Temple. 93 pages. Penguin; 25¢

RELIGION IN SOVIET RUSSIA, 1917–1942, *by N. S. Timasheff. xii + 171 pages. Sheed and Ward;* $2.00

THE role that organized religion plays in society is usually ambiguous. This ambiguity is to be observed even in the forms and developments of Christianity. Some of the churches in America have fostered the democratic spirit; others have done all in their power to resist it. Some of the churches in Germany have shamelessly come to terms with the nazi political domination and with the barbarous racism that accompanies it; others have stubbornly and heroically resisted both the political domination and the race doctrines. Some churchmen in Russia have vehemently resisted every struggle for economic emancipation; others, like the Acting Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, have "as a mother seeing the meaning of life in the salvation of her children . . . from the fascist 'Crusade' " called for prayers for the victory of the Red Army—moreover, the venerable Patriarch sees in the disestablishment of the Church a forced return to its true calling.

In England, some churchmen have strained their eyes in an effort to see the good that Hitler has done, and they have eagerly given their blessing to the "Christian" Franco and to the Tory sympathizers with fascism. Others, like Dr. Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the present titular head of the World Council of Churches, have courageously criticized, not only the injustices of fascism and capitalism, but also the "spiritual" indifference of churches to these injustices. No doubt it is because of the blasphemous pretensions and the ignoble complacency of certain "religious" people that Archbishop Temple has recently asserted, "It is a mistake to suppose that God is only or even chiefly concerned with religion."

The three volumes here under review provide ample evidence, either direct or circumstantial, of the ambivalence of certain "religious" faiths and organizations in the present crisis of civilization and of the Christian religions.

Professor Timasheff, a Roman Catholic who is now Professor of Sociology at Fordham University and who was, before the Revolution, a professor in Leningrad (he suffers from a nostalgia that makes him call this city Petrograd), contrasts the "truly Neronian atrocities" against the churches in Russia with the religious freedom enjoyed by the churches in the United States. Yet he belongs to a church that cherishes freedom only for itself, a church that aspires, always in the name of God, to a power that can override freedom. Indeed, Archbishop Temple goes so far as to say that "blindness to . . . the spiritual necessity of freedom . . . is the conspicuous defect of Rome to this day, leading to a never-repudiated belief in persecution and to a spontaneous sympathy with authoritarian regimes." The ambiguousness of Professor Timasheff's sentiments for freedom should not, however, prevent us from valuing the *authenticated* evidence he presents concerning twenty-five years of now diminishing conflict between church and state in Russia.

If one wishes to find a somewhat less ambiguous attitude toward the principles of freedom, one can scarcely do better than read the other two books here under review. The volume by Dr. Herman is one of the most stirring accounts now available of the resistance offered by the German Confessional churches to nazi doctrines and policies. His report is based on six years of first-hand observation as minister of the American Church in Berlin and on three years of simultaneous service on the staff of the American Embassy in Berlin. Here is an enthusiastic, though not uncritical, account of the heroic struggle of the Protestant groups against the nazi oppression, its nihilist duplicity, its well-oiled brutality, and its racist fantacism. One judicious chapter is devoted also to the German

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Catholic "rejection of the Axis" and to the Nazi persecution of the Catholics.

Although the author rightly sees ground for hope in the persistence of Christian attitudes under dire oppression (indeed, he facetiously suggests that "for fighting Hitlerism it [the German Protestant Church] deserves a seat among the United Nations"!), he does not point out that influential Protestants in Germany were feeble in their support of the Weimar Republic and that they are for the most part even today little concerned with the larger social implications of Judeo-Christian ethics. Nor does he recognize that one reason for this feebleness and for the political immaturity he attributes to the Germans is the fact that the political liberalism of the eighteenth century skipped Germany. Indeed, at times we are tempted to think it has skipped Dr. Herman also. Speaking of "the spiritual bankruptcy" of France today, he says: "The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century has borne its last bitter fruit in Vichy where—paradoxically—Marshal Pétain is now, at long last, trying to revitalize the nation with a return to religion. Pétain's diagnosis of the root of the nation's difficulty is correct." Dr. Herman's apparent support of Pétain's specious appeal for "a return to religion" makes one wonder if he has not missed the point of the Reformation as well as of the Enlightenment. Religion, Martin Luther would remind us, is often only the cloak for man-made gods. In other words, when we hear the appeal for "a return to religion" we ought, just as Christians, to ask what kind of religion is being returned to.

Yet, Dr. Herman's book does show—and that right spiritedly—what Americans under the stress of war are likely to forget or ignore, namely, that when the nazi New Order announced, "It's Your Souls We Want," many a German churchman stood up and said, "No," and said it unambiguously.

A greater hope for the future of free world principles is, of course, to be found in the prophetic leadership among Christian churchmen symbolized by the peerless Archbishop of Canterbury. In this little volume, one of the greatest, and certainly also the most influential, of Christians of our day sets forth the principles, both theological and social, which are today increasingly eliciting the adherence of progressively minded Christians in all Protestant groups in the English-speaking world. With a forthrightness that is rare among church dignitaries of any "faith," Dr. Temple expounds the principles of "freedom, social fellowship, and service" which must govern the Christian conscience. Holding that "the cause of freedom will not be established till political freedom is fulfilled in economic freedom," the Archbishop boldly brings to the bar of judgment our whole acquisitive society, showing the ills of present-day "democracy" and indicating the specific "task before us" if the bad housing, the malnutrition, and the chronic unemployment of our "normalcy" are to be ameliorated by a planned and yet democratic social order. The specific remedies suggested (without claim of ecclesiastical authority) aim to be neither "individualistic nor collectivist." Yet, the last thing one would think of calling the Archbishop is ambiguous. His is a religion that is audaciously prophetic and radically critical, critical even of "religion." And just for this reason his book is, in the strict and deep sense of the word, conservative, conservative of the values that must be reinterpreted and given a new local habitation if the Christian religion is to play a significant and positive role in the precarious and hazardous pilgrimage toward a free world.

JAMES LUTHER ADAMS

Invitation to Maturity

THE CENTURY OF THE COMMON MAN, by Henry A. Wallace. 96 *pages. Reynal and Hitchcock;* $1.50

ONE WORLD, by Wendell L. Willkie, 206 *pages. Simon and Schuster;* $2.00

IN a remarkable way these two stirring books complement each other. They both seek to impress on Americans that we are a mature and an important people; that we are no longer children left to play in the backyard. Vice-President Wallace says this directly in simple and straight-forward language. "We of the United States can no more evade shouldering our responsibility in this modern world than a boy of eighteen can avoid becoming a man by wearing short pants. The word 'isolation' means short pants for a grown-up United States."

He develops this theme in the fifteen pieces that make up this volume, ranging from a commencement address to the famous declaration that we are fighting a people's revolution. He clarifies his thesis and buttresses his arguments with striking facts and figures on resources, production, tariffs, banking, and all the other diverse factors in twentieth century economy.

But the outstanding feature of this book is that Mr. Wallace carries the fight to the "isolationists," to all the petty souls and perverted minds that sacrificed the welfare of mankind to the greed of callous men. With mounting anger and eloquence he presents the vision of a world in which the tragic mistakes and machinations

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that characterized our earlier policy are at last corrected. And he does not hesitate to tell us that only if we shoulder our "responsibility to the world in the peace that is ahead," shall we achieve a world without chaos in the century to come.

Thus, he sets down not solely his own testament of faith, but a covenant for all men of good will and clear vision. I cannot believe that anyone with pretensions to an understanding of our time and its problems will fail to read this book--and reading, will fail to be impressed and moved by the Vice-President's message.

Mr. Willkie reaches the same point in an entirely different manner. Instead of pleading with Americans to leave their backyard, he takes them to view the world outside its crumbling walls. Implicit in the temper of his book is the assumption that the facts he presents will help us out of our period of adolescence. Outwardly, it is the story of a fascinating journey, and it is being read as such by millions of people, but he neither disguises nor qualifies the preachment for an enlightened internationalism.

In the informal, candid, and genial style of a born raconteur, telling his neighbors about his trip abroad, Mr. Willkie offers the vista and the vision of one united world. "In fact, moving about the world came to seem so easy that I promised the president of a great central Si-

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berian republic to fly back some week end in 1945 for a day's hunting. And I expect to keep the engagement." He is on equally amiable terms with more important and more significant men than this president. He takes them in his stride, learns quickly what they have to say, comments cynically—often brutally—about their motives and reasons. He makes us partake of his discoveries, enthusiasm, and disappointments.

But in this work, too, there is a feature that transcends the graphic revelations of men and events. It is the conversion of Wendell Willkie—the transformation of a Republican Presidential candidate from Indiana into a world citizen. I believe this conversion to be sincere, profound, and permanent; I am aware that it has already had a tremendous influence on the attitude and outlook of masses of Americans; I have no doubt that it will play a part in determining the shape of things to come. This is due to the fact that whereas Mr. Wallace speaks for the common man, Mr. Willkie speaks *to* him. "Self-sufficiency," he explains in terms that even a tabloid reader can comprehend, "is a delusion of the totalitarians. In a truly democratic world, a nation would have no more need of self-sufficiency than the state of New York has of making itself independent of the state of Pennsylvania."

If the common man of America grows mature enough to understand and follow the leadership of Wallace and Willkie, there is hope for the future of this one world.

JOHAN J. SMERTENKO

Recommended for Study

ECONOMIC UNION AND DURABLE PEACE, by Otto Tod Mallery. xvi + 183 pages. Harper; $2.00

ECONOMIC FREEDOM, A DEMOCRATIC PROGRAM, by Charles E. Noyes. xv + 234 pages. Harper; $2.50

TWO programs for post-war reconstruction are presented in these books. Mr. Mallery's is world-wide in scope; Mr. Noyes's is limited to the United States. The first is made up of features which have been tested in practice—the American reciprocal trade agreements and lend-lease programs, a board of managers modeled on that of the International Labor Organization, a fact-finding secretariat and technical staff similar to those of the League of Nations, and an international bank.

Mr. Noyes's suggestions are based on an economic analysis of recent trends, and, in general, agree with the "middle-of-the-road" school. He does not accept the ideas of those who would get all government out of business. Neither does he join those who would, in the coming post-war period, keep government in business to the same extent as during the war. He believes a high national income is both possible and necessary, and builds his program on that premise.

Both books contain proposals which will repay study by those who are more than casually concerned with the economic shape of things to come. Those whose predilections run to international measures will find Mr. Mallery's volume of more interest. While Mr. Noyes is no adherent of the "save America first" school, his democratic program will attract the attention of those who think first in terms of domestic steps. Neither group, however, will find that sufficient weight has been given to the political intangibles, which, in the last analysis, will determine the acceptance or rejection of reconstruction proposals. If this weakness of the two books is recognized and kept in mind, they can be read profitably, yet they will not build up false hopes.

D. C. B.

Chinese Philosophy

THE GREAT LEARNING AND THE MEAN-IN-ACTION, translated by E. R. Hughes. 176 pages. Dutton; $2.00

BEFORE the Sino-Japanese war, China as a nation meant nothing to the average Westerner. She was a matter of indifference even to most intellectuals. Some believed that "East is East and West is West." Some thought of China as a mysterious country of peculiar people. Some, influenced by fiction and misrepresentations, came to the conclusion that she was uncivilized. But since 1937, more and more books have been written telling the truth about China; also, a number of Chinese books have been accurately translated into English. These have changed the average Westerner's conception of Chinese culture. "The Great Learning and the Mean-in-Action," translated by E. R. Hughes, a Reader at Oxford, is one of these books, and it is recommended to anyone interested in the study of Chinese philosophy.

In a long introductory essay on the history of Chinese philosophy, the author points to evidence showing that "in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Confucianist thought entered into the main stream of Western European thought, influencing some of the most forward-looking minds." Thus the "Sinarum Philosophus, Sive Sinensis," published in Paris in 1687,

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was the work of four Jesuit missionaries to China. This volume, which was very popular among the learned in Western Europe, brought the thinking of Confucius to Italy, Spain, Belgium, Holland, and England. Then, in 1711, Mencius was translated and introduced in the West. There is a very interesting discussion as to the nature and extent of Confucianist influence on Western philosophy in the seventeenth century, and Mr. Hughes gives definite proof that such great thinkers as Leibnitz, Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau were influenced by the ideas of Confucius.

This book, which makes a comparative study of the philosophies of Taoism, Mo Ti, Chaung Chou, Shang Yang, and Confucianism, will be interesting to the advanced student of Chinese philosophy, but it may create confusion in the mind of the general reader, for whom, as the author mentions in the preface, the book was written. It seems unnecessary to devote nine pages to the question of who wrote "The Great Learning and the Mean-In-Action," and to debate at great length the interpretations of Confucianism made by scholars of the Han and Soong dynasties. It is regrettable that "Chou Dynasty" was given as "Chou Society," and that *"Tien Hsia"* was translated as "Great Society" instead of "world" or "nation," but on the whole, the author has translated the text carefully and accurately.

C. F. CHOW

NO DAY OF TRIUMPH, by J. Saunders Redding. 342 pages. Harper; $3.00

In this book a Negro discovers America. In it, also, the average American will discover the Negro race of the United States. In 1940, J. Saunders Redding was invited by the University of North Carolina to go out on funds provided by the Rockefeller Foundation and find out about Negro life in the South. This book is the result. The author records conversations he had with Negroes in all classes of society. There is no special pleading, no effort to expound a thesis.

One startling thing emerges: the tremendous class cleavages within the Negro community, the mutual hostilities and suspicions, and the intense bitterness many of them feel toward other Negroes, the constant readiness of some to take sides with the whites against their own race. Just as we shall not achieve democracy in this nation until the whites realize they cannot truly progress while holding the Negroes back, so the Negroes cannot properly progress until they learn that their own injustice to the least of their own kind effectually impedes that progress.

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

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A Check List of Forthcoming Books on International Affairs

AMERICAN EMPIRE IN ASIA, by Albert Viton. John Day. Must America turn its back on Asia or step into England's shoes? Must we abandon "the century of the common man" for fear of an "American Century" of imperialistic adventure? What are we going to do about Japan after we beat her? How close will we stay to Australia, to Russia, to China? What of India and the Near East, and of all colonies in the new order? These are some of the questions given answers by a leading expert on world affairs.

NEW ZEALAND, by Walter Nash. Duell. An informative guide to New Zealand's role in the post-war world. A discussion of New Zealand as a country and its people and politics; its status as a member of the United Nations at war, and its probable role after the war.

RIO GRANDE TO CAPE HORN, by Carleton Beals. Houghton Mifflin. Concerned with those aspects of Latin American life that have most interested Mr. Beals for the past twenty-five years—the author raises such questions as: What is the mainspring of the great popular movement in Mexico? Why did Bolivia fight a war? What may we expect in Chile? Why has our good neighbor policy failed in Argentina? What does Latin America expect from the war and the peace?

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THREE WARS WITH GERMANY: The Inside Story of the Black Tom Sabotage Case; Letters and Papers of Amos J. Peaslee and Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, edited by Joseph P. Sims. An analysis of what is happening now by super-secret service experts of World War I.

BATTLE HYMN OF CHINA, by Agnes Smedley. Knopf. A picture of the real Chinese nation, its millions of soldiers, guerillas, coolies, peasants, workers, children, its inland provinces—the people and places that have kept alive the struggle against the invader.

INDIA AGAINST THE STORM, by Post Wheeler, Dutton. A study of Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, and other Indian leaders by a distinguished American long in the Diplomatic Service. Reliable information about that disturbed land.

PETAIN: From Verdun to Vichy, by Francis Ardant. Dutton. What happened to France's honored general to make him accept the idea of compromise with the Nazi? A portrait of a man who was willing to accept defeat for his country to gain a point.

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WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

JAMES LUTHER ADAMS'S criticism of the ambiguous attitude of the church is of special interest in view of his position as Professor of the Psychology and Philosophy of Religion at Meadville Theological School, which recently merged with other divinity schools to form the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago. A brilliant member of the younger generation of theologians, *PROFESSOR ADAMS* is something of a *rara avis* in religious circles, in that, though an influential Unitarian, he is an out-and-out conservative and is deeply concerned with the historic role of creeds and liturgies.

C. F. CHOW is the business manager of *Tzu Yu Shih Chieh,* the Chinese edition of FREE WORLD. He has studied in both Chinese and American universities, specializing in the field of economic science, and was formerly director of a Chinese business firm in Hong Kong.

JOHN CLYDE, the pen name of one of the most astute and respected English journalists and political analysts, is our London correspondent. His letter is a sequel to the article he wrote last month describing the developments within the British Labor party and their repercussions on the general political situation in Great Britain.

AFRANIO COUTINHO is editor of *Seleçoes do,* the Brazilian edition of the *Reader's Digest.* He is the author of "A Silososia de Machado de Assiz," published in Brazil.

When *FRANCIS VIVIAN DRAKE* talks about air warfare, he knows whereof he speaks. An Englishman by birth, he served in World War I as a pursuit and bomber pilot in the Royal Flying Corps, after studying aerodynamics under Handley Page. Wounded, he came to this country to teach American and Canadian pilots, and remained to become a businessman and an American citizen. Consistent advocate of a large air force, *MR. DRAKE* has had many articles on the subject published in leading magazines, and his third book, "Vertical Warfare," has just appeared.

PIERRE DUPONT is a noted French journalist, obliged to use this pen name in America because his association with FREE WORLD and our French edition, *Le Monde Libre,* may endanger his family in Paris. A graduate of the Ecole des Langues Orientales and the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, he knows all the Slavic languages and is an authority on the Balkan political situation. He was formerly on the staff of *Europe Nouvelle, Paris-Midi,* and other periodicals.

JANET FLANNER, author of "An American in Paris," was foreign correspondent for the *New Yorker* from 1925 to 1939. During this time her Paris Letter appeared under the pen name of "Genêt." From 1933 to 1939, she served as London and general European correspondent for the same magazine, to which she still contributes regularly.

HANS ERNEST FRIED has accomplished many things since his arrival in this country in 1938. After getting a Ph.D. from Columbia (he had received an LL.D. previously in Vienna), he served as a research associate on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research and lectured at Columbia, finding time from his scholastic duties to write "The Guilt of the German Army," which was published in 1942. He is at present on the faculty of the Department of Government at the College of the City of New York.

DON GORDON has contributed poetry to a number of national magazines and anthologies, both here and abroad. A collection of his poems entitled "Statement" is scheduled for early publication.

ROBERT B. HALE, who is responsible for our Frontispiece, contributes art work to various well-known periodicals. A graduate of Columbia University, *MR. HALE* has studied under Despujol, Radenkovitch, George Bridgman, and William McNulty. He teaches anatomy and life drawing at the Art Students League, of which he is vice president. He is also a trustee and vice president of the American Fine Arts Society, and editorial associate of *Art News. MR. HALE* is a grandson of Edward Everett Hale.

HENRI LAUGIER, who has just been appointed Rector of the University of Algiers, was formerly prominent in French political and scientific circles. Under several governments of the French Republic he was *Chef de Cabinet* of the Foreign Ministry and of the Ministry of National Education. Like Sir Norman Angell, he has been a recipient of the Nobel Prize. A contributor to FREE WORLD since its inception, articles of his have appeared in the issues of October, 1941, and January and July, 1942.

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NIKOLAI LAZAREV is a Russian military commentator and aviation expert. He contributes to the leading Soviet newspapers and reviews, including *World Economics and World Politics* and *Znonya* (Flag), a monthly literary and political magazine.

ERNEST K. LINDLEY continues to give us the benefit of his inside knowledge and political acumen in the monthly commentary, World Scene in Washington. As chief of the Washington Bureau of Newsweek, news analyst for the National Broadcasting Company, and American commentator for the British Broadcasting Corporation, he is among those men who are closest to the source of the political events of our time.

The career of *VICTOR ALEXANDER GEORGE ROBERT LYTTON, SECOND EARL OF LYTTON,* has been closely bound up with India, which was the scene of his birth. Under Secretary of State for India, 1920-22, and Governor of Bengal from 1922 to 1927, he was Viceroy and Acting Governor General of India from April to August, 1925, and in 1927-28, led the Indian delegation to the Eighth and Ninth Assemblies of the League of Nations. An active participant in international affairs, he has been the recipient of many honors, and has found time in a busy life to write a number of books, including a biography of his father, Bulwer-Lytton.

Although it was pure coincidence that brought the articles of *LORD LYTTON* and *HENRY STANLEY* to our desk at the same time, we are happy to be able to publish them together. Obviously, *LORD LYTTON'S* proposal suggesting a United States of India is not an official recommendation; nevertheless, we may be sure that it is made with the knowledge and approval of the British Government. It indicates that the British authorities are well aware of the facts analyzed by *MR. STANLEY* and that they are not satisfied with the present situation.

The article of *PROFESSOR JACQUES MARITAIN* published here is based on an address delivered by *DR. MARITAIN* before this year's Bastille Day meeting of France Forever. The complete text of this address is to appear soon in French, in a pamphlet published by the Free French Press and Information Service. A noted French Catholic scholar and philosopher, *JACQUES MARITAIN* is the author of many books on philosophy, religion, esthetics, and politics, among the most recent of which is "Ransoming the Time," which was published in New York in 1942. *PROFESSOR MARITAIN,* who is now president of the Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes in New York, is also professor at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies at Toronto, and a visiting professor at Columbia and Princeton. He was formerly on the faculty of the Catholic Institute of Paris.

SENATOR CLAUDE D. PEPPER, member of the all-important Foreign Relations Committee, is now serving his second term in Congress. A graduate of Harvard Law School, he received an honorary degree in law from the University of Toronto, where he delivered the Marfleet lecture on "The World War Post-War World." In 1938, *SENATOR PEPPER* was a delegate to the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Last year, he presented one of the first resolutions offered in the Senate to indicate the willingness of the United States to participate in an international organization. His proposal would direct the President (1) to inform "the several United Nations that the United States is ready to enter into a solemn pledge that it will, within six months after the conclusion of the war in Europe, become a full participating member of an acceptable form of United Nations in order to implement the Atlantic Charter, safeguard the peace, and promote its welfare by co-operating with other free peoples of the world; (2) to invite the other United Nations immediately to join the United States in executing such a covenant, and (3) to invite the other United Nations to join the United States in initiating immediately a study and exchange of ideas and suggestions as to the specific form and detail of the United Nations organization to be formed.

HENRY STANLEY'S article in this issue is the fourth that he has contributed to FREE WORLD on the subject of India. In April, 1942, we published *How to Make an Ally of India;* just a year ago, *India since Cripps;* and last December, *A Policy for India.*

By the time this issue is published, *VICE-PRESIDENT HENRY A. WALLACE* will have delivered his eloquent and challenging speech at the meeting in Detroit organized by the American Free World Association in collaboration with many other civic and labor organizations. We held up our presses to wait for the advance copy of the address, for we recall how gratified our readers were by the publication of the full text of the *VICE-PRESIDENT'S* first FREE WORLD speech, *The Price of Free World Victory,* now famous in every corner of the earth as "The Century of the Common Man." We predict an equally enthusiastic international reception for this extraordinary testament of a statesman and seer.

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